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Abstract
In this thesis we study how hash chains and other hash structures can be
used in various cryptographic applications. In particular we focus on the
applications of entity authentication, signatures and key establishment.
We study recursive application of hash functions to create hash chains,
hash trees and other hash structures. We collate all these to form a catalogue
of structures that we apply to various cryptographic applications.
We study existing work on authentication and create many entity authen-
tication schemes based on structures from our catalogue.
We present a novel algorithm to find efficient signature schemes from any
given hash structure. We study some suggestions for suitable hash struc-
tures and define a particular scalable hash structure complete with a simple
message to signature map that is the most efficient such scheme of which we
know.
We explore k-time signature schemes and identify two new properties,
which we call perforated and porous.
We look at the application of hash structures to key establishment schemes.
We compare the existing schemes and make improvements on many. We
present a new key establishment scheme, and show a link between certain
k-time signatures and certain key establishment schemes.
We look at the other applications of hash structures, and suggest areas
in which our catalogue could be used for further development.
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Notation
Symbol Meaning
Z The set of integers.
{0, 1}n The set of n-bit strings.
{0, 1}∗ The set of finite bit strings.
{0, 1}∞ The set of infinite bit strings.
|A| The cardinality of set A.
2A The power set of A.
x∗ The set of all items of the form xi.
x >> y The value x is much greater than y.
f(x) := x The function f(x) is defined to be x.
x||y The value x concatenated with the value y.
x⊕ y The bit-wise exclusive-or of x and y.
fn(x) Recursively defined as the function f applied to fn−1(x).
g ◦ f(x) The composition g(f(x)).(
n
r
)
The number of r-element subsets of an n-element set.
P(X) The probability of event X.
A→ B : m A sends the value m to B via an unprotected channel.
A
A−→ B : m A sends the value m to B via an authenticated channel.
A
S−→ B : m A sends the value m to B via a secured channel.
A→ P : m A publishes the value m with no authentication.
A
A−→ P : m A publishes the value m in an authenticated way.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis considers and evaluates the ways in which hash chains and other
hash structures may be applied in many different areas of cryptography.
We begin in Chapter 2 by studying various existing definitions relating to
our topic and subsequently develop three working definitions of hash func-
tions. We go on to explore the relationship between hash functions and
pseudo-random functions, present ideas from the NIST SHA-3 project, and
parameterise hash functions by security and output size, for reference later
in the thesis.
Chapter 3 builds on Chapter 2’s foundations by consolidating and cate-
gorising a large number of structures formed from hash functions. We create
the concept of an almost perfect a-ary tree. We choose definitions of hash
trees and Merkle trees which will be useful in later chapters. After briefly
studying the relationship between the properties of a hash function and the
hash chain it forms, we explore the notion of a generalised hash directed
acyclic graph (mentioned in other literature), and expand it into a formal
definition.
Chapter 4 is concerned with how hash structures from Chapter 3 can be
used in entity authentication. We explore this by comparing various existing
one-time, unlimited-time and n-time entity authentication schemes. We iden-
tify two adversaries that we use in evaluating the security of these schemes. In
the course of this investigation we also identify a new property of some entity
12
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authentication schemes, which we refer to as public verifiability. We develop
several existing entity authentication schemes to provide public verifiabil-
ity. We present an unlimited-time scheme in which the authenticating and
verifying parties have the theoretical minimum storage requirements. Next
we go on to create two entity authentication schemes suitable for use with
many verifying parties, based on hash chains and Merkle trees respectively.
In further consideration of Merkle trees we show a relationship between their
use in an entity authentication scheme and a one-time signature scheme. We
exhibit an entity authentication scheme based on the hierarchical chain con-
struction, and describe its potential use in sensor networks. Furthermore we
suggest similar adaptations of three other hash structures.
In Chapter 5 we look at the topic of signatures, beginning by comparing
one-way trapdoor based signature schemes with hash-based one-time signa-
ture schemes, and evaluating various existing one-time signature schemes.
We prove that any set of Vaudenay’s rake signature patterns with constant
average chain position is a signature scheme and exhibit some properties of
these signature schemes. We also show that the optimal choice of parameters
for a Vaudenay’s rake signature scheme is dependent on more than simply
the size of the signature space required.
We prove that for any signature scheme based on a hash tree there is a
scheme based on a Merkle sub-tree with the same number of signature pat-
terns. We present and evaluate two algorithms — the first of which finds
a large signature scheme based on any given hash structure, and the sec-
ond of which finds the largest such signature scheme. We then use this
second scheme to find graphs admitting particularly efficient one-time signa-
ture schemes. We generalise a signature scheme due to Bleichenbacher and
Maurer and demonstrate that (in the limit) the original scheme is the most
efficient. We then proceed to create two one-time signature schemes, which
are the most efficient for signing blocks of six bits and eight bits respectively.
We identify and define two new properties of k-time signature schemes which
we call porous and perforated, and subsequently suggest a new method for
the construction of porous k-time signature schemes. Finally we explore the
concept of efficiency for k-time signature schemes, and present two distinct
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but useful definitions.
Chapter 6, on key establishment schemes, begins with a discussion com-
paring many key predistribution schemes (KPSs) and key distribution schemes
(KDSs). From this we generalise some existing KPSs to form a new scheme
which we call the inverted hash tree KPS. We then highlight a similarity in
the way that hash chains are used by Leighton and Micali to make a KPS,
and by Reyzin and Reyzin to make a k-time signature scheme. We present
our own KPS for lattice-shaped hierarchies, and then generalise it to many
more hierarchies. In looking at a key escrow scheme by Joye and Yen we
observe that it can be applied to any set of group keys formed by a KPS.
We develop a KDS due to Chang et al. by facilitating the addition of new
users and reducing the TA’s storage requirements. We exhibit a flaw in a
KDS by Kurnio et al. We note the inconsistencies in the literature over the
definitions of forward and backward secrecy, and propose definitions for the
terms strong forward and strong backward secrecy. We compare several hash-
based key refreshment schemes and then go on to propose a key refreshment
scheme based on the chained pseudo-random number generator, and a simple
extension of it.
In Chapter 7 we make some brief comparative observations about various
hash-based schemes in several other areas of cryptography, including micro-
payments, auctions and pseudo-random number generators. We also mention
hash structure based schemes for interval release cryptography and preimage
computation. We generalise an interval release scheme due to Joye and Yen
to many dimensions.
Chapter 2
Hash functions
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will review definitions of hash functions with an ultimate
goal of fixing three definitions of hash functions that we will use in the rest
of this thesis. We discuss the main properties — preimage, second preimage
and collision resistance, as well as the relationship between hash functions
and pseudo-random functions. Finally we comment on the ongoing NIST
project to standardise hash functions for future use.
2.1.1 Differences in definitions
Many definitions of hash functions exist. One aim in this chapter is to explore
current definitions and the reasoning behind them.
Existing definitions differ in three main areas. Firstly definitions differ
over the domain and range of a hash function. Some prefer to err on the side
of theoretical generality by allowing the domain to be any set, and the range
to be any finite set, while others opt for a more practical approach by fixing
the domain and range to be sets of binary strings restricted by their length.
The second variation between definitions is the (often subtle) difference in
concepts of “hard” and “easy”. Original papers on the topic of hash functions
were understandably simplistic in how they defined computational challenges.
As cryptographers have developed notions such as provable security, they
15
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have also improved and expanded precisely what these properties mean. Even
now that rigorous definitions have been published, many informal definitions
are still used because they are easier to understand and express the essence
of what is required.
It is clear that if a problem is “computationally infeasible” then we should
not be able to use a computer to find a solution; however it is difficult to
come up with an absolute number of operations that the computer should
have to do to find a solution. Unless specified otherwise we will use the
following definitions for computationally infeasible and computationally easy
from [88].
Definition 2.1. A problem is computationally infeasible if the best
known algorithm to solve it requires an unreasonable amount of computa-
tional time.
Definition 2.2. A problem is computationally easy if the best known
algorithm solves it in (expected) polynomial time, and only requires available
resources.
Thirdly, definitions differ over the precise properties that a hash function
needs. Some authors have a specific application in mind and so define a
hash function to have application-specific properties, while other authors
propose a more general notion of a hash function and define variants of it
with extra properties. Exploring the differences in terms of properties will
be the primary focus of this chapter.
2.1.2 Initial informal definitions and motivation
The term “hash function” is due to computer science, and refers to a func-
tion which compresses an arbitrary length input bit string to an output bit
string of fixed finite length [111, 141]. These functions are primarily used to
speed up the process of finding stored data [151]. However the term “hash
function” has since been adopted by cryptographers, and desirable proper-
ties of cryptographic hash functions, such as “one-wayness” and “collision
resistance”, have been identified.
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When discussing the various definitions used for hash functions in cryp-
tography it will be useful to have fixed informal definitions of several proper-
ties that a general function might have. We emphasise that these properties
could apply to a general function because we have not yet defined what we
mean by a “hash function”.
Definition 2.3. A function f : D → R is preimage resistant if for a given
y ∈ R it is computationally infeasible to find an x ∈ D such that f(x) = y.
Definition 2.4. A function f : D → R is second preimage resistant if
for a given x ∈ D it is computationally infeasible to find x′ ∈ D with x′ 6= x
such that f(x′) = f(x).
Definition 2.5. A function f : D → R is collision resistant if it is com-
putationally infeasible to find x, x′ ∈ D with x′ 6= x such that f(x) = f(x′).
There are some well known upper bounds on the computation required
to exhibit a preimage, second preimage or collision [83]. For a function with
an n-bit range a preimage can be found for a given value by simply guessing
at input values. On average a preimage will be found after trying no more
than half of the input values, which equates to 2n−1 function evaluations.
Finding a second preimage requires approximately the same computation
as finding a preimage, however a finding a collision is typically much easier.
Using the birthday paradox we can see that for a function with an n-bit range
a search of input values will provide a collision in an average of 2n/2 function
evaluations.
The reason for choosing to define these three properties can be justified
by three potential applications of such functions.
• Preimage resistance
If a computer system stores a user’s password, then there is a chance
that a hacker will be able to recover that password. However if the
computer applies a preimage-resistant function f to the password p
before storing it, then a hacker can only recover f(p). The preimage
resistance of f means that from this value the hacker cannot deduce a
valid password.
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• Second preimage resistance
To justify second preimage resistance, consider a respected software
writer who wants clients to be confident that they have received the
correct program before they run it. The software creator could apply a
second preimage resistant function f to their program file p and publish
the result on their official website. A user can apply f to the program
file p′ that they have obtained, and check that f(p′) = f(p). If the
two values match, they can be confident that they have the original
program because it is computationally infeasible for anyone to make
another program file with the same output under f .
• Collision resistance
Collision resistance is essential for a function f to be used as the com-
pression function in the process of making a digital signature for a mes-
sage m. The process has two steps; compressing the message to f(m),
and then processing f(m) with a signature key to get the signature s.
Typically another person can verify the signature by processing s using
the corresponding verification key, and checking that the result is f(m)
(which they can compute from m). If the hash function f is not colli-
sion resistant, then it may be possible to find two messages which have
the same signature regardless of the private signature key used.
2.1.3 Confusion in the literature
One of the first authors to define a hash function was Merkle [84], who defined
a hash function f to be any function with the following properties:
1. The function f can be applied to an input of any size.
2. The output of f is a bit string of fixed length.
3. The output f(x) is computationally easy to calculate for any x.
4. The function f is preimage resistant (see Definition 2.3).
5. The function f is second preimage resistant (see Definition 2.4).
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Rabin used the same definition in [114]. This definition is also sometimes
known as a weak hash function [83]. Other authors define hash functions
without preimage resistance or second preimage resistance [127, 131], or with
additional properties such as collision resistance [78], or such that the input
should include a key [134]. Many more authors use the term hash function
without specifying the precise properties they require.
Preneel highlights in his thesis [111] the different terms used for output
of a hash function.
“... the result of a hash function has been given a wide vari-
ety of names in the cryptographic literature: hashcode, hash to-
tal, hash result, imprint, (cryptographic) checksum, compression,
compressed encoding, seal, authenticate, authenticator, authenti-
cation tag, fingerprint, test key, condensation, Message Integrity
Code (MIC), message digest, etc.”
We will refer to the output of a hash function as the “output”, the “hash
value”, or simply the “hash”.
2.1.4 Baseline definition of a hash function
We now propose a baseline definition for a hash function. This definition is
too weak for most cryptographic uses, but is inclusive of any other definition
of a hash function. It is also consistent with many other sources [27, 83, 88,
111].
Definition 2.6. A hash function is a function f : D → R such that:
1. The domain D is a set that may be infinite or finite.
2. The range R is a finite set.
3. The function is computationally easy to evaluate for any given input
x ∈ D.
We leave open the possibility that D is finite, since for many practical
situations it will be possible to put a limit on the size of the input. Note
CHAPTER 2. HASH FUNCTIONS 20
that we do not require that a hash function compresses (therefore we allow
R = D) and therefore our definition includes one-way permutations, which
are particularly useful for hash chaining (see Chapter 3).
Even amongst the sources we have cited there is discrepancy over whether
D and R must conform to stricter constraints such as being sets of binary
strings, or sets of fixed length binary strings. In [64], condition 1 is that
D is “the set of all binary sequences of some specified minimum length or
greater”. Due to the nature of information, we are tempted to write that D
and R must be finite length bit strings. In fact for most software-based ap-
plications, efficient hash functions should operate on 64-bit blocks (assuming
the processor has a 64-bit architecture), and so D and R should both be of
the form {0, 1, 2, . . . , 264 − 1}∗.
A common practice when using hash functions to validate files is to use
a binary file (i.e. a member of {0, 1}∗ or {0, 1, 2, . . . , 264 − 1}∗ (see above))
as the input, and to output text representing a hexadecimal string of the
form {0, 1, . . . , 9, a, . . . , f}n. Although it is clear that the hexadecimal string
could equally be represented as a member of {0, 1}4n, and indeed the hash
function was probably designed with that in mind, it is not strictly true that
{0, 1, . . . , 9, a, . . . , f}n ⊂ {0, 1}∗, and so we leave R ⊆ D as a suggestion
rather than a strict rule.
2.2 Preimage-resistant and second preimage
resistant functions
2.2.1 Motivation and Definitions
The idea of “one-way functions” originates fromWilkes [153] (page 91), where
it was used in connection with login procedures. The definition of a one-way
function seems to be agreed by the majority of authors (for example [83, 134])
to be the same as a preimage-resistant function (see Definition 2.3).
However it is also widely agreed that a “one-way hash function” is a
hash function (as in Definition 2.6) which is preimage resistant and second
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preimage resistant [111, 83, 141].
Menezes et al. in [83] (Remark 9.19) acknowledge that this discrepancy
between the definition of one-way in the context of hash functions and one-
way in the context of general functions causes ambiguity.
It should be noted that in [111], Preneel designs his definition of a “one-
way function” to match up with the standard definition of a “one-way hash
function” (i.e. both of them are preimage resistant and second preimage
resistant).
Occasionally a less restrictive and more logical definition of “one-way
hash function” appears, omitting second preimage resistance [88], but this
non-standard use just adds further ambiguity to the term “one-way”, and
so we will try to avoid using the term “one-way” whenever possible. It is
quite conceivable to think of a situation when we require preimage resistance
but not second preimage resistance (for an example see Section 2.1.2), so we
propose to use the term “preimage-resistant hash function” for this.
Definition 2.7. A preimage-resistant hash function f : D → R is a
function with the following properties:
1. The domain D is a set that may be infinite or finite.
2. The range R is a finite set.
3. The function is computationally easy to evaluate for any given input
x ∈ D.
4. The function f is preimage resistant (see Definition 2.3).
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, a hash function which is both preimage
resistant and second preimage resistant is also known as a “weak hash func-
tion” [83, 127].
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Definition 2.8. A weak hash function f : D → R is a function with the
following properties:
1. The domain D is a set that may be infinite or finite.
2. The range R is a finite set.
3. The function is computationally easy to evaluate for any given input
x ∈ D.
4. The function f is preimage resistant (see Definition 2.3).
5. f is second preimage resistant (see Definition 2.4).
In other words a weak hash function is a preimage-resistant hash function
that is also second preimage resistant.
2.2.2 Adversarial models
If we want to know whether a cryptographic scheme is secure, we are really
asking whether someone might be able to break it somehow. A traditional
approach to this is to model the scheme as a game which is set for some
adversary. To win the game the adversary must break the scheme with some
non-negligible probability, and we hope that there is no such way to do so.
In some cryptographic schemes there are parameters which the adversary
may or may not know (for example the plaintext in an encryption scheme). In
some security models an adversary may have access to previous data (such
as plaintext/ciphertext pairs), or may be able to create data of their own
before the game begins (for example by persuading the challenger to encrypt
some messages for him). It is important to define exactly what an adversary
must do in order to win the game/break the scheme.
It is sometimes possible to prove the equivalence of the security of a cryp-
tographic scheme and the difficulty of a well known problem in mathematics
(for example the Rabin public-key encryption scheme reduces to the difficulty
of factoring products of two large primes). In this way we can prove that
either our scheme is secure, or the well known problem can be easily solved
(and we hope the former is true).
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2.2.3 Formalisation
As we just saw, it is important to be precise when stating security properties.
Historically the informal definitions of hash functions have presented prob-
lems for cryptographers trying to prove the security properties of algorithms
that use hash functions.
A property of both preimage-resistant hash functions and weak hash func-
tions is preimage resistance (for a given y ∈ R it is computationally infeasible
to find an x ∈ D such that f(x) = y).
The way that y is chosen from R is very important since, if defined
wrongly, preimage-resistant hash functions would not even exist. As an ex-
ample, if the adversary is allowed to choose their own y then they could first
pick x ∈ D and then chose y = f(x), allowing trivial inversion. In [122] the
authors examine as an example the following definition of preimage resistant
quoted from [83]:
preimage resistance — for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it
is computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to
that output, i.e., to find any preimage x′ such that h(x′) = y
when given any y for which a corresponding input is not known.
Although one immediately understands the sense of what is meant by this
definition of preimage resistance, it is not clear, even in theory, how to check
if a function exhibits this property. How would one pre-specify the outputs?
Should they be chosen uniformly at random from R, or uniformly at random
from D and then hashed, or is the challenger allowed to pick a particularly
difficult set of outputs?
For the purposes of this thesis we will consider challenge values y to be
chosen uniformly at random in R, but there are other reasonable ways of
chosing y.
Rogaway and Shrimpton [122] considers three challenges which could all
be considered tests of preimage resistance. These challenges are expressed
with keyed hash functions in mind, but for an unkeyed hash function a key
could be introduced as a value appended to the front of the message before
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hashing. The three challenge settings are with a random key and a random
y, a fixed key and a random y, and with a random key and a fixed y. It
is possible to consider a choice of key as the same as a choice of hash func-
tion from a family of hash functions. Rogaway and Shrimpton applied each
of these settings to the problem of finding a preimage for a hash function
(i.e. preimage resistance as in Definition 2.3) and studied the relationships
between them.
We are interested in the case of a fixed key and random y, since this best
corresponds to most uses of hash functions in practice.
As well as preimage resistance, weak hash functions also raise the problem
of formally defining second preimage resistance. One well-known attempt to
formally define second preimage resistant functions is the universal one-way
hash function (UOWHF) [91].
Essentially, a UOWHF family is such that no adversary is “good” at
finding a second preimage for some challenge value x (which it can choose),
when the hash function is selected uniformly at random from the family.
For the adversary to be “good”, they have to do better on average than an
exhaustive search would manage.
Much more recently Rogaway and Shrimpton gave a rigorous study of
preimage-resistant and second preimage resistant functions (as well as collision-
resistant functions, which we will look at in the next section) [122]. As pre-
viously mentioned, the basic considerations are whether the challenge value
is randomised, and whether the choice of hash function is randomised. For
preimage resistance the challenge is f(x), whereas for second preimage resis-
tance the challenge is x. If both the challenge and the key are fixed then there
exists a trivial algorithm which breaks either property (assuming a solution
exists) — the algorithm that tries the correct value first. This amounts to
six properties for hash functions, which are the first six properties given in
Table 2.1.
The relationship between these properties is discussed in Section 2.5.
CHAPTER 2. HASH FUNCTIONS 25
Name Property Where found
Pre Preimage resistant with random
challenge and random key
ePre Preimage resistant with fixed
challenge and random key
aPre Preimage resistant with random Property 4 in
challenge and fixed key Definition 2.7
Sec Second preimage resistant with random
challenge and random key
eSec Second preimage resistant with fixed UOWHF [91]
challenge and random key
aSec Second preimage resistant with random Property 5 in
challenge and fixed key Definition 2.8
Coll Collision resistant with random key Definition 2.9
(no challenge) in Section 2.3.1
Table 2.1: The seven properties discussed in [122]
2.3 Collision-resistant hash functions
The idea of a “collision-resistant hash function” (CRHF), or “strong hash
function”, has existed for a long time, although precise definitions differ.
Other commonly used names for this type of function include “cryptographic
hash function” [138, 148], and “secure hash function” [134].
2.3.1 A traditional formal definition
One of the definitions was due to Merkle [86], who defined a “strong hash
function” to be any function f with the following properties:
1. The function f can be applied to an argument of any size.
2. The output of f is a bit string of fixed length.
3. The output f(x) is relatively easy to compute for any x.
4. The function f is collision resistant (see Definition 2.5).
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This definition is also used by Menezes et al. in [83].
However, there are many slightly different definitions. In [26], [127] and
[141], a “collision-resistant” or “strong” hash function f is any function with
the following properties:
1. The function f can be applied to an argument of any size.
2. The output of f is a bit string of fixed length.
3. The output f(x) is relatively easy to compute for any x.
4. The function f is preimage resistant (see Definition 2.3).
5. The function f is collision resistant (see Definition 2.5).
One potential definition of collision resistance is that a function is collision
resistant if there does not exist an adversary which can exhibit a collision
in (on average) less than the time it would take to do an exhaustive search
for one. However if collisions do exist (and they usually will, since typically
|D| > |R|), then under this model no collision-resistant functions exist. This
is because there exist adversary algorithms which try any pair of values as
their first guess, so if the distinct values x and x′ happen to collide then
there exists an adversary algorithm which tries those two values first. This
adversary will succeed in a very short time every time it is run, and so the
function is not collision resistant in the traditional sense.
However, the traditional interpretation of preimage resistance and second
preimage resistance are both fine. In both of these the adversary is supplied
with a randomly chosen challenge value, meaning that any adversary which
simply guesses at values of D in a set order will (on average) do no better
than an exhaustive search for a solution.
This leads us to the idea that we would like to randomise the challenge for
collision resistance in the same way that it is randomised for preimage and
second preimage resistance. Since we have no challenge value (the adversary
can unrestrictedly pick values as potential collisions) the only thing left to
randomise is the choice of hash function.
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Consequently there seems to be a need to define collision resistance in
terms of collision-resistant hash function families and then, when needed,
a hash function can be chosen from the family. Damg˚ard [25] defined a
“collision-free hash function family”, which is a bit misleading as it does
actually contain collisions; they are just hard to find. We will refer to the
family as a fixed-size collision-resistant hash function family and define it as
follows:
Definition 2.9. A fixed-size collision-resistant hash function family
is a set of hash functions with the following properties:
• There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which, given a secu-
rity parameter, selects a member of the family uniformly at random.1
• All functions in the family are computationally easy to evaluate.
• The problem of finding x 6= x′ such that f(x) = f(x′) for a given f in
the family is computationally infeasible to solve.
It is important to note that we have a family of hash functions, which
is such that no adversary algorithm can easily find a collision for a hash
function chosen at random from the family.
In Table 2.1 this type of collision resistance is our final property, and
the relationships between fixed-size collision-resistant hash functions and the
other types of hash functions in the table are explored in Section 2.5.
2.3.2 A working definition
In practice a particular hash function (for example SHA-1) is chosen for a
particular application. This is obviously different from the formal definition
above, as there is no family from which SHA-1 is chosen. This discrepancy
between (historical) theory and practice is picked up by Rogaway, and we
will now discuss his simple solution that appears in [121].
1The security parameter is used in [25] to help define what they mean by “computa-
tionally infeasible”.
CHAPTER 2. HASH FUNCTIONS 28
In most traditional security proofs there is a protocol and a cryptographic
primitive which we make some assumption about (for example a hash func-
tion which we assume is collision resistant). The proof typically shows that
if there is an algorithm which breaks the protocol then there also exists an
algorithm that violates the assumption (this would show either the protocol
is secure, or that collision-resistant hash functions do not exist).
As we have already discussed above (in Section 2.3.1) for any given hash
function there does exist an algorithm that finds a collision for it, so it is
not sensible to use this as the assumption. The idea which Rogaway [121]
uses is to restructure the proof of security, and thereby base the security on
a different assumption. Rogaway defines three forms of proof as follows:
1. existential form (C0): If there is an effective algorithm A for attacking
protocol Π then there is an effective algorithm C for finding collisions
in H.
2. code-constructive form (C1): If you know an effective algorithm A for
attacking protocol Π then you know an effective algorithm C for finding
collisions in H.
3. blackbox-constructive form (C2): If you possess effective means A for
attacking protocol Π then you possess effective means C for finding
collisions in H.
These second two forms are much better for collision resistance because
it is generally true (for “good” hash functions) that no one can find an
effective algorithm for producing collisions, and also that no one has the
computational power to find collisions.
We will use Rogaway’s “code-constructive form” for our definition of a
strong hash function.
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Definition 2.10. A strong hash function f : D → R is a function with
the following properties:
1. The domain D is a set that may be infinite or finite.
2. The range R is a finite set.
3. The function is computationally easy to evaluate for any given input
x ∈ D.
4. The function f is preimage resistant (see Definition 2.3).
5. The function f is second preimage resistant (see Definition 2.4).
6. No one can find an efficient algorithm to find a collision for f .
In other words a strong hash function is a weak hash function with the
addition of Property 6.
Clearly we cannot hope to prove that a function is collision resistant in
this sense without proving that no efficient algorithm exists to find collisions,
but in practice it is a realistic definition.
2.4 Pseudo-randomness
Although many authors do not mention pseudo-randomness in their discus-
sion of hash functions, for some applications it is a required property. Real
life applications of hash functions include pseudo-random number generators
[46], stream cipher keystream generators [8] and encryption key generators
(see Section 6.5). Proofs of security often formally model hash functions as
“random oracles”, which are effectively functions producing random output
[5, 147]. A few authors require pseudo-randomness of output as a property
in their definition of a hash function; for example [78] gives the following
properties that their definition of a hash function f must have:
1. The function f can be applied to an argument of any size.
2. The output of f is a bit string of fixed length.
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3. The output f(x) is relatively easy to compute for any x.
4. The function f is preimage resistant (see Definition 2.3).
5. The function f is collision resistant (see Definition 2.5).
6. On any input x, the output hashed value f(x) should be computationally
indistinguishable from a uniformly random binary string of the same
length.
It is not clear how the x in Property 6 should be chosen so as to compare
the output to a random string. It is also not clear how to define computation-
ally indistinguishable for a fixed (unkeyed) hash function. This definition is
informal and aims to aid understanding of hash functions, not to be rigorous.
Putting aside rigour for the moment, it seems intuitive that if the out-
put is random then no amount of information about the output gives any
information about the input, and so it would immediately satisfy preimage
resistance. However since we want the hashing process to be deterministic
(f(x) is a fixed value) the idea of pseudo-randomness is appealing.
It is not easy to define what is meant by the output of a hash function
being pseudo-random. With applications such as pseudo-random number
generators it is clear that the aim should be that output values should bear
no correlation to previous output values, but with hash functions there is no
obvious ordering of the output words.
In [98] Okamoto uses the term “correlation-free one-way hash functions”.
In [2] Anderson gives a simplified definition, defining a hash function f as
“correlation free” if the best way to find two distinct values x and x′ such
that f(x) has most of its bits in common with f(x′) is just to guess. He goes
on to give a proof that it is a strictly stronger notion than collision resistance.
The proof has two parts. Clearly if you can easily find collisions then you
can also easily find output values with many bits in common. Secondly, if
you have a hash function f for which it is hard to find collisions, then you
can define a new hash function which is not “correlation free”, but which is
still collision resistant, namely g(x) := x1||f(x2), where x1 is the first k bits
of x and x2 is the rest.
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Anderson continues in [2] by giving several other potentially desirable
properties which are not implied by this definition of “correlation free”.
These include “complementation freedom” (it is infeasible to find x and x′
such that f(x) is the complement of f(x′)), “addition freedom” (it is infeasi-
ble to find x, x′ and x′′ such that f(x) = f(x′) + f(x′′)) and “multiplication
freedom” (it is infeasible to find x, x′ and x′′ for some set of N such that
f(x) = f(x′)f(x′′) mod N).
However, intuitively pseudo-randomness should include all of these defin-
itions since if the output of a function is pseudo-random then it should not be
feasible to distinguish the output from a uniform random variable (assuming
the input is not repeated). This much stronger notion of pseudo-randomness
is the definition of a “random oracle”.
In [5] a random oracle R is defined as a map from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}∞
chosen by selecting each bit of R(x) uniformly and independently, for every x.
Although no protocol actually uses an infinitely long output, this removes
the need to specify how long “sufficiently long” is.
Clearly a fixed hash function can never satisfy this definition, but many
cryptographers model hash functions as random oracles in order to aid proofs
of security [5, 72, 56].
As we have seen, there exist some attempts to define the properties re-
quired for a “pseudo-random hash function”, some practical, and some im-
practical, but we will not try to resolve this complex issue here.
2.5 Relationships between the definitions
2.5.1 Introduction
We have now defined several types of hash functions including preimage-
resistant hash functions (Definition 2.7), weak hash functions (Definition
2.8) and strong hash functions (Definition 2.10), which are all hash func-
tions with different additional properties. We would like to know which of
these properties are the strongest, and which properties are independent of
one another. We will also discuss the work in [122], which explores all the
relationships between the types of hash function given in Table 2.1.
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2.5.2 Second preimage resistance and collision resis-
tance
One common statement in introductory texts on hash functions is that col-
lision resistance implies second preimage resistance [83, 111]. To understand
this we need to go back to the informal definition of collision resistance (De-
finition 2.5): f is such that it is computationally hard to find x 6= x′ with
f(x) = f(x′).
If a function is not second preimage resistant (aSec in Table 2.1) then for
any given x it is feasible to find x′ 6= x with f(x) = f(x′). Consequently it
is also easy to find a collision (by picking our own value for x), and so this
definition of collision resistance implies second preimage resistance.
Due to technicalities, neither of the formalisations of collision resistance
that we have looked at preserve this implication.
The family of collision-resistant hash functions in Definition 2.9 are col-
lision resistant as a group, whereas for second preimage resistance we want
a specific function to be second preimage resistant. This type of collision
resistance is referred to as Coll in Table 2.1 and [122].
The second formalisation of collision resistance is the one in our definition
of a strong hash function (Definition 2.10), which technically does not imply
second preimage resistance either. Instead it is implied that no one is able to
find a second preimage, but this does not ensure that there does not exist a
program to find one (which is the standard assumption for second preimage
resistance).
However it seems reasonable to assume that in practice any hash function
thought to be collision resistant will also be second preimage resistant.
2.5.3 Preimage resistance and collision resistance
Another well-studied relation is the link between collision resistance and
preimage resistance. It is agreed that preimage resistance (aPre in Table
2.1) is not a stronger condition than collision resistance.
In [128] it is shown that preimage resistance does not necessarily follow
from collision resistance. Whereas in [134], they use the Pre definition of
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preimage resistance from Table 2.1, and show that Coll implies Pre.
Our statement of collision resistance in the definition of a strong hash
function (Definition 2.10) does not imply preimage resistance for the same
reason that it does not imply second preimage resistance: it is a statement
about the capability of humans and preimage resistance is a statement about
hypothetical algorithms.
In [83] (Note 9.20) it is explained that although there exist pathological
examples of collision-resistant hash functions which are not preimage resis-
tant, for collision-resistant hash functions used in practice it seems reasonable
to assume that they are also preimage resistant.
2.5.4 Preimage resistance and second preimage resis-
tance
The final relationship that we will consider is the one between preimage re-
sistance and second preimage resistance. It is generally agreed that preimage
resistance does not imply second preimage resistance, but we would like to
know if the converse is true.
From [122] we find that under certain conditions second preimage resis-
tance implies preimage resistance. The implication is that if the best adver-
sary (for running time t) has advantage δ when guessing a second preimage
for a randomly chosen challenge x, then the best preimage guessing adversary
(for running time t minus the time to hash c messages) has advantage of at
most cδ + 2m−n, where n is the hash length and m is the maximum input
text length.
For practical hash functions with unlimited input size m this does not
really say anything. However we will often be dealing with applications
where the domain is the same as the range of the hash function, and so this
is a result worth noting.
The relationships between the other properties in Table 2.1 are also ex-
plored in [122], and the full set of cases is given in Table 2.2.
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Property ⇒ Pre ⇒ ePre ⇒ aPre ⇒ Sec ⇒ eSec ⇒ aSec ⇒ Coll
Pre 3 5 5 5 5 5 5
ePre 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
aPre 3 5 3 5 5 5 5
Sec * 5 5 3 5 5 5
eSec * 5 5 3 3 5 5
aSec * 5 * 3 5 3 5
Coll * 5 5 3 3 5 3
Table 2.2: The relationships between the seven properties discussed in [122].
The * symbol indicates that there is an implication under certain conditions.
2.5.5 The relationships between our hash functions
We have defined three types of hash function which we will focus on: preimage-
resistant hash functions (Definition 2.7), weak hash functions (Definition 2.8)
and strong hash functions (Definition 2.10).
Although in the above we have seen that our definitions of preimage resis-
tance, second preimage resistance and collision resistance do not technically
imply each other, it seems that in practice (excluding pathological examples)
collision-resistant functions are also second preimage resistant, and second
preimage resistant functions are also preimage resistant. However even with-
out this unsubstantiated claim, our types of hash function do have an order-
ing. Strong hash functions are a specific type of weak hash function, and
weak hash functions are a specific type of preimage-resistant hash function.
This can be seen by comparing properties of the definitions.
2.6 Parameterising hash functions
Traditionally the security of a hash function is given by the number of bits
that the output has. However for some applications we would like to use a
fast hash function which need not be as secure as the output size suggests.
We therefore suggest two parameters for any hash function: the output
size and the security parameter. The output size is simply the number of
bits that the output of the hash function has.
The security parameter s ∈ [0, 1] relates the output size to the actual
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security. The simplest way to explain this is with an example. If we have a
0.5-secure 256-bit preimage-resistant hash function then the amount of effort
to find a preimage is approximately 2(256×0.5)−1 = 2128−1 (therefore the same
amount of effort that would be required to find a preimage for a 1-secure
128-bit preimage-resistant hash function). We would typically hope that the
function is faster to evaluate than a 1-secure 256-bit preimage-resistant hash
function.
Definition 2.11. An s-secure l-bit strong hash function (s ∈ [0, 1],
l ∈ Z) is a hash function with an l-bit output such that the amount of effort
to find a preimage or second preimage is 2l·s−1 and the amount of effort to
find a collision is 2(l·s/2).
Whenever we do not specify s for a hash function we assume that it is 1,
and whenever we do not specify l we assume it to be any suitably large value
(such as 128 or 256).
2.7 The NIST project to create SHA-3
We have seen that there is a reasonable amount of confusion in the literature
about exactly what properties a hash function should have. On the whole
we have seen that as definitions get more rigorous, the gap between theory
and practice grows.
In recent years, a number of attacks on hash functions have been devised.
In particular there have been attacks on MD5 [146] and SHA-1 [145], hash
functions which have both been in widespread use. Since NIST (the National
Institute of Standards and Technology) was responsible for the standardis-
ation of SHA-1, it took on responsibility for the creation of a replacement
hash function standard.
SHA-2 2 already existed at the time, and consequently NIST suggested
that for certain uses (digital signatures, digital time stamping and other
applications that require collision resistance) SHA-2 should be used as a
2The SHA-2 family of hash functions consists of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512, which were standardised as alternatives to SHA-1 [94].
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replacement for SHA-1 [92]. Many cryptographers have speculated that sim-
ilarities in structure between SHA-1 and SHA-2 may indicate that attacks
on SHA-2 will be found in the next few years [22].
NIST organised two workshops [22, 96] and then used the feedback from
these workshops to create a specification for a new hash function [95]. The
selected hash function family would become known as SHA-3, and is intended
to replace instances of SHA-1 and SHA-2.
2.7.1 The properties required of SHA-3
The NIST call [95] listed the following properties required of any submitted
hash function:
• The hash function should be publicly disclosed and available worldwide
without royalties or intellectual property restrictions.
• The hash function should be suitable for implementation on a wide
range of platforms.
• The hash function must be capable of producing output of length 224,
256, 384 and 512 bits.
NIST also specified that any submitted hash function would be ranked
by the following criteria (listed in order of importance):
1. Security — Any submission must be secure for use in many applica-
tions, including digital signatures, key derivation and pseudo-random
number generation. Additionally the submissions are expected to be
preimage resistant, second preimage resistant and collision resistant.
2. Cost — Submissions should ideally be computationally efficient on a
wide range of platforms. They will also be rated on the amount of
data storage required, and the number of gates required for hardware
implementations.
3. Algorithm and implementation characteristics — Any flexibility al-
lowed by the hash function will be viewed in a positive light. For
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example it would be good to provide an intuitive way to increase secu-
rity at the cost of greater computational complexity (such as allowing
the number of rounds to be increased). Assuming many algorithms are
presented which are similar in terms of all the previously listed criteria,
then they will be ranked by the relative design simplicity.
2.7.2 Relevance to this thesis
Any hash function satisfying the properties in Section 2.7.1 will be suitable for
use as a preimage-resistant, weak or strong hash function by our definitions
(assuming the definitions of preimage resistant, second preimage resistant
and collision resistant match).
Since this thesis is founded on the assumption of the existence of ‘cryp-
tographically secure’ hash functions, the SHA-3 project is of interest to us.
However the remainder of the work presented here is only dependent on the
properties that a hash function has, not on the specific hash function. Con-
sequently we will look no further at the development of the SHA-3 project
in this thesis.
2.8 Conclusion
For the purposes of this thesis we have chosen to define three types of hash
functions: preimage-resistant hash functions, weak hash functions and strong
hash functions. The formal defining of types of hash functions is a very
complex area of ongoing research, however these three definitions will suffice
for our subsequent discussions.
Chapter 3
Hash structures
In this chapter we will discuss many different methods of combining hash
functions, which will be used in later chapters. The major contribution of
this chapter is to consolidate and categorise all structures formed from hash
functions, and this will serve as an essential reference for later chapters.
We will look at hash chains, hash trees and hash directed acyclic graphs (or
DAGs), before moving on to generalised hash DAGs. We will then identify
a number of specific instances of generalised hash DAGs, including inverted
hash trees.
3.1 Hash chains
We begin this section with an example, motivating the further study of hash
chains. We will then look at some basic properties of hash chains and outline
how these properties make hash chains useful for certain applications. We
end the section by mentioning some further properties of hash chains.
3.1.1 Motivation and definition
As we saw in Chapter 2, a hash function’s range is usually a subset of its
domain. This naturally leads to the idea of applying a hash function to its
own output.
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One of the earliest examples of this being used is Lamport’s password
authentication scheme [69], which we discuss in more detail in Chapter 4,
but give a summary now.
We consider the scenario of a user who wants to log on to a computer
remotely, and who has to send the password across an insecure channel. To
prevent an eavesdropper intercepting the password and then using it at a
later time, the user could have a set of passwords {x0, x1, . . . , x1000} stored
on the computer, and once a password is used it becomes invalid.
Alternatively, to minimise the storage requirements for the computer and
the user, the value x0 could be chosen by the user and the other values
are defined as xi = f(xi−1) for some preimage-resistant hash function f .
To initiate the system it is only necessary to store x1000 on the protected
computer. The computer also stores the index of the password that should
be used next (initially 1).
When the user wishes to remotely access the computer for the ith time
they send their username to the computer, which replies with a request for
the ith password. The user enters x0 into the terminal which computes the
value x1000−i by applying the hash function i times to x0. The value x1000−i is
then sent to the computer. The computer checks that applying the function
f to the value received gives the next chained value x1000−i+1 (which the
computer will have stored from the last session). The computer now stores
x1000−i (and i+ 1) and no longer needs to remember x1000−i+1 (or i).
We will refer to this construction of linked hash functions as a hash chain.
Definition 3.1. A hash chain C is a set of values {x0, . . . , xn} for n ∈ Z
such that xi = f(xi−1) for some hash function f , where i ∈ [1, n] and x0 is a
valid input for f .
The length of a hash chain is the number of hash function evaluations
required to create the hash chain. A hash chain with values {x0, . . . , xn} has
length n. Note that this is very similar to the definition of the length of a
path in graph theory.
CHAPTER 3. HASH STRUCTURES 40
3.1.2 Basic properties of a hash chain
It is useful to think of a hash function as a directed link from an input to an
output. A hash chain will look like a line of directed links:
x0 // x1 // x2 // . . . // xn
1. In the definition of a hash function (Definition 2.6) we demand that a
hash function is computationally easy to evaluate for any given input
x ∈ D. This in turn implies that values in a hash chain will be easy to
evaluate for any given input x0 ∈ D.
2. As we noted in the example of Lamport’s password authentication
scheme, a hash chain is very efficient to store; we only require the
input value x0 in order to calculate any other value in the chain.
3. If our hash function’s output is in some sense pseudo-random (see Sec-
tion 2.4) then we can represent a large set of pseudo-random values by
just one value (x0). It should be noted that “pseudo-random” values
generated in this way are not suitable for all situations, as we will see
later in Section 3.4.4.
4. A final trivial property of a hash chain is that any value xi can be
calculated from any value xj if i ≥ j.
3.1.3 Basic applications
The properties from Section 3.1.2 each have an impact on the applications
that may be able to employ hash chains.
The fact that the hash chain is directed makes it suitable for situations
where repeated authentication is required, for example Lamport’s password
authentication scheme [69], which we mentioned in Section 3.1.1. This re-
quires us to use a preimage-resistant hash function, otherwise it becomes
possible to work out future authentication values from previous ones (that is
it becomes possible to work out xi−1 from xi).
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The ease of creation and storage of a hash chain, make it a particularly
suitable tool for platforms with limited memory and processing power.
If the hash function used in our hash chain allows us to generate a large
amount of pseudo-random data then we can conceivably use it for some
cryptographic applications where we might use a shared one-time pad (see for
example [125]). Later, in Section 3.4.4, we will discuss the issues surrounding
this, and a more suitable way of combining hash functions to generate random
numbers.
The property that any xi can be calculated from any xj if i ≥ j makes
some applications more robust. For example, if we have a noisy channel and
are trying to authenticate with Lamport’s password authentication scheme
then the receiver might receive a corrupted password (which it would rightly
disregard). However this value may still have been intercepted (before cor-
ruption) by an eavesdropper, and so the next value from the hash chain
should be sent. The receiver can still authenticate this value by applying the
hash function twice.
3.1.4 Further properties of hash chains
We will now look at preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, collision
resistance and pseudo-randomness in hash chains.
3.1.4.1 Preimage resistance
If there exists an algorithm A which takes as input f(x) (for arbitrary x) and
outputs a preimage x′ in time t then there exists a trivial extension to this
algorithm which finds a preimage for fn in time t · n.
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Algorithm 1:
Description: An algorithm which takes as input fn(x), and
uses a preimage finding algorithm A to find an nth preimage
in time t · n.
Find nth preimage(U)
(1) xn = f
n(x)
(2) for i = n to 1 step −1
(3) xi−1 = A(xi)
(4) return x0
This provides an upper bound, but it may be possible to invert fn more
efficiently than this.
As an extreme example, consider a one-way permutation f . For any
permutation f : S → S there exists a period p such that for all i ≥ 0 and
all x ∈ S, f i+p(x) = f i(x). Suppose the period of our function is n. Now
consider the (very long) hash chain {x, . . . , fn−1(x)}. We can find x from
fn−1(x) by simply applying f to it (fn(x) = x), which is much easier than
inverting n− 1 times.
3.1.4.2 Second preimage resistance
If there exists an algorithm B taking as input x, and producing a second
preimage x′ 6= x for f in time t, then the same algorithm will also find a
second preimage for fn in approximately time t (under the assumption that
evaluation of fn can be done as efficiently as evaluation of f). We now
explain this claim.
To find a second preimage of x under fn we use B to find x′ = B(x), a
second preimage for f . We know that x′ 6= x, but also we have that
fn(x) = fn−1(f(x)) = fn−1(f(x′)) = fn(x′),
and so x′ is a second preimage for x under fn.
The most efficient algorithm for finding a second preimage under f may
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not be the most efficient algorithm for finding a second preimage under fn,
but it provides us with an upper bound on the ‘second preimage resistance’
of fn.
In fact it may be easier to find a second preimage for the hash chain as
we can pick any start value not on the chain and hash it repetitively, hoping
to get any of the values on the chain. If we collide with some point on the
chain then we will stay on the chain, and so one of the values we have already
considered will be a second preimage under fn (under the assumption that
we do not coincide with the original hash chain at a point f i(x) until at least
i hash applications).
3.1.4.3 Collision resistance
Finding a collision under chained hash functions is similar to finding a second
preimage. If we know a collision for f then we also know a collision for fn,
but collisions for fn are not necessarily collisions for f , so intuitively finding
a collision for a hash chain should be easier.
3.1.4.4 Pseudo-randomness
As was discussed in Section 2.4, we have not given a precise definition of
what it means for a hash function to be pseudo-random. It seems intuitive
that if we were not ‘expecting’ f(x) then we also will not be ‘expecting’ f 2(x)
or fn(x) but, by considering a one-way permutation again, we can see that
if we have a very long chain with n equal to the period of our hash function
then we may not be able to guess anything about f(x) from x, but we will
know the value of fn(x) for any value of x.
3.1.4.5 Random mapping properties
In the above discussion we looked at various properties which we may want fn
to have, and whether properties of f provide these properties. One property
that it is possible to overlook is that hash functions are often designed to
map arbitrary length strings to finite strings, and so fail to be bijective by
design. Consequently it is quite possible that the range of f 2 is smaller than
CHAPTER 3. HASH STRUCTURES 44
the range of f . In fact it is possible (if very unlikely) that for some i the
range of f i is only one value. This would obviously make any hash chains
formed from f useless if they needed to be longer than i values long.
It is also certain that cycles (possibly only cycles of length 1) will exist
in the digraph formed by the application of f to the range of f (every vertex
x has a directed edge leading to vertex f(x)). We do not need to worry if
these cycles are very long compared to the length of the hash chain, but if
the cycle is shorter than the length of the chain then we may get repetition
of values in our hash chain, which would be a problem for many applications
(for example Lamport’s password scheme).
There has been much research looking into properties of chained func-
tions [40, 109, 112]. In [40] Flajolet and Odlyzko prove that for a random
mapping f with range 2l, the size of the image after k applications of f
is approximately (1 − τk) × 2l, where τ0 = 0 and τi+1 = eτi−1. They also
prove that the average cycle length will be approximately
√
pi2l/8, with the
expected number of cycles of length r equal to 1/r.
These results show that when working with a hash chain formed from
an l-bit hash function, the resulting security is likely to be less than l bits.
However if 2l is large compared to n then the security will not be drasti-
cally affected. Thus by assuming 2l >> n for the rest of this thesis we can
assume that a hash chain formed with a preimage-resistant hash function f
(respectively second preimage resistant, collision-resistant) will be approxi-
mately preimage resistant (respectively second preimage resistant, collision
resistant) at each step, as well as fn being approximately preimage resistant
(respectively second preimage resistant, collision resistant).
Further study of the properties of random mappings falls outside the
scope of this thesis.
3.1.5 Infinite-length hash chains
While hash chains require very little storage, a disadvantage for many situa-
tions, such as Lamport’s password authentication scheme (see Section 3.1.1),
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is that a hash chain is finite1 and thus any application eventually requires
the hash chain to be replaced by a new chain.
‘Infinite-length hash chains’ [9] (or ‘Chameleon chains’ [32, 33]) use a trap-
door one-way function, such as exponentiation modulo a composite number,
instead of the hash function. This allows traversal in one direction along the
chain by anyone who knows the composite (public key), but only people who
know the factorisation (private key) can easily compute values in the other
direction.
Although this approach may be useful in some applications, we will not
consider it further, as trapdoor one-way functions are significantly slower
than hash functions, and speed is one of the key reasons for using hash
chains.
3.2 Hash trees
We can use the compression property of a hash function to combine two (or
more) input values to produce a single output value. This observation invites
the idea of having values at the nodes of a tree, and hashing along the edges
towards the root. We explain why this might be useful in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Basic graph theory definitions
In this section we define some basic terminology from graph theory.
A graph G is made up of a set of vertices V and edges connecting pairs
of vertices together. The set of edges E is contained in the set of unordered
vertex pairs and an individual edge between vertices v and w is denoted vw
(or equivalently wv).
In our definition we do not allow edges for which both ends are the same
(loops), or two edges which share the same pair of end points. If there is an
edge between two vertices we say the vertices are neighbours. The degree of
a vertex is the number of neighbours it has.
1Hash chains have finite length as the end value must be computed before the rest of
the values can be used.
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A path is a list of vertices P = v0, . . . , vn such that no vertex appears
more than once on the list, and such that any two consecutive vertices on
the list are neighbours. The length of a path containing n + 1 vertices is n
(the number of edges between consecutive vertices on the path). If there is
a path with start vertex v and end vertex w, then we say that v and w are
connected. If there is no path starting at v and ending at w then we say they
are disconnected. A graph is connected if all vertices are pairwise connected.
A cycle is a path (with 3 or more vertices) whose last vertex is a neighbour
of the first. The length of a cycle containing n vertices is n (the number of
edges traversed when following the cycle).
A tree is a connected graph with no cycles. A leaf of the tree is any vertex
with degree one. A rooted tree is a tree with one special vertex labelled as
the root vertex. A leaf of a rooted tree is any vertex with degree one, with
the possible exception of the root, which is never a leaf.
The parent of a vertex v in a rooted tree is the neighbouring vertex on
the unique path from v to the root. The root has no parent. Vertex v is the
child of another vertex w if w is the parent of v. The leaves of a rooted tree
have no children. A vertex in a rooted tree may have several children, but
will have exactly one parent (with the exception of the root).
The siblings of a vertex v in a rooted tree are the other children of the
parent of v. Obviously the root has no siblings. Note that it is not necessary
that the siblings of a leaf are also leaves. We define the sibling set of a path P
to be the set of all vertices that have a sibling in P .
If a path exists from the root to a vertex w through a vertex v then we
say that w is a descendant of v, and that v is an ancestor of w.
In a rooted tree, the height h(v) of a vertex v ∈ V is the length of the
(unique) path connecting it to the root. The height of a rooted tree is the
maximum height of a vertex in it.
A binary tree is a rooted tree such that any vertex has at most two
children. An a-ary tree is a rooted tree such that any vertex has at most
a children.
Note that a 1-ary tree is a path, and a 2-ary tree is a binary tree.
A proper a-ary tree is a tree where all vertices have either 0 or a children.
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A perfect a-ary tree is a proper a-ary tree such that the height of all leaves
is the same.
We will introduce a new definition of our own that will be useful later.
Definition 3.2. An almost perfect a-ary tree is an a-ary tree with the
following two properties.
• Any vertex that is not the root or a leaf has exactly a− 1 siblings.
• The difference in height between any two leaves is at most 1.
Note that any perfect tree is also almost perfect.
3.2.2 Definition of a hash tree
Definition 3.3. A hash tree is a rooted tree on an ordered vertex set V ,
with a value xv associated with each vertex v ∈ V , computed using a hash
function f . The value associated with each vertex depends on its position in
the tree, and is given by:
xv =
{
f(xc0|| . . . ||xcr−1) if v has r > 0 children (c0, . . . , cr−1)
Any valid input if v is a leaf.
In other words, to make a hash tree from a rooted tree we choose values
for each leaf, and for every vertex v with children w0, . . . , wd−1 we set xv =
f(xw0|| . . . ||xwd−1). It is important that the vertices have some fixed ordering,
otherwise changing the order of the children will alter the value xv. An
example of a hash tree is given in Figure 3.1 to help illustrate some of the
terminology.
We name hash trees by the underlying tree type; for example, a binary
hash tree is a hash tree on a binary tree.
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x0 = f(x1||x2)
x1 = f(x3||x4)
44jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
x2 = f(x5||x6)
jjTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
x3
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x4
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x5
88qqqqqqqqqqq
x6
ffNNNNNNNNNNN
Figure 3.1: A perfect binary hash tree with height 2.
3.2.3 Merkle trees
In this section we look at a particular type of hash tree which we will refer
to as a Merkle tree.
Definition 3.4. A Merkle tree is a hash tree where every leaf has no
sibling.
Many authors use the term Merkle tree to refer to any hash tree, but
in this thesis it refers to the class of hash trees in Definition 3.4. We note
that a Merkle tree as we have defined it here corresponds more closely to the
construction given by Merkle in [85], than our definition of a hash tree.
Although Merkle trees are clearly a type of hash tree, it can be useful to
think of a Merkle tree as being formed by taking any hash tree, and hashing
the leaf values before using them in the hash tree.
The reason for the preliminary hashing in a Merkle Tree is usually to
ensure that the data going into the tree is of a sensible size. If each of the
leaves represents a whole file of data, then it makes sense to hash the file
before trying to do anything more complicated with it. As we will see later
(Section 5.2.3.2), it is sometimes also useful to have the leaves of the hash
tree ‘protected’ by an extra hash.
We will name types of Merkle Trees by the underlying hash tree. For
example the Merkle tree in Figure 3.2 is a perfect binary Merkle tree, be-
cause it is the extension of a perfect binary hash tree (see Figure 3.1) to a
Merkle tree. We will refer to the height of a Merkle tree as the height of
the underlying hash tree. Consequently the Merkle tree in Figure 3.2 has
height 2, even though it can also be seen as a hash tree with height 3.
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x0 = f(x1||x2)
x1 = f(x3||x4)
55kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
x2 = f(x5||x6)
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x3 = f(x7)
99ttttttttt
x4 = f(x8)
eeJJJJJJJJJ
x5 = f(x9)
99ttttttttt
x6 = f(x10)
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x7
OO
x8
OO
x9
OO
x10
OO
Figure 3.2: A perfect binary Merkle tree with height 2.
3.2.4 Motivation
To understand our motivation for the use of hash trees, consider how they
can be used to help with version management of computer files. This scheme
is based on Merkle’s original use of a hash tree to verify the public keys of
instances of a one-time signature scheme [85].
A set of files are grouped into folders, and the folders may also be grouped
into other folders, in such a way that everything is ultimately contained in a
top level folder. The folders form a rooted tree structure with the root vertex
represented by the top level folder, and the leaves represented by the files.
A hash tree is then formed from the rooted tree, using the hash of each
file as the value at each leaf, and calculating the values at the other vertices
from the leaves.
The root value is published in some respected location, and then all users
can check that they have the same set of files in folders as they are intended
to have (for example for a program to execute correctly). If a user has a
corrupted file then the value they obtain at the root of their hash tree will be
different from the published value, and they will know they need to replace at
least one file. If some of the other values are published then a user can narrow
down further which file is corrupted, and so will have to obtain replacements
for fewer files.
It is of course possible to publish the hash of each file, but this may not
be appropriate if we want to minimise the amount of published data, or if
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obtaining published data is costly for the user.
We will explore further this scheme in Section 5.1.1, including how this
scheme is particularly useful when we consider version management.
3.3 Generalising hash function structures
3.3.1 Directed acyclic graphs and hash DAGs
Hash chains and hash trees can both be generalised by a structure we will
call a “hash DAG”, based on a directed acyclic graph.
Definition 3.5. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a graph in which
every edge has a direction associated with it, and which contains no cycle
conforming to the directions of the edges.
A source of a DAG is a vertex which no edge leads to.
A sink of a DAG is a vertex from which no edge leaves.
It can easily be proved that every (finite) DAG contains at least one
source and one sink.
To maintain consistency with hash trees, we define a vertex v to be a
child of a vertex w if there is a directed edge from v to w, and w to be a
parent of v if v is a child of w.
Definition 3.6. A hash DAG is a DAG on an ordered vertex set V , with
a value xv associated with each vertex v ∈ V , computed using a hash func-
tion f . The value associated with each vertex depends on its position in the
tree and is given by:
xv =
{
f(xc0|| . . . ||xcr−1) if v has r > 0 children {c0, . . . , cr−1}
Any valid input if v has no children.
3.3.2 Vertices with the same set of children
If two vertices in a hash DAG have the same set of children then they will also
have the same value. In many applications we will wish to ensure that the
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values at all vertices are different (or at least that they are not predictably
the same value).
There are a number of ways to approach this issue, the simplest of which
is to treat all vertices which share the same set of children in an identical
way. If we wish vertices to have different values then we should simply design
the directed acyclic graph so that they do not share all the same children.
An alternative method is to use an input variable yv for each vertex v
(except the leaves). By this we mean hashing the concatenation of the values
at the child vertices with a (parent) vertex dependent input value.
There are different ways to define the input variables, such as generating
them at random.
In the next section we will look at generalised hash DAGs, which is inclu-
sive of input variable schemes. The remainder of the hash structures in this
chapter are types of generalised hash DAG.
3.3.3 A generalised hash DAG
The next structure generalises a hash DAG by allowing a choice of hash
function for each parent vertex. This allows vertices that share the same
set of children to have values that cannot easily be derived from each other.
Although this structure has been used in the literature (for example [10]),
we believe this to be the first formal definition.
Definition 3.7. A generalised hash DAG is a DAG on an ordered vertex
set V , with a value xv associated with each vertex v ∈ V , computed using a
family of hash functions f∗. The value associated with each vertex depends
on its position in the tree and is given by:
xv =
{
fv(xc0|| . . . ||xcr−1) if v has r > 0 children {c0, . . . , cr−1}
Any valid input if v has no children.
An example of a generalised hash DAG is given in Figure 3.3.
It is important also to note that the generalised hash DAG is a very gen-
eral and unwieldy structure. We will prefer to use more restrictive structures
whenever possible.
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x0 = f0(x1||x2||x3)
x1 = f1(x4||x5)
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x2 = f2(x4||x5)
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x3 = f3(x4||x5)
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Figure 3.3: An example of a generalised hash DAG. Note that by suitably
defining the functions f1, f2 and f3, we can ensure x1, x2 and x3 are inde-
pendent random variables.
3.4 Useful examples of generalised hash DAGs
We now examine some useful examples of generalised hash DAGs. In partic-
ular we look at rainbow chains, hierarchical chain constructions, chained
pseudo-random number generators, inverted hash trees, sandwich chains,
general hash chains and comb skipchain constructions.
3.4.1 Rainbow chains
Using a different hash function for each link of a hash chain generates a
rainbow chain.
Definition 3.8. A rainbow chain C is a hash chain which uses a (po-
tentially) different hash function for each link. That is xi = fi−1(xi−1) for
i ∈ [1, n], and x0 is any valid input.
Figure 3.4 provides an example of a rainbow chain. The term ‘rainbow
chain’ is due to Oechslin [97], and comes from the idea of associating each of
the functions with a colour.
x0
f0 // x1
f1 // x2
f2 //___ . . . fn−1 ///o/o/o xn
Figure 3.4: A rainbow chain of length n.
Rainbow chains have the obvious drawback compared to hash chains that
the construction requires knowledge of several hash functions (or a family of
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hash functions). However the major advantage when using rainbow chains is
the prevention of small cycles.
3.4.2 Joining hash chains
Another useful construction is the idea of using the values of one hash chain
to seed other hash chains.
We first consider a simple case with just one new hash chain seeded from
value xi of the original chain (see Figure 3.5). It is clear that the new chain
cannot use the same hash function as the original hash chain, otherwise we
will end up with the second value of the new chain being xi+1, the third value
being xi+2, and so on. Consequently we use different hash functions for the
additional chains.
x0
f // . . . f // xi
f //
f ′
""D
DD
DD
DD
D
xi+1
f // . . . f // xn
yi+1
f ′ // . . . f
′
// yn
Figure 3.5: A hash chain seeded from another hash chain.
3.4.3 Hierarchical chain construction
Another construction which uses hash chains to seed new hash chains is the
hierarchical chain construction from [76].
Definition 3.9. A hierarchical chain construction with dimension d is a
set of hash chains C0,∅, C1,{a0}, . . . , Cd,{a0,...,ad−1}, with ai ∈ {0, . . . , ni} where ni
is the length of all chains in dimension i. The chain C0,∅ is seeded from some
chosen value, and all the other chains are defined inductively from it. The
chain Cl,{a0,...,al−1} is seeded with the (al−1)th value of the chain Cal−1,{a0,...,al−2}.
We give an example of a hierarchical chain construction in Figure 3.6. In
this example the initial seed value is x0,0,0, and xi,j,k is defined by
xi,j,k = f
k
2 (f
j
1 (f
i
0(x0,0,0))).
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To help reinforce our naming scheme, we give some examples of named
hash chains below.
Hash chain name Set of vertices contained in the hash chain
C0,∅ {x0,0,0, x1,0,0, x2,0,0, x3,0,0}
C1,{3} {x3,0,0, x3,1,0, x3,2,0}
C2,{3,1} {x3,1,0, x3,1,1, x3,1,2, x3,1,3, x3,1,4}
We give an application of a hierarchical chain construction in Section 4.4.3.
x0,0,0
f0 //
f1xx
f2



x1,0,0 //
xx 


x2,0,0 //
xx 


x3,0,0
{{ 


x0,1,0
{{ 


x0,0,1



x1,1,0
xx 


x1,0,1



x2,1,0
xx 


x2,0,1



x3,1,0
xx 


x3,0,1



x0,2,0



x0,1,1



x1,2,0



x0,0,2



x1,1,1



x2,2,0



x1,0,2



x2,1,1



x3,2,0



x2,0,2



x3,1,1



x3,0,2



x0,2,1



x0,1,2



x1,2,1



x0,0,3



x1,1,2



x2,2,1



x1,0,3



x2,1,2



x3,2,1



x2,0,3



x3,1,2



x3,0,3



x0,2,2



x0,1,3



x1,2,2



x0,0,4 x1,1,3



x2,2,2



x1,0,4 x2,1,3



x3,2,2



x2,0,4 x3,1,3



x3,0,4
x0,2,3



x0,1,4 x1,2,3



x1,1,4 x2,2,3



x2,1,4 x3,2,3



x3,1,4
x0,2,4 x1,2,4 x2,2,4 x3,2,4
Figure 3.6: A hierarchical chain construction in 3 dimensions and lengths
{n0, n1, n2} = {3, 2, 4}.
3.4.4 A chained pseudo-random number generator
A particularly useful example of the hierarchical chain construction is the
following construction, which is similar to the construction of the key stream
generators in many stream ciphers. The generator is seeded with an initial
state, and then the key stream is produced by applying two functions, an
update function and output function. We refer to this construction as a
chained pseudo-random number generator (Figure 3.7).
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Definition 3.10. A chained pseudo-random number generator is a
hierarchical chain construction in 2 dimensions with lengths {n, 1}.
The values at the ends of the secondary chains can be used as pseudo-
random numbers, and are all generated from a single seed.
x0
f //
g

x1
f //
g

x2
f //
g

· · ·
y0 y1 y2 · · ·
Figure 3.7: A chained pseudo-random number generator seeded by x0, using
hash functions f and g.
3.4.5 Inverted hash trees
Definition 3.11. An inverted hash tree is a rooted tree on an ordered
vertex set V , with a value xv associated with each vertex v ∈ V, computed
using a family of hash functions f∗. The value associated with each vertex
depends on its position in the tree, and is given by:
xv =
{
fv(xp) if v has a parent p;
Any valid input if v is the root.
Inverted hash trees exist for all types of trees, and so it may be useful to
consider the same trees we looked at in Section 3.2.1. For example, Figure 3.8
shows a perfect binary inverted hash tree.
x0
vvlll
lll
lll
lll
ll
((
x1 = f0(x0)
zzvvv
vv
vv
vv
$$
x2 = f1(x0)
zzvvv
vv
vv
vv
$$
x3 = f0(x1) x4 = f1(x1) x5 = f0(x2) x6 = f1(x2)
Figure 3.8: A perfect binary inverted hash tree with height 2.
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One type of tree which will be of particular interest when considering
inverted hash trees is the tree of depth one. This is used in [70] as part of a
key establishment scheme. The authors refer to the tree as a star-like tree.
An example is shown in Figure 3.9 to illustrate this name.
x1 = f0(x0)
x7 = f6(x0) x2 = f1(x0)
x0
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x6 = f5(x0) x3 = f2(x0)
x5 = f4(x0) x4 = f3(x0)
Figure 3.9: A star-like inverted hash tree with seven leaves.
It can also be seen that a hierarchical chain construction is in fact an
inverted hash tree with one main branch, sub-branches from that, and so on.
3.4.6 Sandwich chain construction
Another idea to connect hash trees together is the sandwich chain construc-
tion from [55]. Here we can imagine a main hash chain C = {x0,0, . . . , xn+1,0}
with secondary hash chains Cxi seeded from each value xi,0 of the main chain.
The secondary chains use a different hash function from the main chain’s
hash function, instead being selected from a family of hash functions g∗. The
secondary chains are tied together at the end by a connected set of values
{x−1,r, x0,r, . . . , xn,r}. Figure 3.10 may help when trying to envisage this, and
a more rigorous definition follows.
Definition 3.12. A sandwich chain of length n and depth r, is a set of
values {xi,j} defined as follows.
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xi,j =

Any valid input if i = 0, j = 0 or i = −1, j = r
f(xi−1,j) if j = 0, i ∈ [1, n+ 1]
gxi+1,0(xi,j−1) if j ∈ [1, r − 1], i ∈ [0, n]
f(xi−1,j||xi,j−1||xi+1,0) if j = r, i ∈ [0, n]
We will see an example of an application of a sandwich chain in Sec-
tion 4.5.1.
x0,0
f //
gx1,0



x1,0
f //
rr
zz






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x0,1
gx1,0



x1,1
gx2,0



. . . xn,1
gxn+1,0



...
gx1,0



...
gx2,0



. . .
...
gxn+1,0



x0,r−1

x1,r−1

. . . xn,r−1

x−1,r // x0,r // x1,r // . . . // xn,r
Figure 3.10: A sandwich chain.
3.4.7 General hash chain
In [16], Bradford and Gavrylyako create a general hash chain. They ob-
serve that each value in the chain could be dependent on any number of its
predecessors, and a chain would still be created.
Definition 3.13. A general hash chain of length n and depth d is a set
of values {x0, . . . , xn} such that xi = f(xi−d||xi−d+1|| . . . ||xi−1) for i ∈ [d, n]
and x0, . . . , xd−1 are valid inputs for f , for some hash function f .
We will see an application of the general hash chain in Section 4.5.3.
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3.4.8 Hash chain with breakpoints
In [42], Goyal creates a structure based on a hash chain. They define every
dth chain value to be dependent on an additional value, as well as the previous
chain value.
Definition 3.14. A hash chain with breakpoints of length rd with break-
points distance d apart, is a set of values s ∪ {x0, . . . , xrd} ∪ {b0, . . . , br}
computed using a family of hash functions f∗, such that:
s = Any valid input;
bi = fi(s);
xi =

f0(s||b0) if i = 0;
f0(xi−1||bi/d) if i is divisible by d;
f0(xi−1) otherwise.
We will see an application of this construction in Section 4.5.4.
3.4.9 Comb skipchain construction
Our final hash structure in this chapter is the comb skipchain construction
from [55]. The construction is a combination of a hash chain and a one-time
signature scheme.
Definition 3.15. A digital signature is a data string which associates a
message (in digital form) with some originating entity.
A digital signature generation algorithm (signature generation al-
gorithm, or signing algorithm) is a method for producing a digital signature.
A digital signature verification algorithm (or verification algorithm)
is a method for verifying that a digital signature is authentic (i.e. was indeed
created by the specified entity). A digital signature scheme consists of a
signature generation algorithm and an associated verification algorithm.
A one-time signature scheme is a signature scheme that can sign at
most one message without risk of forgery.
We will discuss one-time signature schemes more in Section 5.2.
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Definition 3.16. A comb skipchain construction is a one-time signature
scheme with a single public key p0, together with a hash chain seeded from p0.
A comb skipchain construction is shown in Figure 3.11. We will see a use
of the comb skipchain in Section 4.5.2.
One-time
signature
scheme
// x0 // x1 // · · · // xn
Figure 3.11: A comb skipchain construction.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we defined a number of structures which will be used in later
chapters. These included hash chains, hash trees, hash DAGs, generalised
hash DAGs, hierarchical chain constructions, inverted hash trees and sand-
wich chains. We believe this chapter to be the first such catalogue in the
literature, and it will prove very useful in later chapters.
Chapter 4
Entity authentication
In this chapter and the next we investigate how the hash structures from
Chapter 3 can be used to study issues of authentication, and compare these
to solutions based on other cryptographic primitives.
In Section 4.1 we begin by giving a brief overview of authentication, and
then focus on entity authentication. In Section 4.2 we look at hash based
one-time entity authentication schemes. We study unlimited-time entity au-
thentication schemes in Section 4.3, which are initialised over an expensive
secure channel. In Section 4.4 we then study a large number of n-time entity
authentication schemes, based on hash structures, and which do not require a
secure channel. In Section 4.5 we present an assortment of ideas that improve
on the schemes in the earlier sections. Finally in Section 4.6 we compare the
schemes from this chapter.
4.1 Introduction to authentication
In this section we briefly distinguish between message and entity authenti-
cation, before introducing the notions of channels and adversaries. We also
define a property of an entity authentication scheme which we have not seen
defined elsewhere. We end the section by identifying the costs that will be
used to assess the schemes in the rest of the chapter.
We note that there exists a large amount of research into the field of
authentication [15, 28, 31, 83].
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4.1.1 Types of authentication
We now summarise the types of authentication as described by Menezes et
al. in [83].
Authentication can be divided into two types, entity authentication and
message authentication. The aim of message authentication is to provide
assurance that a message has not been tampered with (either accidentally
or maliciously) and to provide evidence of the origin of that message. A
recipient has assurance of the data origin of a message if they are sure of
the source it. Message authentication includes a data integrity check, as
authenticating the origin of a message without being sure of its contents is
nonsensical.
Entity authentication provides evidence of the identity of a person (or
another entity such as a computer or computer program). This proof of
identity normally requires a freshness mechanism, such as a time stamp, as
entity authentication is used to demonstrate that an entity is present at a
particular point in time [65, 66].
The aim of this chapter is to consider the application of the hash struc-
tures from Chapter 3 to entity authentication. In Chapter 5 we will consider
the application of the same set of hash structures to message authentication
(and in particular to signatures).
4.1.2 Public verifiability
The following property of an entity authentication scheme does not appear
to have been defined elsewhere. We will later exhibit some schemes that have
this property.
Definition 4.1. An entity authentication scheme has public verifiability
if the verifier can later prove to any third party that the authentication was
valid.
Public verifiability of an entity authentication scheme is similar to non-
repudiation of a message authentication scheme. If a message authentication
scheme has non-repudiation, then it is possible for anyone to identify the
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author. Therefore it is possible to prove to any third party that the message
authentication is valid.
A real-world example that requires public verifiability is a long-distance
race, where each participant is required to pass through a series of check-
points. If the participants authenticate to the checkpoint officials using a
scheme with public verifiability then, once the race is over, the officials can
prove to the race judge (or anyone else) the identities of the participants that
they met. If the officials also authenticate to the participants using the same
scheme then the participants can also prove that they went through each
checkpoint.
4.1.3 Channels
During an entity authentication attempt, an authenticator A aims to con-
vince a verifier B of their identity. For some systems we may wish to have
a party T who is trusted by all the other parties.
They will be communicating with each other through channels with dif-
ferent properties, where by a channel we mean any method of communicating
between two entities, such as a telephone wire, an optic cable or electromag-
netic waves. When information is made public we denote it as being sent to
some public location P .
In the schemes in this chapter we will make use of the following types of
channel (summarised in Table 4.1).
Description Notation used
A uses an unprotected channel A→ B : m
A uses an authenticated channel A
A−→ B : m
A uses a secured channel A
S−→ B : m
A publishes m with no authentication A→ P : m
A publishes m in an authenticated way A
A−→ P : m
Table 4.1: Notation for different methods of passing information.
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4.1.3.1 Unprotected channel
The simplest way in which A can send a messagem to B is via an unprotected
channel. We represent this communication as A→ B : m.
4.1.3.2 Authenticated channel
In order to provide authentication most protocols require an initial authen-
tication process upon which later authentications can be based. Typically
this initial process is costly, slow or inconvenient, and so using it each time
authentication is required is not feasible. We write A
A−→ B : m to mean that
A sent m to B and B has assurance of the data origin1 and freshness2 on
this channel. We refer to this channel as an authenticated channel.
4.1.3.3 Secure channel
We will describe a channel as a secure channel if it is an authenticated
channel, with the additional property that messages sent through it maintain
confidentiality.
We remark that a channel that is protected against eavesdroppers, but
which is not also an authenticated channel, is open to certain attacks. As an
example consider a bank which encrypts payment instructions in the form
Ek(a), Ek(b), Ek(c) where a and b are the account numbers which are to be
debited and credited, and c is a number representing the amount of money
to be transferred. The bank is using a confidential channel because any
eavesdropper who does not know k cannot work out a, b or c. However if an
adversary deposits a cheque for a small amount addressed to them, and then
changes the bank’s message from Ek(a), Ek(b), Ek(c) to Ek(a), Ek(b), r, with
r chosen at random, then they have a good chance of increasing the amount
their account receives (as it is likely that E−1k (r) is quite large).
1As mentioned in 4.1.1 we need assurance of data integrity to have assurance of data
origin. Here we use data integrity to include reordering and deletion of parts of the
message.
2We need freshness here as we will be using this channel for initialisation. We will always
wish to avoid an attack in which an adversary can reuse an old initialisation message, along
with the recorded authentication values. See [66] for a more detailed discussion.
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If the channel was a true secure channel, the bank would notice that
either the data origin or the message integrity have been violated, and so
would not process the message in the usual way.
We assume that use of a secure channel is relatively expensive and so will
usually only be used for initial key agreements. To show that a channel is
secure we write A
S−→ B : m.
4.1.3.4 Unprotected publishing
If an entity A wishes to send a value to a large number of users, as in the
case of broadcast, then they can publish it, which we denote by A→ P : m.
We will assume that there is an agreed means of retrieval of a message sent
in this way. We assume that the ‘cost’ of publishing is about the same as
sending the message over an unprotected channel.
Although we have not differentiated here between publishing a message
and broadcasting it, the two have slightly different properties. If a message
is broadcast then typically only those users ‘listening’ at the time will receive
it. If a message is published then no user receives it immediately; instead
they must retrieve the message from a published location.
4.1.3.5 Authenticated publishing
In most cases the sender A of a published message m will want to allow
recipients to be able to verify the origin of m. We will assume that they can
guarantee that the data will be quickly available to anyone that wants it.3
This type of authenticated publishing will be denoted as A
A−→ P : m. We
will make the reasonable assumption that authenticated publishing is more
‘costly’ than publishing.
3We note that for some applications this could be very costly.
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4.1.4 Adversarial models
With respect to entity authentication, the main aim of an adversary E is to
persuade the verifier B that they (E) are an authorised entity (for exam-
ple A).
An adversary may be satisfied if they can simply prevent two entities A
and B from carrying out entity authentication successfully, and depending on
the adversary’s capabilities this may be very easy. One attack which may be
possible, depending on B’s capabilities, is a denial of service (DoS) attack,
whereby the adversary sends so many false messages to B that either A’s
messages do not get received or B is so busy processing spoof messages that
B takes a prohibitively long time to process A’s request. Denial of service
attacks fall outside the scope of this research.
We will look at two types of adversary:
Definition 4.2. An active adversary EA can eavesdrop on unprotected
and authenticated channels, and can send messages on unprotected channels.
A special type of active adversary is the record and replay adversary that
records a message sent along an unprotected channel and replays it at a later
time.
Definition 4.3. A man-in-the-middle adversary EM intercepts all mes-
sages along all channels. It can edit, block or create new messages along
unprotected channels. It can block messages along authenticated and secure
channels. It cannot read messages that are sent along secure channels, but
it can read all other messages.
A man-in-the-middle adversary is always able to attack a system by not
passing any communications between the authenticating and verifying par-
ties. We assume that the man-in-the-middle adversary has a secondary objec-
tive to avoid being discovered. If the adversary fails to pass any information
along the channels to which they have gained access then the authenticating
parties may resort to setting up new channels to use, which might not benefit
the adversary.
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We do not consider attacks in which a man-in-the-middle adversary edits
messages on authenticated channels (or secure channels), as these changes
would be detected by the receiver, and the spoof messages would be rejected.
Two other common types of attack are as follows (the adversaries capable
of performing each attack are given in brackets).
• Record and replay (EA and EM): The adversary records an authen-
tication message from one session, and replays it to the verifier during
a later session.
• Intercept and replay (EM): The adversary intercepts an authenti-
cation message from one session, preventing the verifier receiving it.
They then use the message to falsely authenticate to the verifier during
a later session.
We note that for both attacks there is no dependence on the presence of
the authenticator.
4.1.5 Entity authentication phases
The use of hash functions and one-way functions to build password based
entity authentication schemes was first proposed in the 1970s [36, 69, 153].
In the next section we will examine how hash functions, and in particular
hash structures, can be applied to entity authentication.
All our schemes can be viewed as a combination of at most three phases.
Firstly, the initialisation phase allows entities to create and share secret
information and commitments. During the entity authentication phase the
verifier validates the identity of the authenticator. Finally, some schemes
have an additional phase in which the verifier proves to a third party that
they have had contact from the authenticator.
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4.1.6 Associated costs
Each of the schemes that we look at in this chapter has associated costs. We
will now briefly discuss some of these.
1. Complexity - Possibly the most obvious cost associated with any pro-
tocol is the amount of computation needed. In many authentication
protocols this is best approximated by the amount of computation re-
quired to perform modular exponentiation. Since we are interested
in light-weight hash-based schemes where we hash short ‘messages’, a
more appropriate measure of computational complexity is the number
of hash function evaluations required per phase of the entity authenti-
cation protocol.
2. Communication cost - Another cost is the number of values that need to
be sent during each phase. We will mostly be interested in the number
of values sent during the entity authentication phase.
3. Channel type - As discussed in Section 4.1.3, different types of commu-
nication channel have different associated costs.
4. Security - Although security is often thought of as a property of the
scheme, it can also be seen as cost. Some schemes may be very efficient
in terms of complexity and communication costs, but these may come
at the expense of weaker security.
4.2 One-time entity authentication schemes
In this section we present several one-time entity authentication schemes.
They can be used only once before they become vulnerable to record and
replay adversaries. If we are not worried about record and replay adversaries
then they can be used many times.
Definition 4.4. A one-time entity authentication scheme is an entity au-
thentication scheme which can only be securely used once before another
initialisation phase must be executed.
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All of the schemes in this section can be applied to the scenario of an
entity A using a password to log onto a computer network. One potential
problem with password dependent schemes is that, if A is a human, then
A will tend to choose passwords fairly predictably. For the purposes of this
chapter we will assume passwords and other secrets to be chosen in a secure
manner, for example by a pseudo-random number generator.
In the rest of this section we present four schemes which are all ‘one-time’.
We end the section by comparing the schemes and exploring the strengths
and weaknesses of each.
4.2.1 Trivial one-time password entity authentication
Our first example is a very simple authentication scheme based on the idea
of a password. In the trivial one-time password entity authentication scheme,
the authenticator creates a shared secret value with the verifier. As proof of
identity, the authenticator reveals the secret value. Authentication based on
passwords that are only used once is a well known principle in cryptography
[28, 83]. We include this scheme as it forms a benchmark against which
other entity authentication schemes can be compared. The trivial one-time
password entity authentication scheme also emphasises how powerful a secure
channel can be.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.1: The trivial one-time password entity
authentication scheme.
Initialisation
• A chooses a value x at random.4
• A S−→ B : x
Entity authentication
• A→ B : x
• B verifies that A has sent the correct value.
4We note that when choosing secret values randomly they should be chosen uniformly
from a suitably large set - for example the set of bit strings of length 256.
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Security
• If the authentication phase is allowed to be used more than once with-
out first rerunning the initialisation phase then an active adversary can
perform a record and replay attack.
• A man-in-the-middle adversary can perform an intercept and replay
attack to masquerade as A.
Since only A and B know the password x, B can be sure that A is the
sender.
4.2.2 Basic one-time hash based entity authentication
We now look at how we can use hash functions to improve on Entity Au-
thentication Scheme 4.1.
The basic one-time hash based entity authentication scheme has an ad-
vantage over Entity Authentication Scheme 4.1. The initialisation phase does
not require setting up a shared secret, and therefore only needs an authenti-
cated channel, not a secure channel.
Another advantage of this scheme over Scheme 4.1 is that even if an
adversary obtains access to the hard drive of B’s computer (and learns f(x))
then they still cannot falsely authenticate A to B. The storage of the hash
of passwords for this reason is a well established practice [83, 89].
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.2: The basic one-time hash based en-
tity authentication scheme.
Initialisation
• A picks a value x at random, and computes the hash of it using a
preimage-resistant hash function f (which is specified as a system pa-
rameter).
• A A−→ B : f(x)
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Entity authentication
• A→ B : x
• B hashes x and checks it is the same as the value A originally sent.
Security
• If the authentication phase is allowed to be used more than once with-
out first rerunning the initialisation phase then an active adversary can
perform a record and replay attack.
• A man-in-the-middle adversary can perform an intercept and replay
attack to pose as A.
This scheme avoids using a secure channel because it does not matter
who knows f(x). It is only important that A is the only entity that knows x.
4.2.3 Traditional password entity authentication
The traditional password entity authentication scheme (Scheme 4.3) is used
by many applications in computer networks. In the initialisation phase A
passes f(x) to B using a secure channel (for example typing it into B’s com-
puter). This makes no obvious gain in security over Scheme 4.2, as one of
our assumptions is that it is difficult to find x from f(x).
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.3: The traditional password entity au-
thentication scheme.
Initialisation
• A picks a value x at random.
• A S−→ B : f(x)
Entity authentication
• A→ B : x
• B hashes x and verifies it is the same as the value A sent in the initial-
isation phase.
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Security
• If the authentication phase is allowed to be used more than once with-
out first rerunning the initialisation phase then an active adversary can
perform a record and replay attack.
• A man-in-the-middle adversary can perform an intercept and replay
attack to pose as A.
Just as for the previous schemes, a record and replay adversary can
record x when it is sent over the unprotected channel and replay it to B
in an attempt to impersonate A. This attack will fail as long as each value x
is only used once. However since Scheme 4.3 is often used for many ses-
sions without reinitialisation; this constitutes a break of the scheme under
the assumption of the existence of an active adversary.
Despite this weakness, this scheme is widely adopted. One possible ex-
planation that this scheme is used in practice more often than Scheme 4.2
is that the use of a secure channel for initialisation gives a false sense of
protection.
4.2.4 Basic one-time hash based entity authentication
with public verifiability
We now present an extension of Scheme 4.2, which adds public verifiability
(see Section 4.1.2) at the expense of authentically publishing the initialisation
value. This idea forms the basis of Entity Authentication Scheme 4.10 which
we will look at later.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.4: The basic one-time entity authenti-
cation scheme with public verifiability.
Initialisation
• A creates a random key x and computes the hash f(x).
• A A−→ P : (f(x);A,B)
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Entity authentication
• A→ B : x
• B hashes x and checks it against the value received during the initiali-
sation phase.
Proof of authentication
• B proves to some third entity C that A was authenticated by:
B → C : x.
• C can check against the authenticated public value f(x), which was set
up in the initialisation stage.
B has now proved communication with A to C. There are two potential
attacks which are relevant to the proof of authentication stage.
1. B may wish to fool C into thinking they know x before A has revealed
it. This is clearly flawed, as B would have to compute a preimage
of f(x).
2. An adversary may wish to prevent B from communicating x to C.
A man-in-the-middle adversary is able to do this but, as discussed in
Section 4.1.4, this may result in the adversary being detected.
The remaining security analysis is identical to Entity Authentication
Scheme 4.2.
This scheme can only be used once before another initialisation phase is
required. If it is used multiple times then, like all the previous schemes, this
scheme could be broken by a record and replay attack.
This scheme can be used for any application where A wishes to pass au-
thority to B at a later date. Also A does not have to trust C with x. A
hypothetical situation is if A is a well respected entity, paying for a service
that B is providing, and C is A’s bank. A publishes (f(x);A,B) as a commit-
ment to pay B on completion of a service. If necessary B can check with C
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that A has the funds to pay for the service. Once B has provided the service,
A will send them x, which B can present to C to receive payment.
We note that in this example there is no guarantee that A will provide
B with x at the appropriate time, or even that A knows a preimage of f(x).
Instead this scheme relies on A being well respected, and we assume that if
A did not behave fairly then with time they would lose the respect attributed
to them. Schemes which do not depend on this kind of assumption are outside
the scope of this research, but are studied in more detail in [37, 101, 137].
4.2.5 Summary of one-time entity authentication schemes
The elementary one-time entity authentication schemes that we have dis-
cussed in this section are summarised in Table 4.2 in terms of:
• Complexity — The number of hash function evaluations required by A
in the initialisation phase (Init), and by A and B respectively in the
entity authentication phase (Auth).
• Comm. Cost — The communication cost in number of cryptographic
values sent by A during the initialisation phase (Init), and the entity
authentication phase (Auth). We assume all cryptographic values to
have the same number of bits as the output of the hash function used
in the scheme.
• Init. Channel — The (most expensive) type of channel used during the
initialisation phase: secure channel (S), authenticated channel (A) or
authenticated publishing (AP).
• Security EA — The number of times the scheme can be used securely
in the presence of an active adversary.
• Security EM — The capability of a man-in-the-middle adversary to
attack the scheme: EM can successfully pose as A for the duration of
the scheme by intercepting one message (3); EM can successfully pose
as A n times by intercepting one message (n3); EM cannot pose as A
(5).
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• Public Verif. — Whether the scheme has public verifiability or not.
Scheme Complexity Comm. Cost Init. Security Public
Init Auth Init Auth Channel EA EM Verif.
4.1 0 0, 0 1 1 S 1 3
4.2 1 0, 1 1 1 A 1 3
4.3 1 0, 1 1 1 S 1 3
4.4 1 0, 1 3 1 AP 1 3 3
Table 4.2: Summary of the one-time entity authentication schemes.
From Table 4.2 we can see that the scheme with the least computational
complexity is Scheme 4.1. The other schemes all require the same effort.
Scheme 4.4 is very similar to Scheme 4.2, the main performance differences
being that Scheme 4.4 provides public verifiability but requires three times
as much communication during the initialisation phase, as well as access to
public storage space.
Schemes 4.2 and 4.4 do not require a secure channel, and so are cheaper
to set up than the other schemes.
All the schemes in this section are limited by the fact that they can only
be used once before a reinitialisation must take place.
4.3 Simple ‘unlimited-time’ entity authenti-
cation schemes
We begin this section by giving a definition of ‘unlimited-time’ entity au-
thentication schemes. In Section 4.3.2.1 we look at unlimited-time challenge-
response entity authentication schemes. In Section 4.3.2.2 we look at how
unlimited-time schemes can be made using clocks or counters. We then
present a novel scheme with minimal storage requirements for both parties.
Finally we compare the schemes in this section.
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4.3.1 Unlimited-time entity authentication
In the remainder of this chapter we look at schemes that can be used mul-
tiple times for each initialisation. We distinguish between two types of such
scheme: unlimited-time entity authentication schemes and n-time entity au-
thentication schemes.
Definition 4.5. An unlimited-time entity authentication scheme is an
entity authentication scheme that can be used an unlimited number of times,
until the secret values expire due to vulnerability to brute force attack.
In Section 4.4 we will look at ‘n-time’ entity authentication schemes,
which can be used several times, but which are likely to need re-initialising
within the lifetime of the scheme.
Definition 4.6. An n-time entity authentication scheme is an entity au-
thentication scheme that can be used a finite number of times before it must
be reinitialised.
By ‘unlimited-time’ entity authentication schemes we refer to entity au-
thentication schemes which, for all practical purposes, can be used as many
times as is required without repeating the initialisation phase. In theory they
can be broken by brute force if left long enough without re-initialising, as an
adversary could guess the values transferred in the initialisation phase.
An n-time entity authentication scheme may be secure for something in
the region of 210 authentications, depending on the parameters used. This
compares to an unlimited-time entity authentication scheme, which may be
secure for something more like 240 authentications, again depending on how
the scheme is set up and used.
We can convert our trivial one-time password entity authentication scheme
(Scheme 4.1) into an unlimited-time scheme by including a proof of freshness.
We now give two simple ways in which this could be done.
4.3.2 Traditional approaches
In this section we look at two traditional approaches to unlimited-time entity
authentication which are both in widespread use. Challenge-response oper-
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ations and timestamps both allow repeated authentication and have been
examined in the literature [65, 66].
Throughout this section we apply a strong hash function f to the concate-
nation of a key k with a message m. There exist attacks on this construction
if the underlying hash function has particular structural properties (for ex-
ample if the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is used [84]). These attacks led
to the creation of other constructions such as HMAC [4] and these should
be considered for any practical implementations. However it is beyond the
scope of this thesis to consider the structural design of hash functions, so we
simply assume that our hash function is not vulnerable to these attacks.
4.3.2.1 Basic challenge-response scheme
Challenge-response forms the basis of many authentication protocols [129,
160]. In one example of this type of scheme, A and B initially establish a
shared key x. Later B sends a random challenge text to A, who hashes the
challenge text with the key and sends it back to B. The challenge text is a
proof of freshness.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.5: The basic challenge-response scheme.
Initialisation
• The entity A creates a random key x.
• A S−→ B : x
Entity authentication
• B creates a random message m. This message should be chosen from a
suitable large set in a way that ensures messages are not reused. The
potential shortcomings of choosing messages that are too predictable
or that could be reused is discussed in detail in [41].
• B → A : m
• A hashes m together with the key x and sends it back: A → B :
f(x||m).
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The authentication can be repeated an unlimited number of times, which
is a substantial improvement on all of the schemes in Section 4.2. It is not
vulnerable to record and replay attacks, since B will choose a different m
each time, and we assume that finding f(x||m) for a new message m is a
hard problem without knowledge of the key x, even after observing several
authentication phases.
Even a man-in-the-middle adversary EM cannot find the key x, so the only
way the adversary can create f(x||m) is by passing the challenge message m
to A and pretending to be B. However, if A wishes to authenticate and
sends f(x||m) to EM , then the man-in-the-middle adversary has done nothing
more than passing the messages on. Since we gave the adversary power to
intercept and edit unprotected messages as they wish, this does not show a
weakness in the scheme. Rather, it illustrates that the existence of a man-
in-the-middle adversary is a very strong assumption.
A disadvantage of this scheme is that the entity authentication stage
requires two messages to be sent (all previous schemes only require one).
However this scheme easily makes up for this drawback with the increase
in security compared with previous schemes. The amount of computation
required per authentication is approximately the same as for Scheme 4.2.
A bigger disadvantage of this scheme compared to Schemes 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4
is the reliance on a secure channel for the initialisation phase. For many
applications we would prefer to initialise with an authenticated channel as it
is far less expensive to set up.
4.3.2.2 Authentication with a counter or a time-dependent vari-
able
Another well studied proof of freshness is to use a timestamp. We look at
two very similar schemes which use a counter and a time-dependent variable
respectively. If A and B have a synchronised counter then this can be con-
sidered as a logical clock [67]. Both entities set their counter value t to zero
during the initialisation phase.
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Entity Authentication Scheme 4.6: The basic counter based entity au-
thentication scheme.
Initialisation
• The entity A creates a random key x.
• A S−→ B : x.
• A and B both create a counter t, which they initialise to 0.
Entity authentication
• A hashes the key with the current counter value t.
• A→ B : (f(x||t), t).
• If the received value t is less than B’s counter then B rejects the authen-
tication attempt. If t is at least as large as B’s counter then B continues
to the next step.
• B hashes t with the shared secret key x. B accepts A’s proof of identity
if the computed value matches the value received from A.
• A sets their counter to be t+ 1.
• If the authentication was successful then B sets their counter to be t+1.
The analysis of Scheme 4.6 is very similar to that of Scheme 4.7, which
is based on a time-dependent variable.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.7: The basic time-dependent variable
entity authentication scheme.
Initialisation
• The entity A creates a random key x.
• A S−→ B : x.
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Entity authentication
• A hashes the key with a time-dependent variable t.
• A→ B : f(x||t).5
• B finds the time-dependent variable for when A sent their authentica-
tion message, and hashes it with the shared secret key x. B accepts
A’s proof of identity if the computed value matches the value received
from A.
In Schemes 4.6 and 4.7, if the adversary can influence the counters or
clocks then the adversary might hope that A would no longer be able to
authenticate to B. Neither scheme has specific protection against this type
of attack.
In Scheme 4.6, if A’s counter gets ahead of B’s counter then the scheme
still functions well, so a successful desynchronising attack by an adversary
must get B’s counter ahead of A’s. One way to do this is for the adversary
to somehow authenticate to B, without A knowing.
Any implementation of Scheme 4.7 must address the following three is-
sues, which do not affect Scheme 4.6.
• A and B must have synchronised clocks.
• The clocks may run at different speeds.
• There may be delays between the messages being sent and received.
Despite these problems, both schemes are suitable for many applications
and feature in relevant ISO standards [57].
5This step could be replaced with A→ B : (f(x||t); t) as long as B is satisfied with the
time-dependent variable being one of a set of values [30, 62]. This relaxes the necessity
for accurately synchronised clocks. For example, if A uses the current time to the nearest
thousandth of a second then B will probably be satisfied with a variety of different values
of t, but will not want to have to try them all to see which one A used.
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4.3.3 Storing one less value
Scheme 4.7 is very simple and it is quick to compute each authentication
value (only one hash evaluation). It requires storage of at most three values
for each entity: x, t and the value f(x||t) at the time it is used.
In this section we present an unlimited-time entity authentication scheme
based on the chained pseudo-random number generator (see Figure 4.1),
which only requires the storage of at most two values. These two values are
xt and yt (as it is used). Note that t does not need to be stored.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.8: The minimum storage unlimited-
time entity authentication scheme.
Initialisation
• The entity A creates a random key x0.
• A S−→ B : x0.
Entity authentication number t
• A and B both share the secret value xt from the last session (or x0 if
they have only performed the initialisation phase).
• A→ B : g(xt).
• B checks the received value against xt.
• A and B replace their secret stored value xt with xt+1 = f(xt).
This scheme requires the knowledge of two hash functions, which we de-
note f and g. They could be based on the same hash function h, for example
if we define f and g as follows:
f(∗) = h(0||∗);
g(∗) = h(1||∗).
This scheme is identical in analysis to Scheme 4.7, except that it only
requires the storage of at most two values. In particular it can be seen that
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x0
f //
g

x1
f //
g

x2
f //
g

· · ·
y0 y1 y2 · · ·
Figure 4.1: A chained pseudo-random number generator using hash functions
f and g. For the tth authentication A and B can compute the authentication
value from the stored value xt−1.
the scheme may suffer if it is likely an authentication attempt may go missing.
The scheme can be extended to provide protection against this by B checking
ahead upon failed authentications to see if they have been sent a value for a
future session. Each additional authentication value they check against will
provide more resistance against lost messages, but also reduces the security
of the scheme as it is easier to guess one of the valid authentication values.
It can be seen that two values is the minimum storage possible in a envi-
ronment where we are concerned by the possibility of an active adversary EA.
If A and B only ever have one stored value, then it must be the value that
is sent by A to B during the authentication stage. EA can obtain this value,
and then knows as least as much information as A. Consequently EA will be
able to compute subsequent authentication values and masquerade as A to B.
4.3.4 Summary of unlimited-time schemes
In this section we have seen some schemes which can be used to authenticate
an unlimited number of times once the initialisation phase has been per-
formed. This is a significant improvement over the schemes we looked at in
Section 4.2, which required reinitialisation each time an entity authentication
was required.
All the unlimited-time schemes in this section suffer from the drawback
that they require the use of a secure channel during the initialisation phase.
In the next section we will focus on schemes that can provide several
authentications per initialisation, and which only require an authenticated
channel to perform the initialisation.
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Scheme Complexity Comm. Cost Init. Security Public Notes
Init Auth Init Auth Channel EA EM Verif.
4.5 0 1, 1 1 1, 1 S ∞ 5
4.6 0 1, 1 1 2, 0 S ∞ 13
4.7 0 1, 1 1 1, 0 S ∞ 5 A
4.8 0 2, 2 1 1, 0 S ∞ 13 B
Table 4.3: Summary of the one-time entity authentication schemes. For an
explanation of the values and column headings, see Section 4.2.5.
Notes
A: There is the possibility that a man-in-the-middle adversary could perform
an intercept and replay attack before the time-dependent value expires. This
attack would be of the 13 form. This scheme also requires the existence of
synchronised clocks.
B: Whereas the other schemes in this section require the storage of at least 3
values, Scheme 4.8 only requires the storage of 2 values.
Table 4.3 gives a summary of the unlimited-time entity authentication
schemes presented in this section.
4.4 n-time entity authentication schemes
In this section we look at n-time entity authentication schemes based on
structures given in Chapter 3. We have already defined n-time entity authen-
tication schemes in Definition 4.6. We begin by looking at hash chain based
entity authentication schemes, then move on to hash tree based schemes, and
finally schemes based on the hierarchical chain construction.
4.4.1 n-time hash chain based schemes
All the previously discussed schemes are either limited to one use, or they
rely on a secure channel in the initialisation phase. In this section we show
how hash chains can be used to create n-time authentication schemes which
do not rely on secure channels.
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4.4.1.1 Hash chain entity authentication
The first scheme we look at is the hash chain entity authentication scheme
due to Lamport [69]. Many variations of this are used in the literature, but
they all use essentially the same idea as Scheme 4.9 [7, 44, 47, 48, 49, 52, 54,
71, 105].
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.9: The hash chain entity authentica-
tion scheme due to Lamport [69].
Initialisation
• A creates a key x, and uses it to seed a hash chain of length n.
• A A−→ B : fn(x).
• B stores the next session number i (initially i = 1).
Entity authentication number i
• A announces that they intend to authenticate to B.
• B sends A the session number i.
• A→ B : fn−i(x).
• B checks that the hash of fn−i(x) is equal to the previously received
authentication value fn−i+1(x).
• B stores fn−i(x) for use in the next authentication.
Entity A can authenticate themselves to B a total of n times before a
new hash chain must be initialised.
In Scheme 4.2 a man-in-the-middle adversary could completely break the
scheme by stealing A’s authentication value. The same can be done here,
but the adversary will only break the scheme for that authentication attempt.
For subsequent authentications the adversary must repeat the process.
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4.4.1.2 Hash chain entity authentication with public verifiability
In the same way that we added public verifiability to Scheme 4.2, we can add
it to the hash chain entity authentication scheme (Scheme 4.9).
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.10: The hash chain entity authentica-
tion with public verifiability.
Initialisation
• A creates a key x, and uses it to seed a hash chain of length n.
• A A−→ P : (fn(x);A,B).
Entity authentication number i
• A→ B : fn−i(x).
• B checks that the hash of fn−i(x) is equal to the previously received
authentication value fn−i+1(x).
• B stores fn−i+1(x) for use during the next authentication.
Proof of authentication number i
• B → C : fn−i(x), i.
• C checks that the ith hash of fn−i(x) is equal to the published value fn(x).
Note that C could store values that B sends to them, and then hash just
the number of times needed to check against the previous value they received.
It is not necessary for B to send C every authentication value. If B needs
to give a proof of authentication to a different entity C ′ then they can easily
repeat the proof of authentication phase with C ′.
This scheme is vulnerable to loss of synchronisation in a very similar way
to Scheme 4.8 and a potential solution is discussed in Section 4.3.3.
CHAPTER 4. ENTITY AUTHENTICATION 85
4.4.1.3 Entity authentication with many verifying parties
All the schemes we have looked at so far are limited in that they can only
cater for one verifying party. The most obvious way to adapt the earlier
schemes to many verifying parties is to initialise a separate instance of the
scheme with each verifier. We would like to reduce the number of times the
initialisation phase has to be run because it uses an expensive authenticated
(or secure) channel.
We observe that Scheme 4.9 can be adapted to facilitate many verifiers.
We change the initialisation phase so that the hash chain’s end value is
published over an authenticated channel.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.11: Hash chain entity authentication
scheme for many verifiers.
Initialisation
• A creates a key x, and uses it to seed a hash chain of length n.
• A A−→ P : fn(x).
Entity authentication number i
We will refer to the verifying entity for this session as Bi.
• A→ Bi : fn−i(x).
• A publishes the hash chain value and the verifier’s identity: A → P :
(fn−i(x), Bi).
• Bi checks that the ith hash of fn−i(x) is equal to the public value fn(x).
• Bi checks that the published value is the first time fn−i(x) has been
published, and that it is published along with their identity.
Scheme 4.11 requires one access to an authenticated channel for the ini-
tialisation, and can provide many entity authentications to different verifying
entities. This is clearly an improvement on running a separate initialisation
phase for each verifier.
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The scheme is secure against an active adversary since there is no way
for the adversary to use information obtained from previous session to im-
personate A.
The scheme is not secure against a man-in-the-middle adversary. If the
adversary blocks the publication of (fn−i(x), Bi) then they can authenticate
to a party of their choice B∗ by using fn−i(x) and publishing an edited version
of A’s message: (fn−i(x), B∗).
A disadvantage of the above scheme is that it is session-based. That is,
A must wait until Bi is satisfied with the i
th authentication before they can
begin authenticating to Bi+1. If session (i+1) starts before session i finishes
then it is possible for the authentication value from session i+ 1 to be used
to compute the authentication value for session i.
4.4.1.4 Summary of hash chain based schemes
In this section we saw how hash chains could be used as an efficient improve-
ment on both the one-time schemes of Section 4.2 that require re-initialisation
before every session, and the unlimited-time schemes of Section 4.3 that re-
quire a secure channel to set up.
We presented Entity Authentication Scheme 4.11, which is an extension
of Scheme 4.9 to facilitate many verifiers. Although Scheme 4.11 is suitable
to authenticate to many verifiers, it is limited by being session-based.
4.4.2 Hash tree and Merkle tree entity authentication
schemes
We saw in the last section that we could use hash chains to facilitate many
authentications for each initialisation phase. We can create a scheme with
similar properties by using a Merkle tree (see Section 3.2.3).
Merkle trees also facilitate new schemes that were not possible with hash
chains. In this section we will first look at the Merkle tree based entity au-
thentication scheme, which in itself provides no advantages over Scheme 4.9,
but which can be adapted to form two more attractive schemes.
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The first is a new scheme designed for many verifying parties. This scheme
improves on Scheme 4.11 as it is not session-based. The second is a challenge-
response scheme which does not use a secure channel, and which provides
more protection against a man-in-the-middle adversary than any previous
such scheme.
4.4.2.1 Merkle tree based entity authentication
We can use a Merkle tree to form a simple entity authentication scheme
which performs similarly to the hash chain based Scheme 4.9.
This scheme is in fact worse than the hash chain entity authentication
scheme in terms of computational complexity and communication costs. The
scheme makes an appearance here because it can easily be adapted to make
a scheme suitable for authenticating to many people, and also a challenge-
response scheme. Both of these schemes have properties that are arguably
more elegantly provided by the Merkle tree than any other type of hash
structure.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.12: The n-time Merkle tree based en-
tity authentication scheme. For a small example of this scheme see Figure 4.2.
Initialisation
• A generates a Merkle tree of height h from a large set of randomly cho-
sen values (one for each leaf).6 The values at each vertex are calculated
as the hash of their children (see Section 3.2 for more details).
• A sends the root value xr to B: A A−→ B : xr.
Entity authentication
• A picks a leaf l whose value xl has not been used before.
• A creates the sibling set Xl (see Section 3.2.1) of the path from l to the
root.
6Note that this large set of values can be generated from a single master key MK. We
create the ith random value as f(MK||i). In this way A’s storage requirement can be
greatly reduced.
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• A→ B : (xl, Xl; l).
• B computes, in turn, each value along the path from the leaf to the
root.
• B checks that the received values are valid by comparing the computed
root value with A’s authenticated root value xr received during the
initialisation phase.
• B also stores the leaf l in a list of used leaves and checks the list to
ensure this leaf has not been used before. Storing the whole list can be
avoided if there is a prearranged order in which the leaves will be used.
xr
x2
66nnnnnnnnnnnnnnn ◦
hhQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
◦
>>|||||||| ◦
``BBBBBBBB
◦
>>}}}}}}}}
x1
``BBBBBBBB
◦
OO
◦
OO
xl
OO
◦
OO
Figure 4.2: The Merkle tree based entity authentication scheme. The value
at the chosen leaf is marked xl and the vertices whose values are in Xl are
marked x1 and x2. When B receives xl and Xl, they can check the values are
authentic by hashing them together and comparing with the root value xr.
For the example above they compute f(x2||f(f(xl)||x1)), which should be
equal to xr.
A sends out the value at leaf l, and all the values of the siblings of vertices
on the path from l to the root r. From this, B can check that everything
hashes correctly to give the root (public key) value. A must also send out
some information as to which leaf has been provided. The ordering of the
values in Xl can be prearranged.
A Merkle tree is preferable to any other type of hash tree in this appli-
cation as it avoids sending information about other leaves in Xl. If we do
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not use a Merkle tree then there exists a leaf l with a sibling s. The authen-
tication values for leaf l will be completely revealed by the authentication
values for any leaf that is a descendant of s. Consequently, if A used a leaf
descended from s before l then they would not later be able to use leaf l
securely. This situation is completely avoided if we restrict the scheme to
Merkle trees.
An entity using Scheme 4.12 can authenticate to a verifying party once
for each leaf in their Merkle tree. By varying the in-degree of the vertices
in the tree it is possible to trade-off computational complexity with the size
of the authentication message. Using a binary Merkle tree will minimise
the amount of communication, whereas using a Merkle tree of height 1 will
minimise the computation during both the initialisation and authentication
phases.
This scheme has the same security against active and man-in-the-middle
adversaries as the hash chain entity authentication scheme (Entity Authen-
tication Scheme 4.9). However this scheme requires many values for each
authentication (whereas the hash chain entity authentication scheme only
requires one). This scheme also requires more hash evaluations to verify
each authentication value than the hash chain entity authentication scheme.
4.4.2.2 Merkle tree based entity authentication for many verifying
parties
As mentioned earlier, Entity Authentication Scheme 4.12 is not quite as
useful as Scheme 4.9. However with some minor changes it can be adapted
to provide entity authentication to a large number of verifiers.
Scheme 4.11 is based on hash chains and was designed for many verifiers.
However, due to the nature of hash chains, it was not possible to authenticate
to different entities at the same time using this scheme. In this section we
present a scheme using Merkle trees to overcome this problem.
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Entity Authentication Scheme 4.13: The Merkle tree based entity au-
thentication for many verifying parties.
Initialisation
• A generates a Merkle tree of height h as in Scheme 4.12.
• A publishes the root value xr: A A−→ P : xr.
Entity authentication number i
We will refer to the verifying entity for this authentication as Bi.
• A performs the Entity Authentication phase of Scheme 4.12 with Bi.
• A publishes the leaf used, the leaf value xl and the verifier’s identity:
A
A−→ P : (l, xl, Bi). We assume that the server on which the data is
published stores entries with the approximate time and date that they
were published.
• Bi can check the received values as in Scheme 4.12.
• Bi should check that the leaf has not already been used by searching
the published list. The verifier can also check the time that the value
was published to ensure that it has not been used to authenticate to
them before.7
A must use a weak hash function f (Definition 2.8). This will avoid a
verifier being able to attack the scheme by finding a second preimage of a
received authentication set.
A must publish each leaf value when they use it, along with the identity of
the person it was used to authenticate to. This prevents an active adversary
replaying an authentication set that has already been used, or passing off A’s
authentication as their own.
7If this was not the case it could lead to an attack in which an active adversary authen-
ticates to Bi immediately after A has authenticated to them, using exactly the same values
that A used, except that the adversary does not publish anything. Assuming Bi does not
keep records of the values used to authenticate to them, then they will accept it as if it
were a completely new authentication.
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Anyone authenticating A must check the given leaf value against the
published list of expired leaf values. It is not necessary for A to publish the
values Xl during the entity authentication phase, as the second preimage
resistance of f prevents anyone from finding an alternative authentication
set with a different leaf value.
A man-in-the-middle adversary can attack this scheme by stealing the
authentication values for a particular leaf and blocking the publishing step.
They can then provide the values they received when they wish to pose as A,
and publish the appropriate values.
Scheme 4.13 is more suitable than Scheme 4.11 for use with multiple users,
as the authentication values can be revealed in any order without affecting
the security of each other. Scheme 4.11 is based on hash chains and requires
each entity authentication to be completed before the next can be started.
We note that if the number of leaves is significantly smaller than the range
of f , then the leaf values can be chosen at random without replacement. This
allows the publishing step in the entity authentication phase to be replaced
by A
A−→ P : (xl, Bi), as the leaf value can serve as an index.
4.4.2.3 Merkle tree based challenge-response entity authentica-
tion
In Section 4.3.2.1 we saw how challenge-response schemes can be used to
strengthen authentication against some man-in-the-middle adversary attacks.
Our first challenge-response scheme (Scheme 4.5) was dependent on access
to a secure channel for the initialisation phase.
We can use the Merkle tree to make a challenge-response authentication
scheme. This scheme is not prone to record and replay attacks, as the verifier
picks the leaf value they want A to provide at random from the unused leaves
(in the same way as the verifier picks a random challenge message m in
Scheme 4.5). Our tree must have a large number of leaves to keep the set
of unused leaves big enough that the challenge is a meaningful obstacle to a
man-in-the-middle adversary.
A needs to send much more data than for either of the basic challenge-
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response scheme (Scheme 4.5) or the time-dependent variable scheme (Scheme
4.7), but this scheme has the huge advantage that A and B do not need to
use a secure channel.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.14: The Merkle tree based challenge-
response entity authentication scheme.
Initialisation
• A follows the initialisation phase of Entity Authentication Scheme 4.12.
Entity authentication
• B chooses a leaf l at random from the set of unused leaves and sends
it to A: B → A : l.
• A follows the entity authentication phase of Entity Authentication
Scheme 4.12 with leaf l.
This allows B to choose which leaf should be provided, so it is B’s re-
sponsibility to pick a leaf that has not been asked for before (for example by
storing the list of leaves they have already asked for).
If an adversary can pose as B to A then they can obtain many authen-
tication values. If they subsequently pose as A to B then there is a chance
that B will choose a leaf that they know the correct authentication value for.
This chance can be reduced by using a large number of leaves.
4.4.3 Hierarchical chain construction scheme
An issue with the hash chain and Merkle tree based schemes described above
is the amount of computation needed for the initialisation phase. All of these
schemes require A to compute the root value before any entity authentication
can take place.
We consider the application of a sensor network (for example see [76,
107, 159]), for which the initialisation phase for each sensor is performed
by a central computer before the sensors are distributed. We assume that
the sensors are required to authenticate to an entity B using a light-weight
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hash based entity authentication scheme such as one of the schemes in this
chapter. In this application the central computer may need to repeat the
initialisation phase a large number of times, so it will be advantageous to use
an entity authentication scheme with a quick initialisation phase.
It may suffice in this case to deploy a scheme that does not check for a
man-in-the-middle adversary during every session.
By using a hierarchical chain construction, we can maintain n-time en-
tity authentication while substantially reducing the number of hashes in the
initialisation phase.
In Scheme 4.15 we describe the two dimensional hierarchical chain con-
struction based entity authentication scheme was suggested in [76]. It allows
a much smaller initialisation time than the n-time schemes we have seen so
far. To provide for n authentication instances, only approximately
√
n hash
applications need to be done to compute the initialisation value from the
chain’s seed. This compares favourably with Scheme 4.9, which is based on
a hash chain, for which a hash application needs to be done for each authen-
tication instance required. It also compares favourably with Schemes 4.12,
4.13 and 4.14 based on a Merkle tree, for which approximately two hash
applications need to be done for each authentication instance required.
The decrease in initialisation time comes at the cost of a compromise in
security. However, for some applications such as sensor networks, this may
be an acceptable compromise.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.15: The two dimensional hierarchical
chain construction based entity authentication scheme from [76]. An example
is depicted in Figure 4.3.
Initialisation
• A creates a two dimensional hierarchical chain construction (see Sec-
tion 3.4.3, Definition 3.9) with chain lengths {n,m} using a randomly
chosen seed x0,0. A need not compute all the values in the construction
now, only those necessary to find xn,m.
• A A−→ B : xn,m.
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Entity authentication number i
• For the ith instance of entity authentication, A finds the unique values
α and β satisfying i = αm+ β and β ∈ [0,m− 1].
• If β ∈ [0,m− 2] then A sends the next value in the current sub-chain:
A→ B : x(n−α),(m−β−1).
• B can verify the value by hashing and checking against the previously
received value. B stores this value for the next authentication phase.
• If β = m− 1 then A sends the final value in the current sub-chain, and
begins the next sub-chain: A → B : (x(n−α),0, x(n−α−1),m). Note that
A must have computed the values in the new sub-chain by this point.
• B can verify the first value x(n−α),0 by hashing and comparing with
the previously received value x(n−α),1. B can also check this value by
hashing and checking against the value x(n−α+1),0. By doing this B can
convince themselves that this whole sub-chain was authentic.
• Note that B cannot check x(n−α−1),m yet, but must wait until x(n−α−1),0
is released, and then check the whole sub-chain.
x0,0 //

x1,0 //

x2,0 //

x3,0

x0,1

x1,1

x2,1

x3,1

x0,2

x1,2

x2,2

x3,2

x0,3

x1,3

x2,3

x3,3

x0,4 x1,4 x2,4 x3,4
Figure 4.3: A hierarchical chain construction in 2 dimensions with chain
lengths {n,m} = {3, 4}.
This scheme works in a similar way to using many short hash chains.
There is opportunity for an extra check that the seeds of the chains (xi,0)
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also form a hash chain, but the only way to know that a given leaf value xi,m
of a sub-chain is part of the hierarchical chain construction is to wait until
the value xi,0 is revealed.
This scheme is protected against attack by an active adversary as B can
validate each authentication value with the previous one, and the authenti-
cation value changes each time.
A man-in-the-middle adversary EM can only attack one step at a time
with an intercept and replay attack. However if EM attacks the scheme when
β = 0 then they can substitute x(n−α),m for the end value of a sub-chain of
their own. This attack would be imperceptible for the whole length of that
sub-chain. Only when B asks for the base value of the spoof sub-chain, and
finds that it does not hash to give x(n−α+1),0, will it become apparent that
the adversary is not A. This attack also prevents A from using their own
sub-chain to prove their identity, so A must sacrifice it and move onto the
next sub-chain.
The scheme as it stands is vulnerable to denial of service attacks and mes-
sage loss. Extensions to this scheme that address these issues are presented
in the original paper.
The d-dimensional hierarchical chain construction can also be extended
to an entity authentication scheme [76]. The analysis of this scheme is very
similar to the analysis of Entity Authentication Scheme 4.15.
4.4.4 Comparison of schemes in this section
A summary of the n-time entity authentication schemes from this section is
given in Table 4.4. Here we use the value 1∗ to denote a value that is 1 during
the majority of sessions, but which occasionally has a different value.
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Scheme Complexity Comm. Cost Init. Security Notes
Init Auth Init Auth Ch. EA EM
4.9 n 0, 1 1 1, 0 A n 13
4.10 n 0, 1 3 1, 0 AP n 13 A
4.11 n 0, i 1 3, 0 AP n 13 B
4.12 O(dn) 0, O(logd n) 1 O(logd n), 0 A n 13
4.13 O(dn) 0, O(logd n) 1 O(logd n), 0 AP n 13 B
4.14 O(dn) 0, O(logd n) 1 O(logd n), 1 A n 5
4.15 2
√
n 0, 1∗ 1 1∗, 0 A n
√
n3 C
Table 4.4: Summary of the n-time entity authentication schemes from this
section. For an explanation of the values and column headings, see Sec-
tion 4.2.5.
Notes
A: This scheme has public verifiability.
B: These schemes can be used to authenticate to many verifiers.
C: Occasionally A sends two values during the authentication phase. When
this happens, B must perform two hash evaluations. During the authentica-
tion phase A must perform approximately (n−√n) hash evaluations to find
the values that were not calculated in the initialisation phase. Each value
must be found before the session in which it is needed.
4.5 Other (mainly n-time) hash-based entity
authentication schemes
In this section we look at some other schemes from the literature. We be-
gin by looking at weakened hash functions and suggest an extension of the
sandwich chain to an entity authentication scheme. We then explore the
comb skipchain construction, which offers unlimited-time entity authentica-
tion without requiring access to a secure channel. We finish by looking at
entity authentication schemes based on the general hash chain and on a hash
chain with breakpoints.
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4.5.1 Using weakened hash functions to improve effi-
ciency
In this section we will use two types of hash functions. The first is a 1-secure
l-bit strong hash function for l suitably large (for example 128 or 256). This
is the type of hash function that we have dealt with for much of this thesis.
The second function is an (1 − )-secure l′-bit hash function, for  ≈ 0 and
l′ < l (for example, l′ could be 32 or 64). We will refer to the latter as a
weakened hash function.
For the purposes of this section we assume that there may exist a weak-
ened hash function that is faster than a standard hash function. This as-
sumption is intuitive, but we do not have a concrete example of a weakened
hash function that proves the point. There has been little research published
on the subject of weakened hash functions and, as we saw in Section 2.7,
there has been a certain amount of trouble creating ‘full size’ hash functions
with predictable security.
Scheme 4.16 is based on a set of weakened hash chains that are tied
together at both ends by stronger commitments to form a sandwich chain [55].
Each weakened hash chain can be used for entity authentication in the same
way that the hash chain is used in Scheme 4.9. However each weakened hash
chain is only secure for a time t, after which we assume an adversary can
find arbitrary preimages. When a weakened hash chain expires, or when it
is exhausted, the strong commitments are used to allow the authenticator to
start using the next weakened hash chain.
An example sandwich chain is shown in Figure 4.4 and the full definition
is given in Section 3.4.6.
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x0,0
f //
gx1,0



x1,0
f //
rr
zz















gx2,0



. . . f //
ss
{{
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
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
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




xs,0
gxs+1,0



ss
{{

















f // xs+1,0
rr
zz
















x0,1
gx1,0



x1,1
gx2,0



. . . xs,1
gxs+1,0



...
gx1,0



...
gx2,0



. . .
...
gxs+1,0



x0,r−1

x1,r−1

. . . xs,r−1

x−1,r // x0,r // x1,r // . . . // xs,r
Figure 4.4: A sandwich chain of length s and depth r. Hash function f is a
strong hash function (Definition 2.10), whereas gi,j is a weakened hash func-
tion. The values in boxes are full sized cryptographic values (e.g. 256 bits)
and the other values are the output of a weakened hash function, which may
be shorter (e.g. 32 bits). The weakened hash function for each vertical chain
is chosen by the value at the top of the next chain.
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.16: A sandwich chain based entity au-
thentication scheme. We will use the notation from the sandwich chain in
Figure 4.4 for this description.
Initialisation
• A creates a sandwich chain of length s and depth r, seeded from two
randomly chosen values x0,0 and x−1,r.
• A A−→ B : (xs+1,0, xs,r).
Entity authentication
• Suppose that the most recent sandwich chain value that B has received
is xi,j, where j > 0. Hence for this purpose the value of interest that
B received during the initialisation phase is xs,r and not xs+1,0.
• If time t has not passed since A sent xi,r, and j ≥ 2, then A sends the
next value in the current weakened hash chain: A→ B : xi,j−1.
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• In this case B checks the weakened hash gxi+1,0(xi,j−1) against xi,j to
validate A’s claim.
• If time t has passed since A sent xi,r, or j = 1, then A sends the last
value of the current weakened hash chain xi,0, and the first value of the
next xi−1,r: A→ B : (xi,0, xi−1,r).
• In this case B can validate A’s claim by checking both values are as
they should be. The first value xi,0 can be hashed and B should find
that f(xi,0) = xi+1,0.
8 The second value xi−1,r can be checked using the
equality xi,r = f(xi−1,r||xi,r−1||xi+1,0).
Given that a fast weakened hash function exists, Scheme 4.16 potentially
requires less computation during both the initialisation phase and the entity
authentication phase than any other n-time entity authentication scheme in
this chapter.
Due to the nature of the values in the sandwich chain, an active adver-
sary EA cannot imitate A without computing the preimage of a hash digest.
This value may be the output of a weakened hash function, and so EA’s task
is vastly easier than for a preimage-resistant hash function. However, we
have assumed the fastest that EA can find such a preimage is in time t, by
which time A and B have moved on to using a new weakened hash function.
Since the weakened hash function for sub-chain i is selected by the value
xi+1,0, it is impossible for EA to begin attacking the chain before xi+1,0 is
released. If the weakened hash function was chosen in a predictable manner
(for example by using the sub-chain index i) then EA could begin attacking
the sub-chain before it came into use (for example by compiling rainbow
tables [97] for it).
A man-in-the-middle adversary cannot change any of the values that A
sends, as they are all linked to values which B has already received. They
can however intercept an authentication message that A sends and use it
instead.
8Note that B could also check xi,0 against the rest of the weakened hash chain. However
A might have sent xi,0 precisely because the weakened hash chain has become compro-
mised.
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4.5.2 Comb skipchain construction
The comb skipchain construction (Definition 3.16) is equivalent to seeding
a hash chain with the public key of a one-time signature scheme (see De-
finition 3.15). The signature from the one-time signature scheme is used
(when appropriate) to authenticate another comb skipchain end value (see
Figure 4.6). This idea was presented by Hu et al. in [55], which extends work
from [53]. In [43] a similar method of joining one-time signature schemes to
hash chains is suggested, but it is less suited to entity authentication.
The comb skipchain can be used to authenticate an unlimited number of
times from one initialisation. In addition it does not require a secure channel.
It is the first scheme that we have discussed with both of these properties.
One-time
signature
scheme
// x0 // x1 // · · · // xn
Figure 4.5: A comb skipchain construction.
One-time
signature
scheme s0
// x0,0 // x0,1 // · · · // x0,n
One-time
signature
scheme s1
// x1,0 // x1,1 // · · · // x1,n
s0(x1,n)
jj
One-time
signature
scheme s2
// x2,0 // x2,1 // · · · // x2,n
s1(x2,n)
jj
Figure 4.6: A figure showing how three comb skipchain constructions are
tied together to make one long chain. The advantage over using hash chains
is that the one-time signature can be used to verify the last value in the
next chain, no matter what that value is. Thus more comb skipchains can
be generated as and when they are needed, without the need for another
initialisation phase.
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Entity Authentication Scheme 4.17: The comb skipchain entity authen-
tication scheme. This description is based on the comb skipchain construc-
tions in Figure 4.6.
Initialisation
• A forms a comb skipchain seeded from a one-time signature scheme s0
and a hash chain {p0, x0,0, . . . , x0,n} of length n + 1 seeded from its
public key p0.
• A sends the end value x0,n to B using an authenticated channel A A−→
B : x0,n.
Entity authentication
• If the last value that A sent to B was xi,j, with j ∈ [1, n], then
A sends xi,j−1 to B: A→ B : xi,j−1.
• If the last value that A sent to B was xi,0 then A sends the value pi
to B: A→ B : pi.
• In either of these cases B can verify A’s identity by hashing the value
just received to check that the result is the same as the previous value
received.
• If the last value that A sent to B was pi then A creates a new one-time
signature scheme si+1 and uses it to seed a new comb skipchain.
• A creates a signature on the end value from the new chain using the
one-time signature scheme that seeded the previous chain. A sends this
value and its signature to B: A→ B : (xi+1,n, si(xi+1,n)).
• B can verify the signature against the public key value pi, and accepts
A and the value xi+1,n as authentic if successful.
This scheme is secure against active adversaries and may only be attacked
one value at a time by man-in-the-middle adversaries using an intercept and
replay attack.
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A typical one-time signature scheme requires more computation than a
hash chain, so this approach will not be suited to the most light-weight of
applications. However, without access to a secure channel and with only one
use of an authenticated channel, it can provide unlimited entity authentica-
tions.
4.5.3 General hash chain
One as yet unconsidered problem with the hash chain based entity authenti-
cation scheme (Scheme 4.9) arises if an adversary somehow manages to get
hold of the ith authentication value xi while the authenticating parties are
only up to the jth authentication value xj (j < i).
The adversary would be able to generate all authentication values between
xi and xj from xi, and therefore could impersonate A several times. This
is addressed by Bradford and Gavrylyako using general hash chains (see
Section 3.4.7) [16].
x0 99x1
##
99x2
//
##
99x3 //
""
99x4 //
""
99· · · //
""
99· · · //
##· · · // xn
Figure 4.7: A general hash chain of length n and depth 3. The first three
values {x0, x1, x2} are the seeds. All the remaining values are generated from
these three values using the equation xi = f(xi−3||xi−2||xi−1).
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.18: The general hash chain entity au-
thentication scheme from [16] with a general hash chain of length n and
depth d. See Figure 4.7 for an example of a general hash chain.
Initialisation
• A picks d random values {x0, . . . , xd−1}, and uses them to seed a general
hash chain of length n and depth d.
• A sends a list of values to B: A A−→ B : {xn, xn−1, . . . , xn−d+1}.
• B stores the next session number i (initially i = 1).
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Entity authentication number i
• A announces they intend to authenticate to B.
• B sends A the session number i.
• A→ B : xn−i.
• B checks that xn−i = f(xn−i−d||xn−i−d+1|| . . . ||xn−i−1) using the previ-
ously received authentication values.
A general hash chain of length n and depth d only allows n − d + 1 au-
thentications, because d of the values are used during the initialisation phase.
Note that if d = 1, we have exactly the same scheme as Entity Authentication
Scheme 4.9.
The only difference in the security analysis between this scheme and
Scheme 4.9 is that if an adversary gets hold of an authentication value xi
before it has been used, that adversary cannot generate any other authenti-
cation values from the stolen value. In contrast, if an adversary obtains an
authentication value xi in Scheme 4.9 then they can generate all authenti-
cation values xj with j > i. With Scheme 4.18, an adversary has to steal
d consecutive values before they can begin generating other authentication
values.
4.5.4 Hash chain with breakpoints
Another construction which deals with the issue of an adversary who has
discovered a hash chain value ahead of time is a scheme due to Goyal [42].
The idea is to have the hash chain generated from two sources, so that if
an adversary gets hold of an authentication value before it is used then it
only reveals a few other values. The hash chain with breakpoints is defined
in Section 3.4.8 and an example is shown in Figure 4.8. We give an entity
authentication scheme based on this in Scheme 4.19.
CHAPTER 4. ENTITY AUTHENTICATION 104
s // x0 // x1 // · · · // xd // xd+1 // · · · // x2d // · · · // xrd
b0
OO
b1
OO
b2
OO
· · · br
OO
s
mmZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
iiTTTTTTTTTTTT
;;xxxxx
33ggggggggggggggggg
Figure 4.8: Hash chain with break points distance d apart seed s (from [42]).
Entity Authentication Scheme 4.19: Entity authentication based on a
hash chain with breakpoints distance d apart.
Initialisation
• A chooses a seed s at random and generates a hash chain of length rd
with breakpoints distance d apart.
• A sends the end value to B: A A−→ B : xrd.
Entity authentication number i
• If i is not divisible by d then A sends the next value of the chain A→
B : xrd−i.
• If i is divisible by d then A sends the next authentication value and the
corresponding breakpoint value: A→ B : (xrd−i, br−i/d).
• B can verify whatever they are sent by hashing to compare with the
previous authentication value.
If a value is stolen by an adversary before it has been used then it only
reveals a few values after it, the breakpoints prevent all the other values
being derived from it. If, instead, an adversary somehow steals a breakpoint
value then they obtain no authentication values.
4.5.5 Summary of schemes in this section
In Table 4.5 we provide a comparison of the schemes we have looked at in
this section. Here we use the value 1∗ to denote a value that is 1 during the
majority of sessions, but which occasionally has a different value.
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Scheme Complexity Comm. Cost Init. Security Notes
Init Auth Init Auth Channel EA EM
4.16 O(n) 0, 1∗ 2 1∗, 0 A n 13 A
4.17 s+O(n) 0, 1∗ 1 1∗, 0 A ∞ 13 B
4.18 n 0, 1 d 1, 0 A n 13 C
4.19 O(n) 0, 1 1 1∗, 0 A n 13 D
Table 4.5: Summary of the entity authentication schemes in Section 4.5. For
an explanation of the values and column headings see Section 4.2.5.
Notes
A: It is possible that short digest hash functions may require less computation
than the hash functions used in other schemes. Occasionally A will send two
values to B, and when this happens B may have to perform O(
√
n) hash
evaluations.
B: We assume we are using the one-time signature scheme from Section 5.4.3,
and that our cryptographic values have b bits. The value s can be computed
as ( b
0.32
− 1). Every n sessions A sends about 6b
8
values, and B must perform
approximately s
2
hash evaluations to verify.
C: If somehow an adversary gets hold of an authentication value before it
has been used, they cannot use it to generate other values in the chain (as
they would be able to in Scheme 4.9). An adversary must steal d consecutive
values before this attack can be used.
D: If somehow an adversary gets hold of an authentication value early on in
the chain, they can only discover at most d authentication values. If the same
thing happened in Scheme 4.9 then potentially all the authentication values
would be compromised. Every d sessions A must send two values to B.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we investigated the application of hash structures from Chap-
ter 3 to entity authentication. We presented the notion of public verifiability,
and showed that some existing schemes are publicly verifiable. We presented
an entity authentication scheme based on the chained pseudo-random num-
ber generator which has the minimum storage requirements possible of an
entity authentication scheme secure against eavesdroppers. We presented a
Merkle tree based entity authentication scheme suitable for use with many
verifiers. We compared these with other existing hash-based schemes from
the literature.
Chapter 5
Signatures
In the previous chapter we studied the applications of hash functions and
hash structures to entity authentication. In this chapter we continue our
investigation by looking at the applications of hash structures to message
authentication, and in particular, signatures.
We begin the chapter with a brief introduction to message authentication.
We then continue by studying some existing one-time signature schemes,
and look at how one-time signature schemes can be formed on generalised
hash DAGs. We present an algorithm which finds signature schemes for
any given generalised hash DAG. We then present some concrete examples
of one-time signature schemes based on generalised hash DAGs, including
two new examples which are more efficient than any other usable schemes
that we know of. Finally, we look at k-time signature schemes and address
the issue of creating a suitable efficiency measure. We present the notions of
‘perforated’ and ‘porous’ k-time signature schemes, and look at some schemes
that illustrate these definitions.
5.1 Introduction to message authentication
We start this section by looking at message integrity and message authen-
tication codes. We look at how hash structures are used in data integrity
schemes. We give some important definitions relating to signatures and in-
troduce the notion of a one-time signature.
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5.1.1 Checksums and data integrity schemes
A very simple form of message authentication is authentication with a check-
sum. A checksum is a hash function (Definition 2.6) used to detect accidental
corruption of data. The exact choice of hash function will be application de-
pendent (for example see [149] for an analysis of the choice of hash function
used to compute ISBN-10 checksums).
Although checksums can be used to detect accidental changes to a mes-
sage, they do not give much protection against active adversaries. There is
no requirement for a checksum to be second preimage resistant, and so it may
be easy for the adversary to find another message with the same checksum.
The following scheme is very suitable for large file systems, or for version
management of large projects. It is most well suited for environments where
only a few files (or only a few parts of files) change at once. It is used in
many peer to peer file sharing applications [3, 73, 140, 152].
Data Integrity Scheme 5.1: A data integrity scheme for a file system con-
taining files {m0, . . . ,mn−1}, using a weak hash function f (Definition 2.8).
This scheme can also be used to provide data integrity for a large file split
into n sections {m0, . . . ,mn−1}.
Initialisation
• The file manager A computes and stores the hash of each file {f(m0),
. . . , f(mn−1)}.
• A creates a hash tree seeded by the hashes of each file and stores all the
intermediate values. Note that if we consider the hash tree together
with the original files then we have a Merkle tree (Definition 3.4).
• A A−→ P : xr, where xr is the root value of the hash tree.
Update
• When a file mi is changed, A computes the hash of the new file.
• A only needs to perform a hash for each vertex on the path from the
affected leaf to the root, as the rest of the hash tree values have not
changed.
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• A can perform multiple updates at once by recomputing all affected
hash tree values.
Choosing the shape of the Merkle tree is an application dependent prob-
lem. If some files are very related, and are likely to be changed at the same
time, then it would be sensible to place them on leaves that are siblings of
each other.
5.1.2 Message authentication codes
The simplest form of message authentication secure against an active adver-
sary is a ‘message authentication code’ (or ‘MAC’). Communicating parties
share a secret key x and append to a message m the message authentication
code MAC (x,m).
It is beyond the scope of this document to discuss MACs in detail, but
there are many relationships between MACs and hash functions. For a more
detailed discussion of MACs, see [83] Section 9.5.
Message Authentication Scheme 5.2: Message authentication using a
message authentication code.
Initialisation
• A chooses a secret key x and shares it with the authorised recipient B:
A
S−→ B : x.
Message authentication
• If A wishes to send an authenticated message m over an unprotected
channel then A generates a MAC for the message MAC (x,m).
• A sends the message and the MAC to B: A→ B : (m, MAC (x,m)).
• B uses the message m and the secret key x to generate the MAC.
Assuming that it is the same value they received from A, they accept
the message as authentic.
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An active adversary cannot change the message m without also changing
the MAC; otherwise the recipient B will discover that the message has been
altered. The adversary cannot generate a MAC for any new message without
knowledge of the key x.
Although message authentication codes are robust, efficient and fairly
straightforward, relying on a MAC for message authentication has three ma-
jor limitations:
1. The message can only be authenticated by a party who knows the secret
key.
2. Any party who knows the secret key can forge a MAC. This is not an
issue for applications where the recipients have no reason to imperson-
ate the sender. However in some applications it may be necessary to
guard against this, or provide the capacity to change which users have
access to the secret key.
3. Scheme 5.2 requires a secure channel for initialisation. In the next
section we will look at signatures, which in general do not have this
constraint.
5.1.3 Hash functions and conventional digital signa-
tures
The aim of a digital signature scheme is to facilitate the binding of a message
with the originating entity. A digital signature indicates that the signer
‘agrees’ with the contents of the message.
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Menezes et al. give the following definitions [83]:
Definition 5.1. A digital signature is a data string which associates a
message (in digital form) with some originating entity.
A digital signature generation algorithm (signature generation al-
gorithm, or signing algorithm) is a method for producing a digital signature.
A digital signature verification algorithm (or verification algorithm)
is a method for verifying that a digital signature is authentic (i.e. was indeed
created by the specified entity). A digital signature scheme consists of a
signature generation algorithm and an associated verification algorithm.
Although we have used a definition of a digital signature scheme which
contains two algorithms, there is a third which is also sometimes included.
Before any messages can be signed, a ‘key generation’ algorithm must be run
by each entity to generate a private and public key pair (ks, kp). The public
key kp is sent or made available to anyone who may be required to validate
a signed message.
The size of a signature scheme is the order of the image of the signature
generation algorithm.
We note that some signature schemes allow message recovery from the
signature itself, whereas others form a separate signature which should be
sent along with the original message. Some of our schemes can be used with
message recovery, but we will only be considering the appended signature
model, as this is by far the most common in practice.
The signing algorithm maps messages from a (potentially unbounded) set
M to a finite set S. Most schemes use a signing algorithm consisting of a
strong hash function f (see Definition 2.10) to map M onto a finite set R,
followed by a mathematical algorithm s : R×K → S taking the output of f
and the private key ks as inputs.
The hash function f must also be second preimage resistant otherwise
the scheme will be susceptible to an obvious forgery. An adversary can take
a valid message signature pair and create a new one using the same signature
by appending it to a second preimage of the message.
The hash function must be collision resistant if it is to resist an attack
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in which the adversary can get the signer to sign a message. In this attack,
the adversary finds a collision m, m′ under the hash function, asks for the
signature for m, and then appends it to m′.
An advantage of using a hash function as the first part of the signing
algorithm is that it allows us to extend a signature scheme that can sign
messages from a finite set to a signature scheme that can cope with any
message. Another related reason is that for very long messages, reducing the
message size using a hash function is much more efficient than applying a
(slower) mathematical algorithm to the whole message. The mathematical
algorithm should also be resistant to a ‘lucky adversary’ who guesses the
output correctly, by making sure that the output space is reasonably large
(128- or 256-bit strings are commonly used).
The verification algorithm usually works by inverting the mathematical
algorithm used in the signing phase using the public key and comparing the
result with the hash of the message (computed from the received message).
If the two are the same then the signature is accepted as valid.
For the rest of this chapter we will mainly focus on the mathematical
function s, rather than the strong hash function f . Consequently we will
treat the message m and the hash f(m) as ‘equivalent’, and may use the
term ‘message’ when we actually mean f(m).
5.1.4 Digital signatures based on hash functions
Many digital signature schemes are based on one-way trapdoor functions,
which are functions that are always easy to compute in one direction, but only
easy to compute in the opposite direction with some additional information
(in this case the private key). In practice, for most trapdoor functions there
is no proof of the absolute hardness of computation in the reverse direction.
Instead the reverse computation is shown to be as difficult as some underlying
mathematical problem. Table 5.1 summarises some existing trapdoor related
signature schemes.
However, signature schemes can be based on hash functions instead of
trapdoor functions. Many such signature schemes are one-time signature
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Signature scheme Underlying mathematical problem
Full domain hash [6] The RSA problem
DSA [93] Discrete logarithm problem
ECDSA [155] Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
ElGamal signature scheme Discrete logarithm problem
Rabin signature scheme Large integer factorisation problem
Table 5.1: Some existing trapdoor related signature schemes and their un-
derlying mathematical problems.
schemes (see Definition 3.15), that is signature schemes which can sign at
most one message without risk of forgery. In compensation for this obvious
drawback, it is usual for one-time signature schemes to be more computation-
ally efficient than ‘many-time’ trapdoor-based signature schemes (although
this is not necessarily the case). Some one-time signature schemes are not
primarily based on hash functions, but as they are also generally less efficient
we will not consider them further.
Another benefit of only using hash functions is less dependence on spe-
cific mathematical problems. For example, if an efficient solution to the dis-
crete logarithm problem is found then DSA signatures will become insecure,
whereas if a signature scheme solely based on SHA-256 is broken then it may
be possible to continue using the scheme by deploying another hash func-
tion instead. If quantum computing becomes more practical then all of the
mathematical problems in Table 5.1 may become feasible to solve [113, 126].
A third advantage of one-time signatures over deterministic one-way trap-
door based signatures is that the latter are subject to attacks based on re-
peated signature use. One-time signatures are not vulnerable to such attacks
because the signature for a particular message changes each time the scheme
is reinitialised, which is once per message.
Some signature schemes can be used at most k times before a forgery
is possible, and we will refer to these as k-time signature schemes. There
are also schemes for combining several one-time signature schemes under one
public key to make k-time signature schemes, or schemes which can be used
indefinitely. We will look at these in Section 5.5.
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5.2 One-time signatures
We begin this section by looking at some one-time signature schemes based
on hash functions and hash chains. Next we consider the Vaudenay’s rake
one-time signature scheme, which generalises all the previous schemes. After
this we consider the improvements that can be made to these schemes by
using hash trees and Merkle trees. Finally we generalise from hash trees to
generalised hash DAGs, and look at some important results on the efficiency
of one-time signature schemes due to Bleichenbacher and Maurer [11].
5.2.1 Simple chain-based schemes
In this section we will look at three simple hash-based and hash chain based
one-time signature schemes. We start by looking at arguably the most sim-
ple example of a one-time signature scheme, the Diffie-Lamport one-time
signature scheme. Next we study the Winternitz one-time signature scheme,
which generalises the Diffie-Lamport scheme by using hash chains instead of
hash functions. Finally we examine the Diffie-Lamport-Merkle one-time sig-
nature scheme, which uses an improvement suggested by Merkle to improve
the efficiency of the original Diffie-Lamport scheme.
5.2.1.1 The Diffie-Lamport one-time signature scheme
The first published one-time signature scheme based on hash functions was
due to Rabin in 1978 [114]. It is rather inefficient and so we will instead look
at Lamport’s similar scheme from 1979 [68], which is slightly more efficient
and much more straightforward.
The scheme uses a preimage-resistant hash function f . It is important
that an adversary cannot find a preimage, as this would allow them to forge
a signature on an unsigned message.
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Signature Scheme 5.3: The Diffie-Lamport scheme for signing messages
with n-bit hash outputs.
Key Generation Algorithm
• Signer A picks {x0, . . . , x2n−1} uniformly at random from {0, 1}n.
• Signer A computes {y0, . . . , y2n−1} by yi = f(xi).
• The set {y0, . . . , y2n−1} is published as A’s public key.
Signature Generation Algorithm
• To sign a hash value m, A releases as the signature the following set of
private key values:
{s0, . . . , sn−1} = {x2i+mi : i ∈ [0, n− 1],mi is the ith bit of m}.
Verification Algorithm
• The verifier can check the signature {s0, . . . , sn−1} by checking that for
each bit of the message mi the following equality holds:
f(si) = y2i+mi .
If an adversary is to change any bit of the message and preserve the
signature then they must find the private key value for the corresponding
bit. This is equivalent to finding a preimage of the hash function for that
public key value and so the scheme is secure.
However, if A signs two messages using the same private key then there
is a good chance that the adversary will be able to use the two signatures to
forge a third signature. We give an example of this in Figure 5.1.
5.2.1.2 The Winternitz one-time signature scheme
Shortly after Lamport published the Diffie-Lamport scheme, Winternitz sug-
gested a generalisation of it. His idea appears in Merkle’s paper [85].
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y0 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
First signature:
m = 011 x0
OO
x1
OO
x2
OO
x3
OO
x4
OO
x5
OO
y0 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
Second signature:
m = 101 x0
OO
x1
OO
x2
OO
x3
OO
x4
OO
x5
OO
y0 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
Forged signature:
m = 001 x0
OO
x1
OO
x2
OO
x3
OO
x4
OO
x5
OO
Figure 5.1: TOP and MIDDLE: A Diffie-Lamport one-time signature scheme
is used to reveal two signatures (the signatures for the messages 011 and 101).
BOTTOM: An adversary could use these two signatures to forge others (for
example the signature for the message 001).
Instead of representing the message in binary, Winternitz suggested rep-
resenting it in another base (say base r). We now consider a message m from
a message space of n digit numbers in base r. We still use public and private
keys consisting of 2n values, but now we define the public key values as the
end values of hash chains seeded with xi: yi = f
r−1(xi). The scheme is based
on the use of a preimage-resistant hash function f (see Definition 2.7).
Signature Scheme 5.4: The Winternitz scheme for signing messages with
n digit hash outputs in base r.
Key Generation Algorithm
• Signer A picks {x0, . . . , x2n−1} uniformly at random from {0, 1}n.
• Signer A computes {y0, . . . , y2n−1} as yi = f r−1(xi).
• The set {y0, . . . , y2n−1} is published as A’s public key.
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Signature Generation Algorithm
• Signer A computes s2i = f r−mi−1(x2i) and s2i+1 = fmi(x2i+1) for each
digit mi of the message.
• The signature is the set of values {s0, . . . , s2n−1}.
Verification Algorithm
• The verifier can check y2i = fmi(s2i) and y2i+1 = f r−mi−1(s2i+1) for
each digit mi of the message.
If we set r to 2 then the Winternitz scheme becomes the Diffie-Lamport
scheme (Scheme 5.3), except that one of the two signature values for each
digit of m is equivalent to a value in the public key for that digit and so does
not need releasing.
If an adversary wishes to create a forgery on a message that was not
signed then they must change at least one digit of the message and find
a valid signature for that digit. Without loss of generality, we consider a
forgery for the ith digit mi. If the adversary increases the digit then they
will have to find a preimage for s2i = f
r−mi−1(x2i). If they decrease the digit
then they will have to find a preimage for s2i+1 = f
mi(x2i+1). We assume
that this is hard for a preimage-resistant hash function, so the Winternitz
scheme is secure.
5.2.1.3 The Diffie-Lamport-Merkle one-time signature scheme
In [84] Merkle suggested an improvement to Scheme 5.3 which was based
around only signing the ‘one’ bits of the message. This means that only one
secret key value is needed for each bit of the message. However, in order to
avoid forgeries which simply replace 1’s in the message with 0’s, it is necessary
to append to the message a count of the zeros. This means that the private
and public keys need to be n + dlog2(n + 1)e values long (compared to 2n
values in the original Diffie-Lamport scheme).
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Signature Scheme 5.5: The Diffie-Lamport-Merkle scheme for n-bit mes-
sages. An example of the values used in this scheme when n = 7 is given in
Figure 5.2.
Key Generation Algorithm
• SignerA picks {x0, . . . , xn+dlog2(n+1)e−1} uniformly at random from {0, 1}n.
• Signer A computes {y0, . . . , yn+dlog2(n+1)e−1} by yi = f(xi).
• The set {y0, . . . , yn+dlog2(n+1)e−1} is published as A’s public key.
Signature Generation Algorithm
• Signer A definesm′ as the concatenation ofm, the message to be signed,
with a dlog2(n+ 1)e-bit count of the number of ‘zero’ bits in m.
• A releases as the signature the following set of private key values:
{xi : m′i = 1, where m′i is the ith bit of m′}.
Verification Algorithm
• The verifier computes m′ from m, as described in the signature gener-
ation algorithm.
• The verifier then checks that for all ‘one’ bits of m′ they have been
provided with a valid preimage for the corresponding public key value.
y0 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9
x0
OO
x1
OO
x2
OO
x3
OO
x4
OO
x5
OO
x6
OO
x7
OO
x8
OO
x9
OO
Figure 5.2: The Diffie-Lamport-Merkle one-time signature scheme for 7-bit
messages. The values corresponding to the signature for the message m =
1001010 are highlighted with boxes. Note that 1001010 has four zeros, and
the binary representation of four is 100, so m′ = 1001010100, as defined in
Signature Scheme 5.5.
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If an adversary wants to make a forgery from an existing signature then
they must (at least) either change a 0 to a 1 or (if no 0’s have been changed
to 1’s) a 1 to a 0. If they try to change a 0 to a 1 then they must find a
preimage of the hash function at the public key value corresponding to the
changed bit. If they only change 1’s to 0’s then the adversary increases the
number of 0’s in the message, and so at least one 0 will change to a 1 in the
count of the number of zeros field. This will require finding a preimage of the
hash function for the corresponding public key value. Since it is assumed to
be infeasible to find a preimage of the hash function, the scheme is considered
secure.
There is also a fairly straightforward extension of the Winternitz scheme
(Scheme 5.4) to a Winternitz-Merkle scheme. When signing messages with
n digits in base r, the scheme requires n+ dlogr(n(r−1)+1)e hash chains of
length r−1. The first n are used as before to ensure that the signed message
digits cannot be decreased, and the remaining digits are used to sign the
difference between n(r − 1) and the sum of the message digits. The latter
signing ensures that message digits cannot be increased without computing
a preimage of a hash function.
5.2.2 Vaudenay’s rake
In this section we will look at a natural generalisation of the schemes from
the last section, Vaudenay’s rake. We will define some terms that will come
in useful later in the chapter and consider how to find the most efficient one-
time signature scheme on Vaudenay’s rake (which we will call ‘Vaudenay’s
optimal rake one-time signature scheme’).
5.2.2.1 Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature scheme
The Winternitz-Merkle one-time signature scheme is not the most efficient
use of hash chains for signing messages. In [142] Vaudenay proposed a gener-
alisation of the Winternitz scheme and the Winternitz-Merkle scheme, which
we will refer to as ‘Vaudenay’s rake’ and which is in Signature Scheme 5.6.1
1The description of this scheme as a rake is due to Bleichenbacher and Maurer [10].
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Vaudenay also proposed a specific instance of the scheme, which Bleichen-
bacher and Maurer [10] proved was an optimal use of hash chains to produce
signatures, in the sense that for the same size of message space the ‘opti-
mal rake’ scheme typically requires fewer hash chains, and so has a smaller
private and public key. The ‘optimal rake’ scheme is described in detail in
Signature Scheme 5.7.
Definition 5.2. A signature pattern for a one-time signature scheme
based on a set of r hash chains {{x0,0, . . . , x0,l}, . . . , {xr−1,0, . . . , xr−1,l}} is
a set Ui of vertices, such that Ui contains exactly one vertex from each hash
chain.2
We denote the set of signature patterns by U .
We let Ui = {ui,0, . . . , ui,r−1}, such that ui,k is the vertex in signature
pattern Ui that is also in the hash chain {xk,0, . . . , xk,l}.
Therefore, for each Ui there is a set of integers {s0, . . . , sr−1} such that
ui,k = xk,sk for all k. For convenience we may also refer to {s0, . . . , sr−1} as
the signature pattern.
An example of a signature pattern is given in Figure 5.3.
x0,2 x1,2 x2,2 x3,2
x0,1
OO
x1,1
OO
x2,1
OO
x3,1
OO
x0,0
OO
x1,0
OO
x2,0
OO
x3,0
OO
Figure 5.3: Vaudenay’s rake with 4 chains of length 2. A signature pattern
Ui = {ui,0, ui,1, ui,2, ui,3} = {x0,1, x1,2, x2,0, x3,0} is marked with the boxes.
The signing algorithm for Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature scheme is
made up of three functions. The first, as discussed in Section 5.1.3, is a hash
function f :M→ R. The other two are the signature pattern function and
the evaluation function.
2We will usually wish to consider families of signature patterns, and so use Ui to
represent a signature pattern, as opposed to U .
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Definition 5.3. The Vaudenay’s rake signature pattern function θ :
f(M) → U is a function which takes as input a message m ∈ M, and
outputs a signature pattern Ui ∈ U from the scheme. The function should
be easy to compute and easy for the signer to publish. The function should
also be such that for any two signature patterns Ui and Uj there exist hash
chains {xk,0, . . . , xk,l} and {xk′,0, . . . , xk′,l} such that ui,k is not on the path
from xk,0 to uj,k and uj,k′ is not on the path from xk′,0 to ui,k′ .
The Vaudenay’s rake evaluation function ψ : U ×K → S is a function
which takes a signature pattern and a private key and outputs a signature.
The signature consists of the value at each vertex in the signature pattern.
The Vaudenay’s rake verification function υ : M× S × K → {0, 1}
takes a message, signature and public key and outputs a value indicating
whether the signature is valid for the message and public key. This can
be computed by finding the signature pattern from the message and then
hashing from the values given in the signature to find the end value of each
chain, and then comparing with the public key.
In Figure 5.4 we give an example of Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature
scheme and the corresponding signature pattern function. We note that for
small examples like this it is acceptable to use a look-up table as the signature
pattern function, but for larger message spaces (for example the set of 128-bit
hash values) a look-up table could become unmanageable.
We note that the Winternitz and Winternitz-Merkle schemes are both
based on a set of hash chains where each signature consists of a set of values,
one from each chain. To prevent a forgery, the set of values for any signa-
ture must not be obtainable from the set of values for any other signature.
Vaudenay’s generalisation (Scheme 5.6) also uses a set of hash chains and
each signature consists of a value from each chain with the same property
required to prevent forgeries.
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x0,2 x1,2 x2,2
x0,1
OO
x1,1
OO
x2,1
OO
x0,0
OO
x1,0
OO
x2,0
OO
Hash Values revealed
value as signature
000 x0,0, x1,1, x2,2
001 x0,0, x1,2, x2,1
010 x0,1, x1,0, x2,2
011 x0,1, x1,1, x2,1
100 x0,1, x1,2, x2,0
101 x0,2, x1,0, x2,1
110 x0,2, x1,1, x2,0
Figure 5.4: An example of Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature scheme. On
the left is a set of three hash chains on which the signature scheme is based.
On the right is a look-up table for the signature pattern function of our
signature scheme.
Signature Scheme 5.6: Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature scheme from [142].
Key Generation Algorithm
• Signer A picks r values {x0,0, . . . , xr−1,0} at random. This will be the
private key ks for the scheme.
• A creates r hash chains, each of length l, seeded by {x0,0, . . . , xr−1,0}.
• A publishes the end value of each chain {x0,l, . . . , xr−1,l} as the public
key kp for the scheme.
• It is essential that the signature pattern function θ is known, or can
easily be found, by any potential verifier.
Signature Generation Algorithm
• The signer A applies the signature pattern function θ to the f(m) to
find which signature pattern should be used.
• A computes the value at each vertex indicated by the signature pattern
from the private key values {x0,0, . . . , xr−1,0}.
• A releases the set of all these values {s0, . . . , sr−1} as the signature.
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Verification Algorithm
• The verifier B applies the signature pattern function to the message m
to find the signature pattern for the message.
• For each value si in the signature, B hashes along the chain to find
the chain’s end value xi,l. B then checks that this is the same as the
corresponding value in the public key.
• If all the signature values validate against the public key then B accepts
the signature as authentic.
It is important that A only uses the signature scheme once, as if they
reveal signatures on more than one message it is likely that an adversary
could forge signatures on other messages. We consider the example of Signa-
ture Scheme 5.6 with three chains of length two, and the signature pattern
function given in Figure 5.4. If A signs two messages with hash values 011
and 101, then an eavesdropper can obtain the values x0,1, x1,1, x2,1, x0,2 and
x1,0. Using x2,1 the adversary can compute x2,2 and then will possess all
the values they need to create a forgery on a message with hash value 010
(x0,1, x1,0 and x2,2).
Before we look at the largest Vaudenay’s rake scheme for a given set of
hash chains (which we will call Vaudenay’s optimal rake scheme), we will first
explore a particular family of Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature schemes.
5.2.2.2 Constant sum Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature schemes
In this section we examine a family of Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature
schemes. We look at some research by Bleichenbacher and Maurer [10] who
suggested a method to compute the size of these signature schemes, but did
not give a proof. We present a new method by which the size of the signature
schemes can be computed, and provide a proof of correctness. Finally we give
a result from [10] which shows that this family contains the largest signature
scheme for any given number and length of hash chains.
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We start by presenting the family of signature schemes and, since we
could not find it in the literature, we also provide a proof that these are
indeed signature schemes.
Theorem 5.4. For a set of r hash chains seeded by {x0,0, . . . , xr−1,0} and
each of length l, we can form a signature scheme by including all signature
patterns {x0,s0 , . . . , xr−1,sr−1} satisfying:
r−1∑
i=0
si = k, (5.1)
where k is a constant.
Proof Firstly we note that any set of vertices {x0,s0 , . . . , xr−1,sr−1} is a
signature pattern, because there is exactly one vertex in it from each hash
chain.
For the set of signature patterns to be a signature scheme they must also
satisfy the property that, for any two signature patterns {x0,s0 , . . . , xr−1,sr−1}
and {x0,s′0 , . . . , xr−1,s′r−1}, there exist hash chains xc,∗ and xc′,∗ such that xc,sc
is not on the path from xc,0 to xc,s′c and xc′,s′c′ is not on the path from xc
′,0 to
xc′,sc′ . This is equivalent to saying that for any two signature patterns there
exist c and c′ such that sc > s′c and s
′
c′ > sc′ . Since the two ordered sets of
values s∗ and s′∗ are not identical, there must exist c such that, without loss
of generality, sc > s
′
c. Given this, and that
∑r−1
i=0 si = k =
∑r−1
i=0 s
′
i, there
must also exist c′ such that s′c′ > sc′ .
We will refer to the signature scheme on r hash chains of length l formed
by all signature patterns {x0,s0 , . . . , xr−1,sr−1} satisfying (5.1) as S(r, l, k). We
are mainly interested in the size of S(r, l, k).
In [10] Bleichenbacher and Maurer gave, without proof, an equation to
compute |S(r, l, k)|:
|S(r, l, k)| =
bk/(l+1)c∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
r
j
)(
r + k − j(l + 1)− 1
r − 1
)
. (5.2)
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Since no proof of (5.2) was provided (and since we have not been able to
create a proof ourselves) we present another method to compute |S(r, l, k)|,
for which there is a fairly straightforward proof of correctness.
Theorem 5.5. For a signature scheme S(r, l, k) as described above, the fol-
lowing relations hold:
|S(1, l, k)| =
{
1 if k ∈ [0, l]
0 otherwise.
(5.3)
|S(r, l, k)| =
min(l,k)∑
i=0
|S(r − 1, l, k − i)| if r ≥ 2 (5.4)
Proof In (5.3) we are considering signature schemes with only one hash
chain. We observe that all signature patterns contain only one value {x0,s0},
and that s0 is restricted to values in [0, l]. Consequently if k ∈ [0, l] then
|S(1, l, k)| = 1, otherwise |S(1, l, k)| = 0.
To prove (5.4), we rewrite (5.1) to get:
k = sr−1 +
r−2∑
i=0
si,
and note that we are interested in the number of combinations of values of
s∗ which add to make k. The number of ways to make k − sr−1 with r − 1
chains has already been computed (by induction this is true, as (5.3) implies
it is true for r = 2), and so we can sum the combinations over the different
values of sr−1. Hence,
|S(r, l, k)| =
l∑
sr−1=0
|S(r − 1, l, k − sr−1)|.
However, when sr−1 > k, there are no ways to add non-negative values
and get a negative value. Consequently, we get (5.4):
|S(r, l, k)| =
min(l,k)∑
i=0
|S(r − 1, l, k − i)| if r ≥ 2.
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From (5.3) and (5.4) we can compute |S(r, l, k)| for all r ≥ 1, l ≥ 0 and
k ≥ 0.
In [10] Bleichenbacher and Maurer used the Sperner property from [132]
to show that the signature scheme S(r, l, b rl
2
c) is the largest signature scheme
that can be formed on r chains of length l. We will refer to the fam-
ily S(r, l, b rl
2
c) as Vaudenay’s optimal rake one-time signature scheme.
5.2.2.3 Vaudenay’s optimal rake one-time signature scheme
Signature Scheme 5.7: Given a set of r hash chains of length l, {x0,0, . . . , x0,l},
. . . , {xr−1,0, . . . , xr−1,l}, Vaudenay’s optimal rake one-time signature scheme
is the specific instance of Signature Scheme 5.6 where the set of signature pat-
terns is defined to be every signature pattern of the form {x0,s0 , . . . , xr−1,sr−1}
satisfying:
r−1∑
i=0
si =
⌊
rl
2
⌋
.
Although Signature Scheme 5.7 is the largest signature scheme on a given
set of hash chains, it is not necessarily the best scheme to use in practice. To
use Vaudenay’s rake one-time signature scheme it is also necessary to have an
efficient signature pattern function. There is currently no known ‘efficient’
mapping for Vaudenay’s scheme.3
5.2.2.4 Further optimisation
Using Signature Scheme 5.7 we can, for given r and l, find the largest signa-
ture scheme possible. However, in practice we are more likely to know the
size of our message space and want to know how large r and l must be. One
way to handle this is by trial and improvement; try a pair of values r and l,
find the largest signature scheme, adjust r and l, then repeat.
Even if we find a small pair of values r and l which provide us with a large
enough signature scheme, it is likely that we will get more than one pair. For
example, if we wanted to be able to provide a signature on a message space
3We have seen no signature pattern functions in the literature. The best such function
that we know of is a look-up table.
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of size 50 then we could choose 8 chains of length 1, 5 chains of length 2,
4 chains of length 4, 3 chains of length 8 or 2 chains of length 49. We give
the maximum size of signature scheme for each of these pairs of values in
Table 5.2.
r l b rl
2
c |S(r, l, b rl
2
c)|
8 1 4 70
5 2 5 51
4 4 8 85
3 8 12 61
2 49 49 50
Table 5.2: Some Vaudenay’s optimal rake signature schemes that cater for a
message space of size at least 50.
Choosing the ‘best’ signature scheme to use from this list is an application
dependent problem. For example:
• if we wish to minimise the size of the private and public keys then we
must minimise r, and so S(2, 49, 49) is the best choice;
• if we wish to minimise the storage for the signing party then we should
minimise the number of vertices in the chains, and so S(5, 2, 5) is the
best choice;
• if we wish to minimise the number of hash function calculations that
are needed to compute the values for a signature (or equivalently the
number of hash applications to verify a signature) then we should min-
imise b rl
2
c, and so S(8, 1, 4) is the optimal scheme.
Although it is clear that there cannot be a universal measure of efficiency
suitable for all applications, work has been done to identify reasonable mea-
sures. In Section 5.2.4.1 we will discuss in more detail a measure of efficiency
due to Bleichenbacher and Maurer [11].
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5.2.3 Using hash trees and Merkle trees for one-time
signature schemes
In this section we look at two applications of Merkle trees to one-time sig-
nature schemes. The first is in the reduction of the public key size, at the
expense of more computation during the initialisation and verification phases.
The second application is to use the Merkle tree as the basis of the one-time
signature scheme itself, which can reduce the size of the signature from the
schemes in earlier sections.
5.2.3.1 Reducing public and private key sizes
All of the one-time signature schemes that we have looked at so far require
the signer to store a collection of private keys. It is possible to generate all the
keys from a single master key, which greatly reduces the amount of storage
required for the signer. We can use a pseudo-random number generator
seeded with the master key to generate a set of independent private keys.4
As we discussed in Section 3.3.2, there are many ways of generating in-
dependent values from a master value using a hash function. If we use one
of these with one of the hash-based signature schemes described earlier then
the overall structure formed is an inverted hash tree (see Section 3.4.5).
Similarly, most one-time signature schemes require each user to publish
a collection of public keys. The public key values can be reduced to one
master public value by hashing all the public key values together. If we use
a strong hash function (Definition 2.10) then the verifier can have the same
confidence in the signature by checking the collection of public key values is
correct, as by checking the master public value is correct.
If we use one of the one-time signature schemes described earlier in this
chapter and then hash the public key values to form a master public key, then
the overall structure used is a Merkle tree (see Definition 3.4). In the next
section we will look at other Merkle tree based one-time signature schemes.
4Independent in the sense that no information can be derived about one of the private
keys from any subset of the others. Trivially, the private keys are not independent of the
master key.
CHAPTER 5. SIGNATURES 128
These reductions add extra computation to the signature generation and
verification algorithms, but greatly reduce both the storage requirement for
the private key and the message costs of distributing the public key.
5.2.3.2 Merkle tree based one-time signature schemes
Merkle trees can also be used as the basis of a one-time signature scheme,
in a similar way to a set of hash chains. In Section 5.2.2.1 we gave some
definitions which helped to discuss signature schemes based on hash chains.
We now give some similar definitions for hash trees.
Definition 5.6. A signature pattern for a one-time signature scheme
based on a hash tree is a set of values Ui from the hash tree such that
each path from a leaf to the root contains exactly one value from Ui.
Definition 5.7. A one-time signature scheme based on a hash tree is a
set of signature patterns such that for any two signature patterns Ui and Uj
there exist two paths Pk and Pk′ satisfying the following two conditions:
1. The vertex Ui ∩ Pk is not on the path from Uj ∩ Pk to the root;
2. The vertex Uj ∩ Pk′ is not on the path from Ui ∩ Pk′ to the root.
We note that Definition 5.3 can be applied to hash chains or to hash trees.
As an example, the Merkle tree in Figure 5.5 has a signature pattern
marked on it, and there are a total of 4 such signature patterns which together
form a signature scheme.
◦
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>>}}} ◦
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◦
OO
•
OO
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◦
OO
Figure 5.5: An example of a signature pattern on a Merkle tree is marked by
the solid circles.
In fact one-time signature schemes can be created on any type of hash
tree, not just Merkle trees. However, if the hash tree is not a Merkle tree
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then some of the leaves can be deleted to form a Merkle tree with one-time
signature schemes of the same size. We now present a construction by which
this can be achieved (Theorem 5.8) and then we give a proof that the Merkle
tree admits a signature scheme of the same size (Theorem 5.9).
Theorem 5.8. For any hash tree on a tree T with leaves L and non-leaves N ,
we can define a subtree M by:
M = N ∪ {v ∈ L : v has no siblings on its left, and no siblings in N}.
The hash tree on M is a Merkle tree.
Proof In Definition 3.4 we define a Merkle tree as a hash tree where
every leaf has no sibling.
It can be seen that any leaf in L that is also in M has no siblings.
There are no leaves in M∩N , as every vertex in N either has children
in N ∩M or a child in L ∩M.
Figure 5.6 gives a hash tree and the Merkle sub-tree formed by the method
in Theorem 5.8. Also shown is a signature pattern on the hash tree, and
the equivalent signature pattern on the Merkle tree formed from the hash
tree. We now give a formal analysis of the equivalence of signature patterns
on hash trees and signature patterns on Merkle sub-trees. This result is
implied for binary hash trees during the study of tree-based digital signatures
by Bleichenbacher and Maurer [12], but we present it here as they did not
explicitly provide it, nor did they imply the result on general hash trees.
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Figure 5.6: An example showing a signature pattern on a hash tree and the
equivalent signature pattern on the corresponding Merkle tree. The signature
patterns are marked by the solid circles.
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Theorem 5.9. For any signature scheme on a hash tree on a tree T there
is an equivalent signature scheme on the Merkle tree on M (as defined in
Theorem 5.8) with the same number of signature patterns.
Proof From each signature pattern Ui in the original signature scheme
we create a signature pattern U ′i on the Merkle tree by:
U ′i = Ui ∩M.
To prove the theorem, we first show that U ′i is a signature pattern and then
that the set of signature patterns form a one-time signature scheme.
We show that U ′i is a signature pattern. Every leaf in M was also a leaf
in T , as was shown in the proof of Theorem 5.8. Consequently, every path
from a leaf inM to the root ofM is also a path from a leaf in T to the root
of T . Every path from a leaf to the root in M must intersect U ′i at exactly
the same vertex that the path intersected Ui, and no others. Hence U
′
i is a
signature pattern.
We now show that the set of signature patterns U ′∗ form a one-time sig-
nature scheme. Assume U ′∗ is not a signature scheme. Hence we can find two
signature patterns U ′i and U
′
j such that there is no pair of paths satisfying
the three conditions given in Definition 5.7. Without loss of generality we
assume that for every path Pk on M the vertex U ′i ∩ Pk is on the path from
U ′j ∩ Pk to the root.
Ui and Uj are signature patterns on T . We note that U ′i ⊆ Ui, U ′j ⊆ Uj and
all the paths in M are also in T . Consequently (without loss of generality)
we must have a pair of paths Pk and Pk′ satisfying the three conditions,
with Ui ∩ Pk′ /∈M.
The only vertices in T \M are leaves which have siblings, at least one
of which, v, is in M. Any signature pattern containing Ui ∩ Pk′ must also
contain a vertex on each path from v to the leaves descended from v. One of
these vertices is also inM, and so is also in U ′i . Hence any path Pk through v
in M does not have U ′i ∩ Pk on the path from U ′j ∩ Pk to the root, and we
have a contradiction.
This theorem allows us to restrict further analysis of hash tree based
signature schemes to those based on Merkle trees.
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5.2.4 Generalised hash DAG one-time signature schemes
In [10], Bleichenbacher and Maurer generalise all the previous schemes by
proposing a one-time signature scheme based on a generalised hash DAG.
They also gave the following useful definitions for analysing generalised hash
DAG one-time signature schemes.
Given a DAG G = (V,E), we can define the secret key pattern S(G) ⊂ V
as the set of vertices with in-degree 0, and the public key pattern P (G) ⊂
V as the set of vertices with out-degree 0. The secret key values are the
values associated (by the generalised hash DAG) with the secret key pattern
vertices. Similarly, the public key values are those values at the vertices of
the public key pattern.
Given a set of vertices X ⊂ V , we say that a vertex v ∈ V is computable
from X if either v ∈ X or v has at least one parent, and all its parents are
computable from X. Given two sets X, Y ⊂ V we say Y is computable from
X if all its members are computable from X. We say that a set X is verifiable
(with respect to the public key) if P (G) is computable from X.
Definition 5.10. A minimal verifiable set (or MVS) is a verifiable set X
such that no proper subset of X is verifiable.
A signature pattern for a one-time signature scheme based on a gener-
alised hash DAG is a minimal verifiable set.
We only wish to consider minimal verifiable sets since smaller signature
patterns will equate to lower communication costs in the protocol. The set
of minimal verifiable sets of a graph G is denoted W(G).
Two minimal verifiable setsX, Y ∈ W(G) are compatible if neither is com-
putable from the other. A set of MVSs are compatible if they are compatible
pairwise.
Remark 5.11. A minimal verifiable set intersects every path from S(G)
to P (G).
Definition 5.12. A one-time signature scheme based on a generalised
hash DAG is a compatible set of MVSs.
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We briefly give a few definitions of well studied combinatorial objects that
will be of use to us during the rest of this section.
Definition 5.13. A poset (or partially ordered set) is a set S, together
with a binary comparison operator ≤. For every element a ∈ S we have
a ≤ a. For every pair of distinct elements a, b ∈ S we have exactly one of
a ≤ b, b ≤ a, or a and b are incomparable. Finally if a ≤ b and b ≤ c we
have a ≤ c.
Definition 5.14. In a poset (S,≤) a chain is a subset of S such that for
every pair of elements a, b ∈ S we have either a ≤ b or b ≤ a.
In a poset (S,≤) an antichain is a subset of S such that every pair of
elements a, b ∈ S are incomparable.
Definition 5.15. The associated poset of W(G) is the poset formed by
the set W(G) and the binary comparison operator of computability. That is
a ≤ b if a is computable from b.
The largest signature scheme that can be formed from a particular gen-
eralised hash DAG is the largest compatible set of minimal verifiable sets.
This is equivalent to the largest antichain in the associated poset of W(G),
and the size of this antichain is the width of W(G), which we will denote by
w(W(G)).
The authors of [10] define two functions ν(n) and µ(n), which are the
maximal number of MVSs for a DAG on n vertices, and the maximum size
of signature scheme that can be formed on a graph with n vertices. The
functions are defined as:
ν(n) = max{|W(G)| : G = (V,E) with |V | = n}; (5.5)
µ(n) = max{w(W(G)) : G = (V,E) with |V | = n}. (5.6)
We define a DAG G of order n to be an optimal DAG on n vertices
if w(W(G)) = µ(n).
In [11], the same authors prove an interesting relation between µ(n) and ν(n)
which holds for all n ≥ 1.
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Result 5.16. Equation 1 of Bleichenbacher and Maurer [11]:
ν(n)
n
≤ µ(n) ≤ ν(n).
The lower and upper bounds in Result 5.16 are attained respectively by
a hash chain on n vertices, and a graph of n unconnected vertices.
It is clear that by generalising hash chains and hash trees to generalised
hash DAGs we may find schemes with the same number of vertices but more
signatures. An example is given in Figure 5.7, which shows, for nine vertices,
the tree and DAG which admit the largest signature scheme (as found by
exhaustive search).
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Figure 5.7: An optimal tree and an optimal DAG on 9 vertices. The
optimal signature scheme for the tree contains 4 signature patterns
({g, h, c}, {d, h, f}, {g, e, f}, {d, e, i}), whereas the optimal signature scheme
for the DAG contains 5 signature patterns ({g, h, c}, {d, h, f}, {g, e, f},
{d, e, i}, {b, h, i}).
5.2.4.1 Efficient schemes
The authors of [11] also focus on finding efficient schemes. To compare the
efficiency of schemes they focus on the underlying DAG. To simplify things
further they insist that every scheme should have only one public key (as
discussed in Section 5.2.3.1).
They also insist that every vertex in the DAG has in-degree at most two.
This can be achieved by replacing vertices with in-degree greater than two
with a binary hash tree, and replacing any edges that left the old vertex with
edges that leave the root of this new tree. We give an example in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: On the left is a DAG where the filled in vertex has in-degree
greater than two. It can be replaced by a binary hash tree, as shown in the
diagram on the right, to ensure that all vertices now have in-degree of at
most two.
We assume that all the seed vertices are formed from a single private key,
as described in Section 5.2.3.1; however this vertex is not included as part of
the DAG for the purposes of counting the vertices.
With this model, all vertices in a generalised hash DAG except the single
seed vertex require a hash function application to compute. Consequently,
Bleichenbacher and Maurer [11] approximate the amount of ‘work’ needed
to use a particular one-time signature scheme by the number of vertices it
contains. They approximate the payoff of the signature scheme’s DAG as
the size of the largest one-time signature scheme based on it (that is the size
of the largest compatible set of minimal verifiable sets).
For a generalised hash DAG of order n, they define the efficiency η(Γ) of
a one-time signature scheme based on a set Γ of minimal verifiable sets to be
η(Γ) =
log2 |Γ|
n+ 1
. (5.7)
As an example, consider the Diffie-Lamport scheme for k-bit messages with
a binary hash tree to make a single public key value (see Figure 5.9).
The scheme is designed to sign k-bit messages and so has minimal ver-
ifiable sets for each of the 2k messages, that is |Γ| = 2k. To calculate the
efficiency we also need to find n, the number of vertices, of which there
are 6k − 1. The efficiency η(Γ) can be computed as follows:
η(Γ) =
log2 |Γ|
n+ 1
=
log2 2
k
6k
=
1
6
. (5.8)
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Figure 5.9: The Diffie-Lamport one-time signature scheme for k-bit messages
with a binary hash tree to combine all the public key values to a single value.
The authors also prove that the maximum efficiency of a one-time signa-
ture scheme based on a hash tree is less than 0.42 and give a construction
of a sequence of signature schemes based on a sequence of generalised hash
DAGs with
lim
n→∞
η(Γn) > 0.47. (5.9)
In Section 5.4.1 we will look in more detail at this construction and in Sec-
tions 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 we will give some constructions of our own.
First we present a method by which ν(n) and µ(n) can be investigated.
In Section 5.3.2 we exhibit a collection of algorithms that finds the associated
poset of a DAG G, and hence gives us a lower bound on ν(n) for small n.
In Section 5.3.3 we present several algorithms that find the largest signature
scheme on G, and consequently give us a lower bound on µ(n).
5.3 Finding the largest compatible set of min-
imal verifiable sets for a given graph
In this section we will present several algorithms that build towards an al-
gorithm that efficiently finds and outputs a large one-time signature scheme
on a given DAG G. In Section 5.2.4 we saw that this was the same as finding
a large compatible set of minimal verifiable sets for G.
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We start this section by explaining how we split the task of finding a
large set of compatible minimal verifiable sets from a DAG G into two smaller
problems. We then present algorithms that build towards several solutions
to the first problem and we compare the efficiency of these algorithms. We
then look at algorithms to solve the second problem, and again study their
performance. Finally we present the results obtained by implementing our
algorithms.
5.3.1 Introduction
We are interested in µ(n), the maximum size of a one-time signature scheme
on a DAG of order n. By trying many graphs, our program finds a lower
bound on this, which we will call m(n). For each signature scheme, our
program can optionally also output the DAG G, the set of MVSs W(G) and
the signature patterns Γ(G) that make up the signature scheme found.
The method by which we select graphs is itself of interest. Originally we
tested randomly chosen graphs, edges added randomly with the restriction
that no vertex had an in-degree greater than k. We were not satisfied by
the rate at which m(n) increased, and so we redesigned the graph selection
algorithm to keep track of the best graph found so far, and to make small
changes to that graph. This significantly improved the rate at which m(n)
increased.
A list of all the algorithms we present in this section is given in Table 5.3.
The problem of finding a large set of compatible minimal verifiable sets
from a DAG G seems to split logically into two problems:
1. Finding the set of minimal verifiable sets W(G) from the DAG;
2. Finding a large set of compatible minimal verifiable sets M(G) from
W(G) (and G).
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Algorithm Description
Algorithm 2 An algorithm to check whether a given subset U of
G is a minimal verifiable set or not.
Algorithm 3 An algorithm to check whether a given subset U of
G is a verifiable set.
Algorithm 4 An algorithm to check whether a given verifiable
subset U of G is minimally verifiable or not.
Algorithm 5 An algorithm to output all the paths in a DAG G
with source set S(G) and sink set P (G).
Algorithm 6 A trivial but inefficient exhaustive search algorithm
to find all the minimal verifiable sets in a DAG G.
Algorithm 7 A second trivial but inefficient exhaustive search
algorithm to find all the minimal verifiable sets in
a DAG G with paths Paths(G).
Algorithm 8 An algorithm to output all minimal verifiable
sets that is very often more efficient than Algo-
rithms 6 and 7.
Algorithm 9 An algorithm to construct the associated poset on
the set of minimal verifiable sets MVS(G) ordered
by computability.
Algorithm 10 The Bron-Kerbosch algorithm - a reasonably effi-
cient recursive algorithm to find the largest com-
patible set of MVSs for a DAG G.
Algorithm 11 A very efficient algorithm to find a large compatible
set of MVSs for a DAG G.
Table 5.3: A list of the algorithms presented in this section. Those in the
top half are found in Section 5.3.2 and those in the bottom half are found in
Section 5.3.3.
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5.3.2 Problem 1 — Finding the set of minimal verifi-
able sets from the DAG
We can check if a subset U of G is a minimal verifiable set by checking that it
contains at least one vertex from each path from a source of G to a sink (i.e.
it is verifiable), and by checking that each vertex in the subset is the only
vertex of the subset present in at least one path (i.e. the subset is minimal).
This straightforward scheme is given in Algorithm 2, which makes calls to
Algorithms 3 and 4.
Algorithm 2:
Description: An algorithm to check whether a given subset
U of G is a minimal verifiable set or not.
Is set minimal and verifiable(U)
(1) if Is set verifiable(U) and Is set minimal(U)
(2) return true
(3) else
(4) return false
Running time: O(|U | · |Paths(G)|).
Algorithm 3:
Description: An algorithm to check whether a given subset
U of G is a verifiable set.
Is set verifiable(U)
(1) foreach path P in G
(2) if P and U have no vertices in common
(3) return false
(4) return true
Running time: O(|Paths(G)|).
It is clear that Algorithms 3 and 4 require us to have a list of all the
paths from sources to sinks in G. Algorithm 5 is a classic depth first search
algorithm [150] for finding paths in a graph G with source set S(G) and sink
set P (G).
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Algorithm 4:
Description: An algorithm to check whether a given verifi-
able subset U of G is minimally verifiable or not.
Is set minimal(U)
(1) foreach vertex u in U
(2) Initialise flag VertexIsCritical to false
(3) foreach path P in Paths(G)
(4) if P ∩ U = {u}
(5) Set VertexIsCritical to true
(6) if not VertexIsCritical
(7) return false
(8) return true
Running time: O(|U | · |Paths(G)|).
Algorithm 5:
Description: An algorithm to output all the paths in a DAG
G with source set S(G) and sink set P (G).
Find paths(G, S(G), P (G))
See Appendix A for the full algorithm.
To find every minimal verifiable set in G we could simply try all subsets
of G and check each with Algorithm 2. This naive approach is given in
Algorithm 6. However the number of sets to be checked for each DAG is 2n,
which proved prohibitively large by about n = 10.
Algorithm 6:
Description: A trivial but inefficient exhaustive search algo-
rithm to find all the minimal verifiable sets in a DAG G.
Find minimal verifiable sets 1(G)
(1) foreach subset U of G
(2) if Is set minimal and verifiable(U)
(3) print U
Running time: O
(
2|G| · |G| · |Paths(G)|).
Another way to find all minimal verifiable sets is to form subsets of G
by taking one vertex from each path and checking with Algorithm 4 to see
if the set is minimal (it will trivially be verifiable). This method is given in
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Algorithm 7. Unfortunately this too becomes a prohibitive method when we
are dealing with DAGs that have five or six paths of length about three or
four vertices.
Algorithm 7:
Description: A second trivial but inefficient exhaustive
search algorithm to find all the minimal verifiable sets in a
DAG G with paths Paths(G).
Find minimal verifiable sets 2(Paths(G))
(1) Create a set Pointers with a pointer for each path.
(2) foreach combination of Pointers with the ith pointer
pointing to a vertex from the ith path
(3) Create a set U containing the union of all vertices
pointed to by Pointers.
(4) if Is set minimal(U)
(5) print U
Running time: O
(
PathLen(G)|Paths(G)| · |G| · |Paths(G)|),
where PathLen(G) is the average path length in G.
We devised a method of combining elements of these two methods of
searching to create a much more efficient exhaustive search. There are two
important observations.
1. If a DAG has a vertex v that is in almost all of the paths then we can
find all the minimal verifiable sets containing v very quickly, and then
we can ignore v for the rest of the search.
2. If a DAG has a very short path P then since all minimal verifiable sets
intersect P , we can consider every subset U of the vertices in P , and
then only consider paths that do not intersect U .
The actual algorithm we have used is recursive in order to optimise the
benefit of the two above observations. It is given in Algorithm 8.
The best way to illustrate these two observations is with an example, so
we will consider the DAG in Figure 5.10. We need to have an ordered list of
the paths in our DAG, so these are given in Table 5.4.
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Algorithm 8:
Description: An algorithm to output all minimal verifiable
sets that is very often more efficient than Algorithms 6 and 7.
Input: A list of all the paths in G, an empty set (PartialMVS).
Output: A list of all the minimal verifiable sets in G.
Find minimal verifiable sets(Paths, PartialMVS)
See Appendix A for the full algorithm.
Algorithm 6 would require us to test all subsets of G and check each with
Algorithm 2. Since there are seven vertices, this would take approximately
27 = 128 calls to Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 7 would require us to check all sets formed by taking one vertex
from each path with Algorithm 4. Although this algorithm is marginally
quicker than Algorithm 2, we need to check 2 · 4 · 4 · 4 · 4 · 4 · 4 = 8192 subsets,
and so this method would almost certainly be slower than Algorithm 6.
However, if instead we use Algorithm 8 then we only end up checking
12 sets with Algorithm 2.5 This is much faster than either of the aforemen-
tioned methods.
A B
C
``@@@@@@@
>>~~~~~~~
D
OO
E
``@@@@@@@
F
OO
>>~~~~~~~
G
``@@@@@@@
OO
Figure 5.10: An example DAG.
5These sets in order are CF, CA, C, AB, ADE, ADG, AD, AFE, AFG, AF, FG, FDE.
This assumes that, if the algorithm allows a choice, the paths are selected lowest index
first and vertices are chosen lexicographically.
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Path index Vertices in path
0 FA
1 FDCA
2 FDCB
3 GDCA
4 GDCB
5 GECA
6 GECB
Table 5.4: The paths in the example DAG in Figure 5.10.
5.3.3 Problem 2 — Finding a large compatible set of
minimal verifiable sets from the set of all minimal
verifiable sets
Once we have found the set of all MVSs W(G) for a given DAG G, the next
task is to find a large compatible subset of W(G). Ideally we would like to
find the largest compatible subset, but we also wish our program to finish in
a sensible length of time.
For the purposes of this section it will be good to have a graph by which we
can compare performances of different algorithms. We have chosen to use the
graph given in Figure 5.11, since it is not too hard to analyse. For a 13 vertex
graph it does not have an extreme number of minimal verifiable sets (54),
nor does it permit an overly large one-time signature scheme (size 12).
5.3.3.1 Discussion of Algorithm 9
The first step in finding a large set of compatible sets is to construct the
associated poset of the DAG. The associated poset of G consists of the set of
minimal verifiable sets and the relation of whether one MVS is computable
from another (see Section 5.2.4 for definitions).
We note that two members i, j ∈ MVS(G) must satisfy exactly one of the
following four conditions: i = j, i < j, i > j or i and j are incomparable. If
i = j then i and j must be same element. If they are distinct and there is no
path P for which i ∩ P is nearer the source than j ∩ P then i < j. If j < i
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Figure 5.11: An example graph with 13 vertices. This graph contains 54 min-
imal verifiable sets, of which at most 12 can combined to form a compatible
set.
then we have i < j and finally if none of the other conditions are satisfied
then i and j are incomparable.
Algorithm 9 uses this observation to determine the relationship between
each pair of elements in MVS(G).
Algorithm 9:
Description: An algorithm to construct the associated poset
on the set of minimal verifiable sets MVS(G) ordered by com-
putability.
Input: A list of the minimal verifiable sets of G, a list of the
paths in G.
Output: An array containing the poset relations between the
members of MVS(G).
Find associated poset(MVS(G), Paths(G))
See Appendix A for the full algorithm.
Once we have identified which minimal verifiable sets are computable
from each other, and which are compatible with each other, we are ready to
attempt to construct a large compatible set of minimal verifiable sets.
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5.3.3.2 Discussion of Algorithm 10
Finding the largest compatible set of MVSs on a DAG is the same as the
maximum clique problem [59] on the graph with MVSs as vertices and edges
between pairs of MVSs that are compatible.
In [18] Bron and Kerbosch present an algorithm for finding the largest
clique in a graph. This method is given in Algorithm 10.
Algorithm 10:
Description: The Bron-Kerbosch algorithm to find the
largest clique G [18]. Initially the algorithm is called as
BK(∅, V (G, ∅). The function Γ(v) returns the neighbours of
the vertex v.
Input: Three sets of vertices R, P and X
Output: A list C containing the vertices in a maximal clique.
BK(MVS(G), Poset[MVS(G),MVS(G)])
(1) Set C = ∅.
(2) if P = ∅ and X = ∅
(3)
(4) if |R| > |C|
(5) Set C = R.
(6) else
(7) foreach v ∈ P
(8) P = P − {v}
(9) Rnew = R ∪ {v}
(10) Pnew = P ∩ Γ(v)
(11) Xnew = X ∩ Γ(v)
(12) BK(Rnew, Pnew, Xnew)
(13) X = X ∪ v
(14) print C
Our experiments show Algorithm 10 to be a useful algorithm on graphs
with up to 14 vertices, and all but the best graphs on 15 and 16 vertices.6
For some 15 vertex DAGs with around about 100 MVSs, the algorithm was
still running after an hour.
6Here we use ‘best graphs’ to mean those graphs that admit the largest signature
schemes.
CHAPTER 5. SIGNATURES 145
5.3.3.3 Discussion of Algorithm 11
If a large compatible set A of minimal verifiable sets is compatible with
another minimal verifiable set b then we can create a larger compatible set A∪
b. Consequently we can form an estimate of how good a minimal verifiable
set is by measuring the number of minimal verifiable sets that it is compatible
with.
We can create a subset iteratively by including, at each iteration, the
MVS which is compatible with the largest number of MVSs, until there are
no more MVSs to include in the subset. This algorithm is presented as
Algorithm 11. It is a greedy algorithm, because we only look one step ahead
at each step.
Algorithm 11 is more efficient than Algorithm 10. We can approximate
the number of computations needed to find a large compatible set in this
way by looking at the line which is repeated the most times. Line 15 of
Algorithm 11 is the line inside more loops than any other (one ‘while’ loop
and three ‘foreach’ loops). For a DAG with 54 minimal verifiable sets and
maximal compatible verifiable set of order 12, this line is inside loops of size at
most 12, 54, 54 and 12 (Lines 3, 5, 12 and 14 respectively). Multiplying these
values together, we find that Line 15 is visited no more than 4.2×105 times,7
which would take about 0.4 seconds at a speed of a million computations a
second.
5.3.3.4 Comparison of algorithms for finding large compatible sets
We have presented two algorithms for finding large compatible sets of MVSs
for a DAG G. Algorithms 10 and 11 are both of use to us, since they provide
a trade-off between size of output set and running time.
Algorithm 10 takes an excessive time for some graphs of order 15 and
increasingly so for many graphs on more vertices. Although we have found
some DAGs for which Algorithm 11 does not find the maximal compatible
set, they have all been too large to evaluate with Algorithm 10.
7We measured this with our implementation of Algorithm 11 for the DAG given in
Figure 5.11 and found that the program visited Line 15 about 5300 times. It is clear that
our estimation of algorithm complexity is generous towards rival algorithms.
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Algorithm 11:
Description: A greedy algorithm to find a large compati-
ble set of minimal verifiable sets on a DAG G. The constant
INCOMPARABLE is defined in Appendix A.
Find A Large Compatible Set(MVS(G),
Poset[MVS(G),MVS(G)])
(1) Set MVSsLeft = |MVS(G)|.
(2) Create an empty set CompSet.
(3) while MVSsLeft > 0
(4) BestScore = -1
(5) foreach MVS i
(6) Set flag Incomparable to true
(7) foreach MVS k from the set CompSet
(8) if Poset[i, k] differs from INCOMPARABLE
(9) Set flag Incomparable to false
(10) if Incomparable = true
(11) Set Score to 0
(12) foreach MVS j
(13) Set flag Comparable to true
(14) foreach MVS k from the set CompSet
(15) if Poset[j, k] differs from INCOMPARA-
BLE
(16) Set flag Incomparable to false
(17) if Incomparable = true and Poset[i, j] =
INCOMPARABLE
(18) Increment Score by 1
(19) if Score > BestScore
(20) BestScore = Score
(21) BestMVS = i
(22) Add BestMVS to the set CompSet
(23) Set MVSsLeft to BestScore
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We also note that in Section 5.4.3, where we exhibit a one-time signature
scheme based on a hash DAG, we do not use all of the MVSs found in order
to simplify the signature pattern function.
5.3.4 Results
The results in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 have been produced by a program us-
ing Algorithms 5, 8, 9 and 11. The program tested a succession of graphs
and output information each time it improved the value of m(n) (defined in
Section 5.3.1). The first graph was either selected randomly by the program,
or entered by hand. We used a hill-climbing method of making small changes
to the graph while maintaining the maximum in-degree, and if a graph im-
proved on the value of m(n) then it replaced the original graph, and future
graphs would be derived from it.
Due to the random nature of the DAGs tested by our program, there is
always a chance that by testing one more graph we will find an improvement
on the previously found signature scheme. Consequently we made a decision
to run the program for ten minutes for each value of n and output all the
DAGs found.
For reasons discussed in Section 5.2.4.1, Bleichenbacher and Maurer only
consider DAGs with in-degree at most two. In [10] they presented a list of
the size of the largest one-time signature schemes they had found for DAGs
with a fixed order n.
Using our program we have been able to improve on a number of their
results. In fact, for all values of n ≥ 13 we have improved on the size of the
best signature scheme known. These results are presented in Table 5.5.
This table also shows a number of other trends. By plotting the results
with a spreadsheet application and asking for a line of best fit, we find the
approximate results: |W(G)| ≈ 0.75e0.34n and m(n) ≈ 0.37e0.29n. From
Result 5.16, we can see that if ν(n) and µ(n) are functions of the form aebn
then the constant b must be the same for both ν(n) and µ(n).
We then investigated the value of m(n) for graphs with maximum in-
degree three. In Table 5.6 we present our results, along with the values
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of m(n) from Table 5.5 for maximum in-degree two. Unsurprisingly, we can
find larger signature schemes on the same number of vertices if we allow the
in-degree to be increased.
From our results we get the approximate relation m(n) ≈ 0.40e0.30n for
DAGs with in-degree three. We note that this is similar to our approxima-
tion for in-degree two DAGs, the main difference being the linear factor has
increased.
In Table 5.6, and also in Table 5.7, there is a bracketed row for which our
program could not find the best signature scheme fromW(G). Instead we dis-
covered this DAG by hand. We note that if we had been using Algorithm 10
instead of Algorithm 11 then the program would not have overlooked these
results, but it may not have found them in the allotted time.
We went on to investigate the value of m(n) of DAGs with the maximum
in-degree increased to four, the results of which are in Table 5.7. Since this
includes all the DAGs previously tested, it might be expected that the value
ofm(n) found would be larger than in the previous tables. When there are 11
or fewer vertices, the larger in-degree did not make an impact on m(n). At
12 vertices our program found a DAG that admitted a signature scheme
larger than any previously tested 12 vertex DAG.
However for DAGs with 13 vertices or more, our program did not manage
to find improvements on any of the results in Table 5.6, and by 20 vertices it
did not even find the DAG that admitted a signature scheme with 141 pat-
terns in the ten minutes that we ran the program for. We believe that this
is because the increase in maximum in-degree also increased the number of
DAGs that could be checked. By the time n reached 20, the size of the search
space became the overwhelming factor.
Our program helped us to identify DAGs that facilitated large signature
schemes, and in the next section we will see two signature schemes that
we have designed with the help of our program. Both of the schemes have
maximum in-degree two, so that they are comparable to the work by Ble-
ichenbacher and Maurer [10, 11, 12].
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Vertices n Edges Paths |W(G)| m(n) Old value of
m(n) from [10]
8 8 4 12 4 4
8 9 5 12 4 4
8 10 5 11 4 4
9 9 4 17 5 5
9 9 4 18 5 5
9 10 4 12 5 5
9 11 5 12 5 5
9 11 5 16 5 5
9 13 13 17 5 5
10 12 6 24 7 7
10 12 6 24 7 7
10 13 6 24 7 7
11 13 8 31 9 9
12 14 8 45 12 12
12 15 8 41 12 12
13 15 8 65 16 15
13 16 10 65 16 15
13 17 10 59 16 15
14 16 8 95 22 20
14 17 9 95 22 20
15 19 13 108 28 25
16 18 11 159 36 33
17 21 14 251 55 45
18 22 15 351 69 57
19 24 16 492 90 79
20 26 28 639 131 101
21 27 28 935 173 139
Table 5.5: Best lower bounds found by our program for µ(n) and previous
best lower bounds from [10] for DAGs with in-degree at most 2.
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Vertices n Edges Paths |W(G)| m(n) m(n) when in-
degree is 2
8 8 4 12 4 4
9 11 8 16 6 5
9 12 12 16 6 5
(10 9 3 28 8) 7
10 12 11 21 7 7
11 14 7 34 11 9
11 15 8 34 11 9
12 13 6 51 13 12
12 14 7 51 13 12
12 15 8 50 13 12
12 15 9 48 13 12
12 15 9 51 13 12
12 15 10 47 13 12
13 16 9 78 19 16
13 16 10 78 19 16
13 16 12 80 19 16
13 17 11 78 19 16
13 17 13 78 19 16
13 17 13 80 19 16
14 17 11 104 26 22
14 18 12 102 26 22
14 18 12 105 26 22
14 18 13 104 26 22
14 18 15 102 26 22
15 18 11 149 35 28
15 18 11 152 35 28
15 19 13 156 35 28
15 19 15 152 35 28
16 19 9 230 49 36
16 20 10 230 49 36
20 23 12 763 141 131
Table 5.6: Best lower bounds found by our program for µ(n) when the in-
degree is at most 3. Note that the program did not find the bracketed row
(this was found by hand).
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Vertices n Edges Paths |W(G)| m(n) m(n) when in-
degree is 3
8 8 4 13 4 4
9 9 5 17 6 6
9 11 8 17 6 6
(10 9 3 28 8) (8)7
10 10 5 25 7 (8)7
10 10 5 23 7 (8)7
10 11 6 25 7 (8)7
11 14 7 34 11 11
12 15 8 44 14 13
13 12 4 82 19 19
13 15 6 80 19 19
13 15 6 78 19 19
14 17 10 105 26 26
14 17 9 107 26 26
15 19 15 133 35 35
15 19 18 133 35 35
15 18 13 155 35 35
20 24 12 687 132 141
Table 5.7: Best lower bounds found by our program for µ(n) when the in-
degree is at most 4. Note that the program did not find the bracketed row
(this was found by hand).
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5.4 Concrete examples of DAGs which facili-
tate efficient one-time signature schemes
In this section we present some examples of one-time signature schemes based
on a generalised hash DAG for particular families of DAGs. First we present
a family of DAGs due to Bleichenbacher and Maurer [11] that performs very
well in the limit, and as the number of vertices tends to infinity it can be
shown to contain a signature scheme of very high efficiency 0.47. We prove
that this scheme is the optimal choice in a family of schemes.
Unfortunately, for the generalised hash DAG from [11], there is no easy
way to find a construction of a good signature scheme, and consequently no
signature pattern function is known. Without further work this scheme is
primarily of theoretical interest.
We then present our scheme, capable of signing blocks of six bits with an
efficiency of 0.3, and we exhibit a signature pattern function for it. Finally
we present another more complex scheme that can be used to sign eight-bit
blocks with an efficiency of 0.32.
5.4.1 Bleichenbacher and Maurer’s DAG
In [11] Bleichenbacher and Maurer give a sequence of DAGs Hn and prove
that there exists a sequence of signature schemes on them with efficiencies
that tend to over 0.47. Figure 5.12 gives the DAG H2 based on two blocks
of 12 vertices. In general the DAG is formed by stacking n 12-vertex blocks,
and connecting the top three vertices of each block to the block above, as
shown for the bottom block.
In [11] it is shown that there are 43 = 64 signature patterns for each
block. Of these, there are 13 patterns which result in vertices in lower blocks
being unnecessary for a minimal verifiable set, and so there are 64− 13 = 51
combinations which can be used. They then consider the DAG Hn for which
there are n blocks and so there are 51n signature patterns, that is |W(Hn)| ≥
51n. They then show, using Result 5.16, that there exists a signature scheme
CHAPTER 5. SIGNATURES 153
on Hn with at least 51n12n+5 signatures. This scheme has efficiency at least
η(Hn) ≥ log2(51
n/(12n+ 5))
12n+ 6
,
which converges to about 0.47 as n grows:
lim
n→∞
η(Hn) ≥ log2(51)
12
≈ 0.47.
The efficiency of the graph can be improved, since the bottom three
vertices can be merged into one vertex, but this makes no difference to the
limit and would make the diagram less clear.
We now generalise the DAG Hn in Figure 5.12 to a DAG Hn,r. It consists
of n blocks, each containing r chains of length r. The top of the r chains
in the top block are compressed to a single vertex by a binary hash tree (of
order r − 1). The top vertex of every other chain is connected to the block
above by r edges. If this vertex tops the ith chain of a block then the r edges
lead to the r lowest vertices in the block above satisfying:
(chain number + height in chain) mod r = i.
There are r additional source vertices I below the bottom block that are
connected to the bottom block in the same manner.
A lower bound ξr on the efficiency limn→∞ η(Hn,r) for these DAGs can
be found in a similar manner to the original computation for Hn from [11].
For a single block in Hn,r (r chains of length r) we can form (r + 1)r
MVSs by taking one vertex from each chain. The construction in [11] selects
a subset of these as suitable block MVSs {ς∗}. We define a function q(ςi, j)
taking a suitable block MVS ςi and a block index j which outputs the set of
vertices corresponding to the MVS on that block.
To find the most efficient scheme we choose {ς∗} to be as large as possible
so that all sets of vertices of the form:
I ∪ q(ςi0 , 0) ∪ q(ςi1 , 1) ∪ . . . ∪ q(ςin−1 , n− 1)
are signature patterns. The lower bound ξr is found from a sequence of
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Figure 5.12: The DAG Hn due to Bleichenbacher and Maurer on 2 blocks
(i.e. H2). A signature pattern is shown for the graph by the solid vertices.
It can be shown that there are 51 signature patterns in each block that can
be combined to make a minimal verifiable set on the whole DAG.
signature schemes formed from these signature patterns.
Theorem 5.17. The lower bound ξr is maximised when r = 3.
Proof When r = 2 we can see by inspection that |{ς∗}| is at most 6.
When r = 3 we know from [11] that there are 51 suitable block MVSs.
For r ≥ 4 it will suffice to know that there are no more than (r + 1)r
suitable block MVSs.
For each block in Hn,r we can pick any suitable block MVS and take
the union of these sets of vertices and I to form a signature pattern. There
are |{ς∗}|n ways of doing this. This gives us a lower bound on the maximum
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number of MVSs a DAG on |Hn,r| vertices can contain, and by Equation 5.16
a lower bound on the maximum efficiency of a one-time signature scheme on
Hn,r:
log2 (|{ς∗}|n/|Hn,r|)
|Hn,r|+ 1 =
log2 (|{ς∗}|n)− log2 (nr(r + 1) + 5)
nr(r + 1) + 6
.
We set ξr equal to the limit of this as n tends to infinity:
ξr =
log2 |{ς∗}|
r(r + 1)
.
Evaluating this for small values of r gives the following:
r |{ς∗}| ξr
2 6 0.43
3 51 0.47
4 ≤ (4 + 1)4 ≤0.46
We observe that for r ≥ 4 we have
ξr ≤ log2 |{(r + 1)
r}|
r(r + 1)
=
log2(r + 1)
r + 1
,
which is strictly decreasing, and so ξr is maximised when r = 3.
5.4.2 A one-time signature scheme for multiples of six
bits
As was mentioned in Section 5.2.4.1, the Lamport-Diffie scheme can be de-
signed to sign messages of arbitrary length and has efficiency 1
6
. In Sec-
tion 5.4.1 we saw that for arbitrarily sized messages we can construct a gen-
eralised hash DAG on which there provably exists a signature scheme with
efficiency 0.47. There is currently no simple way to find this scheme, nor is
there a simple map from the message space to the set of signature patterns.
We present a scheme with efficiency 0.3, which can be used to sign ar-
bitrarily large messages, and also has a fairly straightforward map from the
message space to the set of signature patterns.
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The generalised hash DAG scheme shown on the right in Figure 5.7, and
reproduced in Figure 5.13, is both simple and fairly efficient (on its own it
has an efficiency of about 0.26). We will refer to this DAG as G in this
section. We could increase the message space and maintain the efficiency by
connecting several copies of G by joining their sinks with a hash tree.
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Figure 5.13: A generalised hash DAG G for which w(W(G)) is maximised
compared to other DAGs of order 9.
Instead, we will investigate the structure of the signature patterns a lit-
tle deeper, in order to improve the efficiency while maintaining a useable
signature pattern function.
The set of all signature patterns of G is shown in Figure 5.14, with paths
leading between all signature patterns which are incompatible.
All DAGs have an associated poset, and given any poset we can group the
elements into layers such that all the elements in a layer are incomparable
(and in this case compatible). With the poset in Figure 5.14 we get seven
layers of sizes 1, 1, 2, 5, 5, 3 and 1.
Theorem 5.18. The DAG H (Figure 5.15) formed by joining the roots of
two copies of G to a new vertex admits a one-time signature scheme of size 64.
Proof If we combine two copies of G by connecting their sinks to a new
vertex, we form a DAG which we will call H. Since both halves of H have
the minimal verifiable sets shown in Figure 5.14, we can form a minimal
verifiable set for H by choosing an MVS for the left copy of G and an MVS
for the right copy of G.
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To construct a signature scheme for H we need to pick signature patterns
which are compatible, which can be done easily with the aid of the layers of
Figure 5.14. We pick a pattern from the ith layer of the left copy of G and a
pattern from the jth layer of the right copy of G such that i + j = 7 (where
ghi is in the first layer, ghf is in the second layer, etc.). This provides a total
of 64 signatures, which are shown in Table 5.8.
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Figure 5.14: The Hasse diagram showing the relation between the minimal
verifiable sets of the DAG in Figure 5.7. The third row from the bottom is
the efficient signature scheme suggested.
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Figure 5.15: The graph H formed by joining two copies of G to new vertex v.
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We can combine r copies of H with a hash tree and use Table 5.8 to
provide 64 signature options for each copy. This gives us a total of 64r = 26r
signatures, and we can sign a 6r-bit message by signing each block of 6 bits
with a copy of H.
This scheme has (19× r) + (r − 1) = 20r − 1 vertices and provides for a
message space of size 26r, giving an efficiency of η = log2(2
6r)
(20r−1)+1 =
6
20
= 0.3.
5.4.3 A one-time signature scheme for multiples of eight
bits
In Section 5.4.2 we presented a complete one-time signature scheme suitable
for signing blocks of six bits. It was noted that by combining several copies
of the generalised hash DAG it was possible to sign any multiple of six bits
without affecting the efficiency of 0.3.
In this section we present another one-time signature scheme, this time
capable of signing eight-bit blocks with an efficiency of 0.32. Again we can
combine many copies of the underlying generalised hash DAG without af-
fecting the efficiency.
Sig. Pattern Index Pattern for left G Pattern for right G
0 bc ghi
1 dec ghf
2 dec gei
3 dec dhi
4-6 bef ghf,gei,dhi
7-11 gec ghc,gef,dhf,dei,bhi
12-16 dhc ghc,gef,dhf,dei,bhi
17-21 def ghc,gef,dhf,dei,bhi
22-26 bhf ghc,gef,dhf,dei,bhi
27-31 bei ghc,gef,dhf,dei,bhi
32-63 Same as 0-31, with left and right patterns swapped
Table 5.8: The map showing how the message space is mapped to the 64
signature patterns of the optimal signature scheme on H.
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The signature scheme will be based on the generalised hash DAG G24
shown in Figure 5.16. It has 24 vertices and, assuming it is seeded from a
master private key (as described in Section 5.2.3.1), it will require 24 hash
function calls to compute the root value from the master private key (one
hash to compute the value at each vertex).
The mapping for each eight-bit value from 0 to 255 to a compatible signa-
ture pattern on G24 is shown in Table 5.9. It is clear from the size of Table 5.9
compared to the size of Table 5.8, that this scheme would be more compli-
cated to implement than the scheme in Section 5.4.2. However this scheme
is more efficient and arguably more suitable for systems based on bytes, or
multiples of bytes, of information (which many modern systems are).
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E2oo // B4
ddHHHHHH
A3
<<yyyyy
E1
OO
B3
bbEEEEEE
A2
<<yyyyy
E0
OO
B2
bbEEEEEE
A1
<<yyyyy
CD3
ccGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
;;wwwwwwwwwwwwwwww
B1
bbEEEEE
A0
<<yyyyy
C2
hhRRRRRRRRRRRR
55kkkkkkkkkkkk
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ggNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
77oooooooooooooooooooooo
D2
iiSSSSSSSSSSSS
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B0
bbEEEEE
C1
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F1
OO
D1
OO
C0
OO
F0
OO
D0
OO
Figure 5.16: The generalised hash DAG G24. There are many compatible
minimal verifiable subsets of this DAG, 256 of which are used by our one-
time signature scheme. The vertices have been labelled to aid the description
of this scheme.
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Theorem 5.19. The signature patterns in Table 5.9 are pairwise compatible,
and so form a signature scheme.
Sketch proof We divide the signature patterns into three types:
1. Signature patterns 0 to 210;
2. Signature patterns 211 to 254;
3. Signature pattern 255.
Any two Type 1 patterns can be checked to be compatible by viewing G24 as
six chains labelled A to F and observing that all of the signature patterns
have the same total distance from the end of the six chains.
A Type 1 and a Type 2 pattern, or any two Type 2 patterns, can be
checked to be compatible in a similar way by treating vertex CD3 as an
extra vertex in chain C.8
There is only one Type 3 signature pattern, so we do not need to consider
whether two Type 3 patterns are compatible.
The Type 3 pattern does not reveal any information about D0, D1 or D2
and, since all of the other patterns contain one of these values, the signature
pattern 255 does not reveal any other Type 1 or Type 2 pattern.
The Type 3 pattern contains both E0 and F0. The only other signature
patterns that reveal both E0 and F0 contain either A3, A4, B3 or B4. Con-
sequently these signature patterns do not reveal A1 and B1, and so do not
reveal the Type 3 signature pattern.
Since the Type 3 pattern does not reveal any other pattern, and is not
revealed by any other pattern, then it is compatible with all other signature
patterns. Since all signature patterns are pairwise compatible, they form a
signature scheme.
This is not the largest signature scheme that can be formed on G24, but
it is a practical scheme for signing multiples of 8 bits. We were unable to
8We note that it is possible to include another 44 compatible signature patterns by
treating CD3 as part of chain D in the same way. However, since our aim was to create
a scheme capable of signing eight-bit messages, we did not include these in our mapping.
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Sig. Pattern Index Signature Pattern
0 A0 B0 C2 D2 E2 F2
1 B1 C1 D2 E2 F2
2 C2 D1 E2 F2
3 D2 E1 F2
4 D2 E2 F1
5 B2 C0 D2 E2 F2
6-8 C1 As 2-4
9 C2 D0 E2 F2
10-11 D1 As 3-4
12 D2 E0 F2
13 E1 F1
14 E2 F0
15-17 B3 C0 As 2-4
18-23 C1 As 9-14
24-25 C2 D0 As 3-4
26-28 D1 As 12-14
29 D2 E0 F1
30 E1 F0
31-36 B4 C0 As 9-14
37-43 C1 As 24-30
44-46 C2 D0 As 12-14
47-48 D1 As 29-30
49 D2 E0 F0
50-53 A1 B0 As 1-4
54-63 B1 As 5-14
64-79 B2 As 15-30
80-98 B3 As 31-49
99-105 B4 C0 As 24-30
106-111 C1 As 44-49
112-113 C2 D0 As 29-30
114 D1 E0 F0
115-159 As 5-49, A&B values swapped
160-210 As 64-114, A&B values swapped
211-216 A0 B1 CD3 As 9-14
217-223 B2 CD3 As 24-30
224-229 B3 CD3 As 44-49
230-232 B4 CD3 As 112-114
233-254 As 211-232 with A&B values swapped
255 A1 B1 CD3 E0 F0
Table 5.9: The map showing how the message space is mapped to 256 signa-
ture patterns on G24.
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find a smaller generalised hash DAG that contained 256 compatible signature
patterns.
Theorem 5.20. By replacing the n leaves of a binary tree of order 2n − 1
with n copies of G24 we obtain a graph G24,n that admits a one-time signature
scheme capable of signing n-byte messages with an efficiency of 0.32.
Proof We can define a signature pattern function for G24,n that maps the
ith byte of the message to a signature pattern for the ith copy of G24 using
the map in Table 5.9. From Theorem 5.19 we can see by inspection that
these signature patterns for G24,n will be compatible and so form a signature
scheme.
We have (28)n signature patterns, one for every n byte message. The
graph G24,n has 24 vertices in each of the n copies of G24 and n − 1 vertices
in the tree. The efficiency of this scheme is therefore:
η =
log2(2
8n)
(25n− 1) + 1 =
8
25
= 0.32.
This scheme could be used to sign a 128-bit hash value with a total of
25× 128
8
− 1 = 399 calls to a hash function.
5.5 k-time signatures
In this section we extend the idea of one-time signatures to k-time signa-
tures. We first present some new results about the efficiency of k-time sig-
nature schemes. Then we define two new concepts: perforated and porous
k-time signature schemes. We note that there already exist k-time signature
schemes, which are both perforated and porous, and present a conceptual
design which is porous, but not perforated.
5.5.1 Efficiency of k-time signatures
Although the idea of a k-time signature scheme based on a generalised hash
DAG has been around for a while (for example [12]) there has not been much
work into developing the theory.
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Definition 5.21. A k-time signature scheme based on a generalised hash
DAG is a signature scheme that contains at least k signature patterns, and
knowledge of the values of up to k signature patterns does not allow a forgery
of any other signature pattern.
As an example, consider the DAG in Figure 5.17 on which the following
2-time signature scheme is based: ide, cje, cdk, fgh.
a
b
<<xxxxxxx
c
<<zzzzzzz
d
bbDDDDDDD
e
aaCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
f
OO
g
OO
h
OO
i
OO
j
OO
k
OO
Figure 5.17: A tree which admits a 2-time signature scheme.
We will represent the set of signature patterns for a k-time signature
scheme as Γk in order to highlight the difference in definition between a
k-time scheme and a one-time scheme.
We look at two different ways in which a k-time signature scheme can be
used:
1. The signatures may be used simultaneously or verified in a different
order to that in which they were sent.
2. The signatures for each message may be created and verified before the
next signature is released. We also assume that in this scenario, the
k messages are all different.
These two different scenarios result in different amounts of information
being signed. This can result in a k-time signature scheme having two dif-
ferent efficiencies depending on the way in which it is used. We present two
generalisations of the definition of efficiency for a one-time signature scheme.
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We give the efficiency η1 for Scenario 1 in (5.10). Our signature scheme
allows us to sign any k of the |Γk| possible messages. Consequently there are
a total of
(
|Γk|
k
)
ways to exhaust the signature scheme.
We give the efficiency η2 for Scenario 2 in (5.11). The amount of data
signed by the scheme increases from log2
(
|Γk|
k
)
bits to log2
(
k!
(
|Γk|
k
))
bits, as the ordering of the signatures is significant in Scenario 2.
In the following equations n is the number of vertices in the DAG on
which the k-time signature scheme is based:
η1(Γk) =
log2
(
|Γk|
k
)
n+ 1
; (5.10)
η2(Γk) =
log2
(
k!
(
|Γk|
k
))
n+ 1
. (5.11)
In the following two theorems we show that by using the first measure
of efficiency, no k-time signature scheme is more efficient than a one-time
signature scheme, but by using the second measure, some k-time schemes
are more efficient than any one-time scheme on the same DAG.
Theorem 5.22. If we use η1 as our measure of efficiency for a k-time sig-
nature scheme then, for any k-time signature scheme on any DAG G, there
exists a one-time signature scheme on G with at least the same efficiency.
Proof We consider the set of all sets of k compatible signature patterns
from Γk:
Θ = {θ : θ = {U1, . . . Uk} with Ui ∈ W (G)} .
There exists a supremum for any subset of W (G) as it is a lattice. We
claim that the set of signature patterns Υ = {sup(θ) : θ ∈ Θ} is a one-time
signature scheme with the same efficiency as the k-time signature scheme.
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We can see that Υ has at most |Θ| =
(
|Γk|
k
)
elements by considering
its design.
We can also show that Υ has at least |Θ| elements. If we assume the
opposite then there must exist distinct θ0 and θ1 such that sup(θ0) = sup(θ1).
This implies that from the signature patterns in θ0 we can compute the
supremum of the signature patterns in θ1. From the supremum of θ1 we can
compute all of the signature patterns in θ1, and so we can also compute them
from θ0. Since θ1 contains at least one signature pattern that is not in θ0 this
contradicts the definition of a k-time signature scheme (Defintion 5.21).
So |Υ| =
(
|Γk|
k
)
and the efficiency of the one-time signature scheme Υ
is the same as the k-time signature scheme Γk:
η(Υ) =
log2
(
|Γk|
k
)
|G|+ 1 = η1(Γk).
In Table 5.10 we show the set of supremums for the 2-time signature
scheme we described above, based on the hash tree in Figure 5.17.
We have proved that for any k-time signature scheme, there is a one-time
scheme on the same DAG whose efficiency (η1) is at least as good. Normally,
however, there will be a strictly more efficient one-time scheme than k-time
scheme on the graph. For example, for the DAG in Figure 5.17, the most
efficient one-time signature scheme contains seven signature patterns (cgk,
cjh, fdk, fje, idh, ige, fgh) but there is no k-time signature scheme with
as good efficiency (k ≥ 2).
Theorem 5.23. There exists a k-time signature scheme with unbounded ef-
ficiency (η2) as k tends to infinity.
Proof Consider a binary Merkle tree with (3k− 1) vertices and k leaves.
We can form a k time signature scheme on this tree by creating k signature
patterns, each containing exactly one of the leaves. The efficiency (η2) of
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this scheme is log2(k!)
3k
. Since log2(k!) ≈ k log2(k) − k (by Sterling’s approxi-
mation [38]) we can approximate the efficiency by 1
3
(log2(k) − 1), and so it
is unbounded as k tends to infinity.
We note that in practice this unbounded efficiency is not very relevant,
as the application would place an upper bound on the parameter k. However
it is interesting, even for small values of k.
In [10], Bleichenbacher and Maurer give a proof that no one-time signa-
ture scheme based on a tree has an efficiency greater than 0.42. Furthermore,
as we mentioned in Section 5.4.1, the most efficient one-time signature scheme
known has efficiency tending to about 0.47 as the size of the underlying DAG
tends to infinity. We now present a simple 5-time signature scheme whose
efficiency (η2) is greater than that under the assumptions made.
On a 17-vertex Merkle tree with six leaves we can form a 5-time signature
scheme using the method in Theorem 5.23. The efficiency of this signature
scheme is η = log2(720)
17+1
≈ 0.53. Since this signature scheme is based on a tree,
we know that any one-time signature scheme based on the same DAG has a
maximum efficiency of at most 0.42.
Sig. pattern from k-time scheme Supremum on the
First signature Second signature associated poset
ide cje ije
ide cdk idk
ide fgh igh
cje cdk cjk
cje fgh fjh
cdk fgh fgk
Table 5.10: For this example we use a 2-time signature scheme based on
the graph in Figure 5.17. If the signatures are used simultaneously (as in
efficiency measure η1) then a k-time signature scheme can be equated to a
one-time signature scheme on the same DAG. This table shows a 2-time sig-
nature scheme and the one-time signature scheme formed by the supremums
of its signature patterns.
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5.5.2 Perforated and porous k-time signature schemes
When looking at the security of any scheme, we make an assumption that the
adversary has only a finite time to perform an attack, and that any ‘attacks’
that take more than a certain amount of computation are not a concern.
All the schemes in this section take this assumption further. They all
start with a scheme that would be insecure in practice for small parameters
but, as the parameters increase, attacks on the scheme become as inefficient
as brute force attacks on the underlying hash functions.
We define two types of k-time signature scheme, perforated and porous
k-time signature schemes.
Definition 5.24. A perforated signature scheme is a signature scheme for
which there is a small chance that it is not possible to sign a particular
message.
Definition 5.25. A porous signature scheme is a signature scheme for which
some subsets of signatures will allow forgeries on another signature.
If a signature scheme is porous then we hope that any forgeries are only
existential forgeries, or that the adversary cannot find the corresponding
messages to the revealed signatures.
All the k-time hash based signature schemes from the literature that we
have seen are both perforated and porous [104, 108, 118]. In the next section
we provide a k-time signature scheme that is porous but not perforated, but
for which we have not been able to find a signature pattern function.
5.5.3 Towards a porous k-time signature scheme
In this section we will look at a conceptual design of a porous signature
scheme. This scheme provides a signature for every message, thus it is not
also perforated.
As we discussed in Section 5.5.1, it is possible to construct a k-time
signature scheme using a generalised hash DAG. We also discussed that the
measure of efficiency for such a scheme was dependent on the application.
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It is hard to design efficient schemes where groups of k signatures do not
reveal other valid signatures. However, (in a suitable security model) it is
enough that the adversary cannot forge a signature from k random signatures
for a message that they can find. In other words, we were concerned during
our earlier discussion of generalised hash DAG based signature schemes that
no new signature is revealed by the given signatures. In some situations, it
may be acceptable for such a signature to exist, provided that the adversary
cannot find a message that corresponds to it.
This would allow us to use a set of signature patterns which are not all
pairwise compatible, as long as it is hard, given a random signature pattern,
to find a different message whose signature pattern is computable from it.
This is potentially a useful observation, since it is often easy to enumerate
the set of all signature patterns, whereas it is often hard to enumerate a
maximal set of compatible signature patterns. A porous signature scheme
may thus be constructed, provided that we can find a signature pattern
function for a large set of mainly compatible signature patterns.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we looked at the applications of hash structures to message
authentication. We then studied one-time and k-time signature schemes
based on hash structures. We presented some results related to Vaudenay’s
rake one-time signature schemes. We proved that for any one-time signature
scheme on a hash tree, there exists an equivalent one-time signature scheme
on a sub-tree, where the sub-tree is the largest Merkle tree contained in the
original tree.
We presented a set of algorithms to efficiently find large signature schemes
on given generalised hash DAGs. We used these algorithms to find two
new one-time signature schemes, both of which are more efficient than any
previously proposed scheme. It is an open problem to find schemes that
are more efficient than ours, or which have similar efficiency but simpler
signature pattern functions. It is also an open problem to find the maximum
efficiency that a one-time signature scheme can attain.
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We investigated the definition of efficiency for k-time signature schemes,
and presented a two-part solution. We proposed two new definitions for k-
time signature schemes, perforated and porous. It is an open problem to
find a signature pattern function for our scheme of Section 5.5.3 in order to
construct a porous k-time signature scheme.
Chapter 6
Key establishment schemes
We begin this chapter with an introduction to key establishment schemes
and related definitions. We then study group key predistribution schemes,
group key distribution schemes and (briefly) group key agreement schemes.
We consider the use of hash structures in these applications and present some
new schemes. We end the chapter by looking at some methods which allow
the lifetime of a key to be extended using hash structures.
6.1 Introduction
In many applications we wish to provide a group of entities with a reliable
method by which they can establish a shared key. Key establishment is
studied by Martin in [79], and we adhere to similar notation and definitions.
The term key establishment refers to processes that ensure the correct
keys are present in the correct places within a network. Often this takes
place during the initialisation phase of a scheme, but it can also occur when
fresh keys need to be distributed. Most schemes that we consider will have
a trusted authority (or TA) denoted T , which is an entity that is trusted by
all members of the scheme.
Consider a set of users U = {U1, . . . , Un} who wish to obtain shared keys
with each other. We define a set C of subsets of U , called the communication
structure, such that for any A ∈ C we wish to establish a key kA that is
170
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shared by each user in A. The key kA is called the group key of A.
For any key establishment scheme we normally wish to prevent certain
sets of users colluding to compute group keys that they are not meant to
know. The set X of such sets is called the exclusion structure of the scheme
and is more precisely defined as:
X = {B ∈ U : B cannot compute kA if A ∩B = ∅ for all A ∈ C}.
A (t, w)-threshold key establishment scheme is a key establishment scheme
where C is the set of all sets of at most t users, and X is the set of all sets of
at most w users.
We define two specific types of collusion security: w-security, where
X = {All sets of at most w users}, and full collusion security where X =
{All sets of users}.
Any key establishment scheme can be broken down into three stages:
initialisation, key establishment and update.
1. Initialisation typically involves a TA creating the necessary values and
sending secret data to each user. A TA may also publish some values
which are available to everyone, which we denote by Pub.
2. The key establishment stage is where a group of users A ∈ C establish
their common key kA. This is the crux of the scheme, and different
types of schemes will involve different amounts of work and communi-
cation during this stage.
3. Finally, in some schemes there is an additional update stage where some
of the group keys are changed. This may involve the TA changing the
public data Pub, or the users computing new keys from information
they already have. Some users may have been revoked from the scheme,
or others may have joined, in which case the sets of users in C may have
changed. Alternatively in the case of key refreshment, the group keys
are simply updated with new values.
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We distinguish between different types of key establishment schemes.
• Group key predistribution schemes (or KPSs) are key establishment
schemes where the TA is only involved during the initialisation phase.
• Group key distribution schemes (or KDSs) are key establishment schemes
where the TA is involved during the key establishment phase.
• Group key agreement schemes (or KASs) are key establishment schemes
where group keys are primarily derived by the users.
Typically, KPSs will have no update phase, as most schemes designed
with update phases require the TA to be active during them. Often KASs to
have no initialisation phase, since they are commonly designed so that the
first communication between users is also the first time a key is needed, and
thus constitutes the key establishment phase.
Most of the schemes that we will encounter will guarantee a key for each
group in C. We call these schemes deterministic. In some schemes for a group
of users in C there is a small chance that they will not be able to generate
a group key. These schemes are called probabilistic (for example HARPS
[115]).
Schemes will be rated by several measures of efficiency:
• Secret storage — the amount of data that each user must keep secret.
We assume that all the secret data is stored in uniform size crypto-
graphic values and so we count the number of values instead of the
number of bits;
• Public communication — the number of cryptographic values that must
be made available to all participating parties during the scheme;
• TA (or user) computation cost — the amount of computation needed
to be done by the TA (or user).
For the computation costs, we assume that ‘basic’ operations (such as
exclusive-or and concatenation) take one unit of time, and we will often
treat them as negligible. We assume that a hash function requires tf units
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of time, and an encryption or decryption function requires tE units of time
(which will typically be larger than tf ).
We will give a joint analysis of the initialisation and key establishment
phases, but will address any update phases separately. This is because the
initialisation and key establishment phases will be performed once to set up
a key, whereas the update phases are likely to be performed repetitively, and
affect all users.
6.2 Group key predistribution schemes
In this section we look at key predistribution schemes, starting with some
simple benchmark schemes. We will then study some schemes based on hash
structures from Chapter 3, and see the potential advantages offered. Finally
we look briefly at the idea of key escrow, and we show how hash chains can
be used to provide it for most predistribution schemes.
6.2.1 Introduction
We begin with a formal definition of a predistribution scheme.
Definition 6.1. A (C,X )-key predistribution scheme (or KPS) is a
key establishment scheme with communication structure C and exclusion
structure X such that any user in A ∈ C can compute kA from the information
provided in the initialisation phase, and any set of users A′ ∈ X cannot
compute kA (assuming A
′ ∩ A = ∅).
We now describe two trivial key predistribution schemes.
Key Establishment Scheme 6.1: The most trivial KPS where each user
gets one key for each group they are in.
Initialisation
• T generates a key kA for each group A ∈ C.
• T securely sends kA to each user in A.
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Analysis
Secret storage Number of groups containing user
Public communication 0
TA computation cost 0
User computation cost 0
This scheme has full collusion security. There is no need for a key es-
tablishment phase; however the scheme suffers from being very expensive in
terms of user secret storage.
We now look at another trivial scheme that requires greater public storage
but less communication over a secure channel, and less secret storage for each
user.
Key Establishment Scheme 6.2: A KPS with minimal secret storage for
each user, but large public storage.
Initialisation
• Each user Ui is securely supplied with a master key Ki by T .
• T encrypts each group key with the master key for each user in it, and
publishes the result EKi(kA).
Key establishment
• If user Ui ∈ A (A ∈ C) wishes to obtain kA, they simply decrypt
EKi(kA).
Analysis
Secret storage 1
Public communication
∑
A∈C |A|
TA computation cost
∑
A∈C |A|tE
User computation cost tE
This scheme can be improved if C has a convenient structure by using
some session keys to encrypt session keys for larger groups. For example, if
group A is completely contained in group B then the members of group A
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would all be able to decrypt EkA(kB) and so T can publish this value instead
of the set of values {EKi(kB) : i ∈ A}.
A final fundamental scheme we will look at is Scheme 6.3, but first we
must define key distribution patterns.
Definition 6.2. A (C,X )-key distribution pattern (or KDP) is a set of
indices I = [0, v − 1] and a set of subsets of these indices B. Each user Ui is
assigned a subset Bi ∈ B such that for any A ∈ C and A′ ∈ X (A ∩ A′ = ∅)
we have ⋂
Ui∈A
Bi *
⋂
Uj∈A′
Bj.
Key distribution patterns were first studied by Mitchell and Piper in [87].
Key Establishment Scheme 6.3: A basic KDP-based KPS.
Initialisation
• T generates a sub-key xi for each index i ∈ I, and securely sends the
sub-key to user Uj if i ∈ Bj.
• T publishes the KDP, so each user can find out which sub-keys each
other user has been given.
Key establishment
• The group key kA for a group A ∈ C is computed from the group
sub-key index set BA =
⋂
Ui∈ABi as the following bit-wise exclusive-or:
kA =
⊕
j∈BA
xj.
Analysis
Secret storage |Bj|
Public communication
∑
j |Bj|
TA computation cost 0
User computation cost |Bj|
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It could be suggested that using exclusive or (XOR) to combine the sub-
keys xj leaves the scheme vulnerable, as a compromised key could reveal the
subkeys. This can be overcome by replacing XOR with a preimage resistant
hash function, but at the expense of more computation.
Two common types of key distribution patterns are the trivial inclusion
KDP and the trivial exclusion KDP, based on the communication structure
and the exclusion structure respectively.
To create a trivial inclusion KDP we have v = |I| = |C|. We as-
sume the communication set C = {A1, . . . , Av}. The index set is defined
as Bi = {j : Ui ∈ Aj}. When Key Establishment Scheme 6.3 is based on this
KDP, the only users with sub-key xj are precisely those in group Aj.
To create a trivial exclusion KDP we have v = |I| = |X |. We as-
sume the exclusion set X = {A′1, . . . , A′v}. The index set is defined as
Bi = {j : Ui /∈ A′j}. When Key Establishment Scheme 6.3 is based on this
KDP there is a sub-key owned by all the users not in A′j ∈ X , and so every
excluded set of users cannot form any group keys they are not meant to. The
trivial exclusion KDP was first given in [39].
6.2.2 Existing hash-based key predistribution schemes
In this section we explore key predistribution schemes based on hash func-
tions. Using some of the hash structures described in Chapter 3 we can
form key predistribution schemes that have better properties than the fun-
damental schemes in Section 6.2.1. We also note that there exist many key
predistribution schemes that are based on one-way trapdoor functions, such
as [13], [14] and [100]. These schemes are also better, in some respects, than
the schemes from Section 6.2.1. However we do not consider them further,
as schemes based on hash functions are typically more efficient and better
suited to light-weight devices.
6.2.2.1 Inverted hash tree key predistribution schemes (IHT KPS)
We present a new type of hash-based KPS, which we call inverted hash tree
key predistribution schemes. This scheme is a generalisation of a KPS scheme
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due to Lee and Stinson from [70], and many of their ideas also apply to our
new scheme.
Both our scheme and the original assign values to each user from a set of
inverted hash trees. In the original scheme, each user receives a value from
every tree. Our generalisation allows the TA to choose a subset of trees for
each user. This increases the range of KPSs that can be produced from a
given set of inverted hash trees.
Definition 6.3. For given C and X , and for a rooted tree G, we can form a
matrix M = (αi,j) with entries from (V (G) ∪∞). Vertex ∞ is considered a
descendant of all vertices in G. We formM with the jth column corresponding
to the user Uj and a row for each of b copies of the tree (for some value
of b). M is a (C,X ,G)-inverse hash tree key distribution pattern (IHT
KDP) if, for any disjoint sets A ∈ C, B ∈ X , there exist values κ(A,B) ∈
[0, b− 1] and λ(A,B) ∈ A such that the following two conditions hold:
1. ακ(A,B),λ(A,B) is a descendant of ακ(A,B),j for all Uj ∈ A;
2. ακ(A,B),λ(A,B) is not a descendant of ακ(A,B),j for all Uj ∈ B.
Figure 6.1 has an example of a (C,X ,G)-inverse hash tree key distribution
pattern for six users, where C and X are both the set of all subsets of at most
two users.
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Figure 6.1: An (C,X ,G)-IHT KDP for six users with b = 5. G is shown on
the left, and C and X are both the set of all subsets of at most two users.
The matrix M = (αi,j) is shown on the right.
Key Establishment Scheme 6.4 constructs a KPS from a IHT KDP.
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Key Establishment Scheme 6.4: An inverted hash tree key predistribu-
tion scheme (IHT KPS) based on a tree G and a IHT KDP M .
Initialisation
• T publishes M , G and the description of the hash function f .
• T generates b inverted hash trees (see Section 3.4.5), each based on the
tree G, and seeded from the root values {x0,0, . . . , xb−1,0}. The value at
vertex v of hash tree i is called xi,v.
• The value xi,∞ is always defined to be 0 and consequently does not
need to be sent to, or stored by, any users.
• T securely sends user Uj the values {xi,αi,j : i ∈ [0, b− 1], αi,j 6=∞}.
Key establishment
• To compute the group key for a group A ∈ C, a set of inverted hash
tree values are selected:
XA =
⋃
B∈X
xκ(A,B),ακ(A,B),λ(A,B) .
The set XA is the ‘most secret’ set of values that all the members of A
can compute.
• The group key for A ∈ C is defined as
kA =
⊕
x∈XA
x.
Analysis
Secret storage ≈ b
Public communication ≈ b|U|
TA computation cost 0
User computation cost |XA|
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We see from the properties in Definition 6.3 that all members of A can
compute the group key, and that for any excluded group B there is a part of
the group key they will not be able to compute, namely xκ(A,B),ακ(A,B),λ(A,B) .
Consequently the members of B will gain no information about the group
key.
Since the TA has to create an inverse hash tree for each row of the matrix
M , we prefer instances of M with fewer rows.
6.2.3 Hierarchies and key establishment schemes
It is often the case that a communication structure can be represented by a
poset, such as the one shown in Figure 6.2.
Definition 6.4. A security hierarchy is a poset of security levels S with the
relation of security. All users are associated with a set of security levels such
that, if a user is associated with a security level s ∈ S then they are also
associated with all lower security levels than s.
If we are creating a key establishment scheme for a hierarchy based on a
poset then we may be able to take advantage of the structure by making the
group keys relate to each other. In the given example, we could let the sales
director’s key be obtainable from the managing director’s key, reducing the
amount of information that the managing director needs to store.
A totally ordered hierarchy is such that all levels are comparable, that is
any pair of security levels s, s′ ∈ S are such that either s ≤ s′ or s′ ≤ s. A
tree-shaped hierarchy is such that for any two upper bounds s, s′ of a security
level, either s ≤ s′ or s′ ≤ s.
6.2.3.1 Tree-shaped hierarchy based KPS schemes
The earliest published KPS for a hierarchy is the scheme in [1] by Akl and
Taylor, which is designed for a totally ordered hierarchy. The members of
the smallest group are given a key x0, which is used to seed a hash chain, and
the ith value along the hash chain is used as the group key for the ith smallest
CHAPTER 6. KEY ESTABLISHMENT SCHEMES 180
group. Each user only needs to store one group key, from which all the other
keys they are entitled to can be computed.
Key Establishment Scheme 6.5: The KPS scheme for a totally ordered
hierarchy given by Akl and Taylor in [1]. We label the groups in C as {A0, . . . , Al}
such that Ai ⊆ Ai+1 for all i ∈ [0, l − 1].
Initialisation
• T picks a value x0 at random and uses it to seed a hash chain of length l.
• T securely sends x0 to all members of A0 and xi to all members of
Ai/Ai−1 (for 1 ≤ i ≤ l).
Key establishment
• A user who has been given xi can compute the group key for Aj as long
as j ≥ i. They compute the group key as f j(x0) = f (j−i)(xi).
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Figure 6.2: A Hasse diagram showing the hierarchy of a business. If there is
a path from security level A to security level B then any user with access to
security level A is allowed to read all documents produced at security level B.
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Analysis
Secret storage 1
Public communication 0
TA computation cost ltf
User computation cost ≤ ltf
Many authors have extended the above scheme to allow for tree-shaped
hierarchies [24, 124, 156, 157, 158], by which we mean a hierarchy such that
for any two sets Ai, Aj ∈ C which both contain the user Uk, we have either
Ai ⊆ Aj or Ai ⊆ Aj. Many of the above schemes define the hash function
for each edge in the inverted hash tree differently, but apart from that they
are all essentially Key Establishment Scheme 6.6.
Key Establishment Scheme 6.6: A key predistribution scheme based on
an inverted hash tree for tree-shaped hierarchies. We label the groups in C
as {A0, . . . , Av−1} such that if Ai ⊆ Aj then i ≤ j.
Initialisation
• T picks a value x0 at random and uses it to seed an inverted hash tree
with the same structure as C.
• T securely sends xi to all members of Ai\(
⋃
j<iAj) (note that each
user only receives one key).
Key establishment
• The group key for a group Aj is the inverted hash tree value at the
vertex corresponding to Aj.
• A user who has been given xi can compute the group key for any group
Aj that they are a member of. They compute the group key by applying
the appropriate sequence of hash functions.
Analysis
Secret storage 1
Public communication 0
TA computation cost |C|tf
User computation cost ≈ log |C| × tf
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This is a deterministic key predistribution scheme with minimal use of a
secure channel.
Another KPS for tree-shaped hierarchies is suggested by Ramkumar and
Memon in [116]. The scheme is an extension of HARPS, formed by restricting
the values a group can receive to be values from a subset of the chains that its
parent’s values are from. This restriction allows the parent group to derive
the child group’s key from its own secret information. This scheme differs
from Scheme 6.6 because it has a small chance of failing to provide a group
with a group key, as was also the case with HARPS [115].
6.2.3.2 General hierarchy-based KPS
The main problem with using hash functions for key predistribution schemes
comes if there is more than one covering element for a particular security level
(for example in Figure 6.2 ‘Production manager’ has two covering elements,
‘Sales director’ and ‘Project manager’). In this case it is infeasible for users
from all these security levels to be able to compute the same group key from
the different information that they have been given.
Using the ‘Production manager’ example from Figure 6.2, we need to give
the ‘Sales director’ and ‘Project manager’ groups distinct information which
can be used to find the ‘Production manager’ group key. One way to do this
is to use Key Establishment Scheme 6.6, ignoring the requirement for the
‘Project manager’ group to be able to compute the ‘Production manager’
group’s key, and then supply the ‘Project manager’ group with the required
key. This is a very practical scheme and for this example would be very
efficient; however it has the drawback that some users have to store more
than one key.
Another obvious, but inefficient scheme is to create two copies of all doc-
uments created by the ‘Production manager’ and ‘Production team’ groups.
These would be encrypted with different keys derived from the ‘Sales direc-
tor’ group key and the ‘Project manager’ group key. In our example this
would double the encryption time. It may also cause other problems with
version management for the organisation.
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The first attempt to solve this problem, while keeping user storage to a
minimum, was by Gudes in [45]. Gudes hoped to find collisions in the hash
functions at appropriate points, although did not explain how one should go
about finding the collisions. We note that if collisions are too easy to find
on a mapping where the codomain and domain are equal (here we have the
application of a hash function to its own range), then the potential key space
will be vulnerable to an exhaustive search attack.
A similar scheme is described in [157] by Zheng et al. The scheme requires
the existence of a family of functions U such that for r given inputs and one
given output it is easy to find a function in U that maps all the inputs to the
given output. This ‘collision’ property allows for all the parents to find the
child’s key, without compromising their own security. They also require that,
given this function, it is computationally hard to find the output without
knowledge of at least one of the inputs. This ensures that the child’s key
cannot be found trivially from the function, since it would be pointless to
use the function if this were the case.
Even if such functions are found then they are unlikely to be as efficient
as the scheme in the next section.
Other methods of extending Key Establishment Scheme 6.6 to general hi-
erarchies have been created by Zhong [158], Yang and Li [156] and Crampton
et al. [23].
6.2.3.3 Key predistribution for lattice-shaped hierarchies
In this section we present a scheme suitable for ‘lattice-shaped hierarchies’.
A d-dimensional lattice-shaped hierarchy is a hierarchy where every security
level A ∈ C has an associated set of indices (aA,0, . . . , aA,d−1), and A is strictly
more secure than B if aA,i ≤ aB,i for all i.
If we have a d-dimensional lattice-shaped hierarchy then we can use the
following new key predistribution scheme.
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Key Establishment Scheme 6.7: A key predistribution scheme suitable
for d-dimensional lattice-shaped hierarchies.
Initialisation
• T creates d hash chains (x0,0, . . . , x0,l0), . . . , (xd−1,0, . . . , xd−1,ld−1) of lengths
l0, . . . , ld−1, where:
li = max
A∈C
(aA,i) .
• T securely supplies each member of A ∈ C who is not also part of a
more secure group with the set {x0,aA,0 , . . . , xd−1,aA,d−1}.
Key establishment
• Any member who is in A and also in B, where A is more secure than
B, can compute the associated index set of B by hashing, because
aA,i ≤ aB,i for all i.
• The group key of A is ⊕
0≤i≤d−1
xi,aA,i .
Analysis
Secret storage d
Public communication 0
TA computation cost
∑
i litf
User computation cost ≤∑i litf
We note that this KPS is also suitable for hierarchies that are contained
within a lattice-shaped hierarchy. We give an example of this in Figure 6.3.
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(d) A x0,2 ⊕ x1,1 ⊕ x2,1
B x0,1 ⊕ x1,1 ⊕ x2,1
C x0,2 ⊕ x1,0 ⊕ x2,1
D x0,2 ⊕ x1,1 ⊕ x2,0
E x0,1 ⊕ x1,0 ⊕ x2,1
F x0,2 ⊕ x1,0 ⊕ x2,0
G x0,0 ⊕ x1,0 ⊕ x2,1
H x0,0 ⊕ x1,1 ⊕ x2,0
I x0,0 ⊕ x1,0 ⊕ x2,0
Figure 6.3: An example of applying Key Establishment Scheme 6.7 to a
hierarchy contained in a lattice-shaped hierarchy.
(a) The hierarchy which requires keys. I is the most secure group and A is
the least secure group.
(b) The lattice in which the hierarchy is contained. The boxed nodes corre-
spond to the groups in the hierarchy.
(c) The hash chains generated for Key Establishment Scheme 6.7 when used
with the lattice in (b).
(d) A table showing the group key for each group in the hierarchy.
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6.2.3.4 A generalisation to many more hierarchies
Using generalised hash DAGs (Definition 3.7) we can extend Key Establish-
ment Scheme 6.7 to many more types of hierarchy.
Key Establishment Scheme 6.8: Our key predistribution scheme based
on a generalised hash DAG.
Initialisation
• T creates a generalised hash DAG G.
• T securely supplies each member of A ∈ C who is not also part of a
more secure group with the corresponding MVS (Definition 5.10).
Key establishment
• Any member who is in A and also in B, where A is more secure than
B, can compute the MVS of B by hashing.
• The group key of A is the exclusive-or of all the values in its MVS.
Analysis
Secret storage |MVS|
Public communication 0
TA computation cost (Number of vertices− Number of sources)tf
User computation cost ≤ (Number of vertices− Number of sources)tf
We would like to use a small DAG whose associated poset W(G) con-
tains our hierarchy. We note that, for any given hierarchy, the algorithms in
Section 5.3 could be adapted to find a small DAG that is suitable.
An example of a hierarchy and a suitable DAG for that hierarchy is given
in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: On the left is a hierarchy, and on the right is a generalised hash
DAG which can provide keys with the relationship needed for the hierarchy.
6.2.3.5 Providing key escrow for key predistribution schemes
A consideration for key establishment schemes is that some applications re-
quire keys to be held in escrow by a third party. The third party will typically
only use the key if the user associated with that key does something wrong,
or is suspected of illicit behaviour. For example, a user’s key might be kept
secret by the third party until the law authorities obtain a court order to use
it.
In [58] Joye and Yen describe a scheme which allows the key escrow agent
to efficiently release a user’s secret keys for a particular time interval. The
TA gives each user the seeds to two hash chains x0 and y0, both of length n,
and defines the session key for time period ti as (xi ⊕ yn−i). The authors
refer to this construction as a ‘one-way cross-tree’.
If the authorities request access to key values between ti and tj (i <
j) then the TA can give them xi and yj, and then the authority can only
compute the requested group keys.
This scheme has the drawback that the TA cannot supply key values for
two separate intervals without also revealing all the session keys in between.
We observe that this scheme can be applied to any set of group keys
formed by a standard KPS. If the original KPS provides a group key kA then
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the key escrow version of the KPS uses two hash chains seeded by f(kA||0)
and f(kA||1) to compute session keys for the same group.
6.3 Group key distribution schemes
This section is mainly included for completeness; some of the most well known
uses of hash structures are key distribution schemes. Our contributions in
this section are to present a summary of some of the better KDSs, to propose
a ‘user add’ phase for a KDS from [21] (Scheme 6.9), and to present a flaw
in the update phase of a KDS from [63] (Section 6.3.3.3).
6.3.1 Introduction
Group key distribution schemes allow for some communication between the
TA and the users during the key establishment phase.
Definition 6.5. A (C,X )-key distribution scheme (or KDS) is a key es-
tablishment scheme with communication structure C and exclusion structure
X such that:
1. Any user in A ∈ C can compute kA from the information provided in
the initialisation phase ui and the information provided by T during
the key establishment phase vi,A;
2. Any group of users B ∈ X disjoint from A cannot compute kA from
the information provided to them during the initialisation and key es-
tablishment phases.
6.3.2 Different schemes for different applications
In this section we look at two very common scenarios which key distribution
schemes are applied to.
In the first scenario there is only one stream of data, and most users
in the scheme are assumed to want to receive it. Users may be added or
revoked from the stream. An example of this scenario is an encrypted digital
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TV channel (or package of channels). All users are assumed to want access
to the programmes, but some may forget to pay their subscription fee and
so may have their access temporarily revoked (or permanently revoked if
they opt out altogether). We will refer to schemes that fit this scenario as
revocation schemes, as the group key is known by all but a small number of
revoked users.
The second scenario may have several streams of encrypted data, each
with only a few users able to decrypt them. Each stream, each group mem-
bership and each group key, is not assumed to be related to other streams,
group memberships and group keys. Also, each stream has a short lifetime
compared to data streams in revocation schemes.
An example of this scenario is pay-per-view sporting events. Any users
who want to watch a particular game must pay to obtain a key for just that
event. Alternatively, the users who want to watch an event pay and then the
broadcast centre encrypts the game in such a way that only the subscribed
members can view it. The set of viewers for one event are not assumed to
have any links to the set of viewers for another.
We will refer to a scheme providing many groups with keys as a broadcast
encryption scheme.
Ideally the user set U for revocation and broadcast encryption schemes
should be adaptable during an update phase.
6.3.3 Logical key hierarchy
If the TA predistributes enough group keys, so that each user has at least
one key, then the TA can use a suitable subset of them to encrypt a universal
group key. This subset of keys is often referred to as a set of key encryption
keys (or KEKs).
One idea for a predistibuted set of group keys is to arrange the users as
the leaves of a tree (often a binary tree), and create a key encryption key at
each node in the tree. Each user receives all the key encryption keys along
the path from their leaf to the root.
A type of key distribution scheme based on a tree is the logical key hierar-
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chy (or LKH) and was independently proposed in [144] and [154]. It was first
suggested as being based on an almost perfect tree, but easily generalises to
any tree. Users are assigned a leaf of the tree and are privy to all the values
along the path from their leaf to the root.
By decreasing the height of the tree and increasing the average degree we
can reduce the storage requirements for each user, but increase the average
number of KEKs that must be used to send a message to an arbitrary set of
users.
6.3.3.1 Using hash structures for a logical key hierarchy
In [82], McGrew and Sherman proposed an improved version of the logical
hierarchy scheme based on [144] and [154]. In it they replace the independent
keys at each node with keys formed by a hash tree.
The hash function used by McGrew at al. to combine child key values c1
and c2 is M(f(c1), f(c2)), where f is a preimage-resistant hash function and
M is a mixing function. The authors suggest that exclusive-or is a suitable
choice for the function M , and for simplicity we assume this to be the case.
Another adaptation of the LKH is proposed in [19] by Canetti et al. The
scheme reduces the overhead required for user add and user revoke by defining
all new keys to be related to each other as values in a hash chain. In this
way, each user only needs to be told the most secure new value that they are
privy to, and from that they can compute all the others.
Although these schemes are designed for binary trees, they can be gener-
alised to other trees (for example see [63]). Canetti et al. [20] also generalise
the binary tree logical key hierarchy scheme to an a-ary tree scheme where
each leaf is associated with a small group of users.
In [117] Reddy and Nalla present a key agreement scheme similar to the
logical key hierarchy scheme, which uses the Diffie Hellman key exchange
method [34]. Their work is an extension of the two party ID-based authen-
ticated key agreement protocol in [130] to a many party scheme based on
a logical key hierarchy. The scheme has advantages over schemes based on
symmetric cryptography, but it is much slower and less suitable for use on
light-weight devices.
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6.3.3.2 The revocation scheme due to Chang et al.
A revocation scheme based on the LKH can be generated from the revocation
scheme described by Chang et al. in [21].
A maximum number of users 2N is specified. This is the number of key
sets in the system, and no user may be allowed to know more than one key
set. There are 2N keys {k0,0, k1,0, k0,1, k1,1, . . . , k0,N−1, k1,N−1}, and every key
set contains either k0,i or k1,i for all values of i.
Key Establishment Scheme 6.9: The revocation scheme described by
Chang et al. in [21].
Initialisation
• T generates 2N independent keys {k0,0, k1,0, k0,1, k1,1, . . . , k0,N−1, k1,N−1}
uniformly at random .
• For each user that registers to the group, T assigns them a uniqueN -bit
identifier XN−1XN−2 · · ·X0.
• The TA securely sends user XN−1XN−2 · · ·X0 all keys of the form kXi,i.
Key establishment
• The TA generates a session key SK and broadcasts it encrypted with k0,0
and again encrypted with k1,0, so that all users can obtain it.
Update — User revoke
• The TA considers the list of users to be revoked and finds a minimal set
of derived keys {κ0, . . . , κr−1}, such that all non-revoked users can find
at least one, while ensuring that all freshly revoked users cannot. Each
key κi is an exclusive-or of a subset of {k0,0, k1,0, . . . , k0,N−1, k1,N−1}.
This is not a simple problem, and the best method to solve it is outside
the scope of this document.1
1According to [21], the TA should use the Quine-McCluskey algorithm of [81].
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• The TA broadcasts the encryption
ESK(Eκ0(SK
∗), . . . , Eκr−1(SK
∗)).
In [21] the authors do not provide a method for user add, but we suggest
below an extension of the scheme to allow new users to join it.
Update — User add
• If there are already 2N users in the scheme then the new user is rejected
until one of the existing users leaves the scheme.
• The new user is assigned an unassigned N -bit identifier. If the user
has previously been part of the system then they must be allocated
the same N -bit identifier as they had previously. If this identifier is
currently allocated to another user then they may not presently rejoin
the scheme (otherwise they would know the keys from both key sets,
which would total more than N).
• The TA securely sends the new user the keys associated with their
identifier and the current session key.
Analysis
Base Add Revoke
Secret storage N No extra No extra
Public communication 0 0 ≈ r
TA computation cost 2tE 0 (r + 1)tE
User computation cost tE 0 2tE
We can use a result from Section 5.2.3.1 to improve the scheme further for
the TA. The TA’s storage can be vastly reduced by generating the 2n keys
from a master key kT known only to T . For example, we can set k0,i =
f(0||i||kT ) and k1,i = f(1||i||kT ). In this way the TA can easily compute any
of the keys from the master key, and knowledge of some of the user keys does
not compromise any others.
CHAPTER 6. KEY ESTABLISHMENT SCHEMES 193
Scheme 6.9 does not protect against collusion. If a freshly revoked user
colludes with any other revoked user then they will usually be able to compute
the new session key (there are some exceptions).
6.3.3.3 Key recovery for logical key hierarchies
Some key distribution schemes address the problem that occurs if a user
misses a key update message relevant to them (for example [77, 106]).
The simplest solution is for the user to request the current key encryption
keys from T . However each time T responds to such a request there is a large
communication cost incurred.
In [63] Kurnio et al. describe a variation of the LKH which solves the
problem more efficiently. We first give the underlying scheme, which is an
extension of the scheme in [20] due to Canetti et al. to allow for simultaneous
addition and revocation of users.
Key Establishment Scheme 6.10: The first key establishment scheme
described by Kurnio et al. in [63] for an a-ary tree.
Initialisation
• T creates an a-ary tree G with n leaves and assigns a random key xv to
each vertex v. Each user is assigned a unique leaf, and each value xv
is securely sent to all users whose leaf is a descendant of v. If a user’s
leaf is at depth d then they will receive d values.
• There is one KPS communication group per vertex:
C ′ = {Bv = {Ui : Ui’s leaf is a descendant of v}} .
Key establishment
• If T wants to communicate with a group A then he decomposes A into
a minimal set {Bv0 , . . . , Bvr} of disjoint subgroups in C ′.
• T picks a random session key kA.
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• For each subgroup Bvj , T encrypts kA with the group key xvj and
broadcasts Exvj (kA).
• Each user in A can decrypt precisely one of the encryptions of kA.
Update — Multiple user add and revoke
• T deletes the leaves of any revoked users and creates leaves for any new
users (this may require the creation of other vertices, depending on the
restrictions imposed on the shape of the tree).
• T deletes any vertices with only one child, and promotes the child
vertex to take their place.
• T creates a subtree of the vertices which the revoked users know the
value of, or which the new users need to know the value of. They then
split the subtree into a set of disjoint chains C.
• T creates a hash chain for each chain in C, seeded with a random value,
and assigns the hash chain values to the vertices of the chain.
• T sends any new user their leaf value.
• For every vertex in the subtree, T broadcasts an encryption of its value
with any child from main tree, except for parent-child pairs which are
part of the same hash chain.
We give an example of the multiple user add and revoke phase in Fig-
ure 6.5.
The full scheme from [63] also includes a key recovery system to counter
the problem of users missing the update messages. The system is designed
for the recovery of a single key, and so the full scheme is best considered as
a revocation scheme with the root key being the session key.
For each session key Ki, T creates two key recovery values, Pi chosen at
random, and Si = Ki ⊕ Pi. With the ith session update, the TA broadcasts
2t encrypted key recovery values, EKi(Pi−t, . . . , Pi−1, Si+1, . . . , Si+t). Since P∗
and S∗ are chosen with a random element, no information about session keys
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can be recovered from a single key recovery message. However a user can
recover session key Ki if they can find Pi and Si, by decrypting one of the
key recovery messages from sessions (i − t) to (i − 1), and one of the key
recovery messages from sessions (i+ 1) to (i+ t).
We present a flaw in the key recovery from the full scheme in [63]. We
will refer to the diagrams in Figure 6.5. We start with the left diagram
and assume that user U5 initially knows k10, k2 and k0, where k0 = K1 the
session key from the first session. Then the scheme is updated to give the
right diagram in Figure 6.5, but U5 does not receive the update message, and
consequently cannot decrypt anything during the second session, including
the re-keying information. Assume that for the next t sessions the changes
do not affect the key f(k′13) at the vertex U8 and U5 have in common, and
so U5 cannot recover any more information, including the t key recovery
messages. Consequently U5 has permanently missed the session information
from the second session. U5 will continue to miss another session for each
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U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7
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U1 U3 U4 U5 U8 U6 U7 U9
Figure 6.5: The left diagram shows the keys in the initial setup, and
the right diagram shows the updated diagram. User U2 is removed, and
users U8 and U9 are added. New keys are marked with a dash for clarity.
U8 and U9 are securely sent their leaf keys, and then T broadcasts the follow-
ing encryptions Ek6(k
′
15), Ek4(k
′
15), Ek10(f(k
′
13)), Ek11(f(k
′
14)), Ek12(f(k
′
14)),
Ef(k′14)(f
2(k′13)), Ef2(k′13)(f(k
′
15)), from which all users can update their keys.
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session that f(k′13) remains unchanged.
This problem can be overcome, but the only methods we have found
greatly increase the communication cost.
6.4 Group key agreement schemes
A third type of key establishment scheme that we will not consider in any
detail are group key agreement schemes. In these schemes users communicate
amongst themselves during the key establishment phase to derive group keys.
A typical scenario which is well suited for key agreement schemes, is secure
conferencing. Here users, who already ‘know’ or ‘trust’ each other, may wish
to communicate as a group in a secure environment.
A large proportion of these schemes are based on the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol [34].
If the group have access to a secure channel then one user can pick a
random group key and securely send it to the others. If the users do not
have access to a secure channel then the best known schemes that are secure
against eavesdroppers all use public key cryptography.
As hash structures do not appear to be of great use in key agreement, we
will not consider these further.
6.5 Extending the lifetime of a key
In this section we compare several hash-based key refreshment schemes. We
propose a scheme based on the pseudo-random number generator, and a
simple extension with improved efficiency.
6.5.1 Introduction
In many applications keys are refreshed periodically. This may be required
when new members join or members leave a group.
Also, assuming there is a brute force adversary who systematically guesses
the key, periodic key refreshment will increase the expected time before the
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key is guessed, as well as ensuring that the adversary can only use the com-
promised key for a limited time.
A key refreshment scheme is a scheme which facilitates the update of
group keys. Usually the update will be instigated by a trusted authority or
will be carried out periodically.
Although the literature is not consistent, we choose to define ‘backward
secrecy’ and ‘forward secrecy’ in what we believe to be the most standard
way (for example [35, 61]).2
Definition 6.6. A key refreshment scheme has backward secrecy if all
subsets of future session keys reveal no information about past session keys.
A key refreshment scheme has forward secrecy if all subsets of past
session keys reveal no information about future session keys.
Some key refreshment schemes derive the session key from a long term
secret, while others derive it from a secret value that is often updated. In both
cases each user stores more information than just the session key, so there
will be a difference between an adversary who discovers a session key and an
adversary who gains access to all the values held by a user. We propose the
following two definitions, which relate to the latter type of adversary.
Definition 6.7. A key refreshment scheme has strong backward secrecy
if it has backward secrecy, and an adversary who has access to all values held
by all current users cannot compute past session keys.
A key refreshment scheme has strong forward secrecy if it has for-
ward secrecy, and it is possible to revoke users from the scheme, such that a
collusion of all revoked users cannot compute future session keys.
We summarise each of the key refreshment schemes in this section with
a table. We denote the secrecy provided by the letters B, F, SB and SF for
backward, forward, strong backward and strong forward secrecy respectively.
For each scheme we also give the storage each user requires (as for the ‘com-
munication cost’ in Section 4.2.5). We also compare the computation needed
2We note that some authors swap the definitions of backward and forward secrecy (for
example [29]).
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to compute the next key from the existing one for each scheme (using the
notation from Section 6.1).
6.5.2 Key refreshment using the session number
For any key establishment scheme it is possible to refresh the group keys
by initialising the scheme again, and for some it is possible just to run the
key establishment phase again. However, if instead we use the group key as
a generator (or ‘master key’) for other keys, we can reduce the amount of
group communication required.
One of the simplest ways to do this securely is by using a preimage-
resistant hash function f to hash the session number with the master key to
form the session key.
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f(K||4) f(K||1)
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Figure 6.6: The session keys for the first five sessions as generated by Key
Refreshment Scheme 6.11.
Key Refreshment Scheme 6.11: Key refreshment using a session number.
We assume that each group A has a master key KA set up using a key
establishment scheme.
Key establishment
• In session s the session key for group A is kA,s = f(KA||s).
Analysis
User storage 3
Secrecy F,B
User computation cost tf
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A disadvantage of this scheme is that each user must store the master
key KA and also the session number s. Assuming each user is in a large
number of groups, and the session number is the same for all groups, then
storing one additional value is not much of a sacrifice.
Another shortcoming of the above scheme is that, although it offers back-
ward and forward secrecy, it does not offer strong backward or strong forward
secrecy.
6.5.3 A hash chain based key refreshment scheme
We can use a hash chain to achieve strong backward secrecy, removing the
need for each user to keep track of the session number.
Key Refreshment Scheme 6.12: A key refreshment scheme using a hash
chain based on a preimage-resistant hash function f in order to avoid each
user storing a session number. We assume that each group A has a master
key KA set up using a key establishment scheme.
Key establishment
• In session s the session key for group A is kA,s = f s(KA). However,
since the user already knows kA,s−1, they can compute the next session
key as kA,s = f(kA,s−1).
Analysis
User storage 1
Secrecy B, SB
User computation cost tf
Although this scheme is very suitable if strong backward secrecy is re-
quired, it is not suitable if it is possible that a key might be guessed or
leaked. If one session key is compromised then all future session keys are
also compromised.
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6.5.4 A chained pseudo-random number generator based
key refreshment scheme
A simple scheme which avoids the problem of a compromised session key
leaking the value of future session keys is to use the chained pseudo-random
number generator (Section 3.4.4).
Key Refreshment Scheme 6.13: A key refreshment scheme based on the
chained pseudo-random number generator. We assume that each group A
has a master key KA set up using a key establishment scheme.
Key establishment
• In session s the session key for group A is kA,s = f2(f s1 (KA)).
• Each user does not need to store the master key KA, but instead should
store the value xA,s = f
s
1 (KA) from the underlying hash chain (see
Figure 6.7). With this, the user can compute the next session key
as kA,s+1 = f2(f1(xA,s)).
Analysis
User storage 2
Secrecy F,B, SB
User computation cost 2tf
This scheme is much more resistant to compromised session keys than
Key Refreshment Scheme 6.12. If an adversary manages to obtain a session
key then it gives them no information about previous or future session keys.
It is slightly slower than the hash chain based scheme, requiring two hashes
per session, and it requires the user to store two values (the session key and
the hash chain value), but this should be efficient enough for all but the most
light-weight of applications.
Even though each session key does not reveal future session keys, the
chained pseudo-random number generator scheme does not provide strong
forward secrecy, as any user can compute all session keys ahead of the point
they join the scheme.
Any user joining the scheme will not be able to compute previous keys.
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Figure 6.7: The key refreshment values for group A using Key Refreshment
Scheme 6.13. The top row of values forms a hash chain. One value is stored
per session in order to derive future session keys.
We observe that Scheme 6.13 can be improved if all users are aware
when a user is added to the scheme. Users simply compute their keys as
in Scheme 6.11 until a user is added, at which point they hash the master
key, as in Scheme 6.13. An example of this scheme is given in Figure 6.8.
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// xA,2 //

ZZ666666666
DD · · ·
kA,1 kA,4 kA,5 kA,8
Figure 6.8: An extension of Scheme 6.13 so that users only need to compute
two hashes when a user is added.
6.5.5 Key refreshment with strong forward secrecy
If we require that a key refreshment scheme has strong forward secrecy then
we need to be able to revoke users. Consequently, it is a good idea to use a
revocation scheme to generate the group key. We can use any of the schemes
from Section 6.3.
Many revocation schemes will provide strong forward and strong back-
ward secrecy. They typically require much greater user storage than the
other key refreshment schemes that we have seen in this section.
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6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we compared several key establishment schemes. We pre-
sented a generalisation of an inverted hash tree key predistribution scheme
(KPS). We suggest that it would be of interest to find the optimal tree shape
for this scheme.
We presented a KPS for lattice-shaped hierarchy, and generalised it to
many more hierarchies. It is an open problem to find, given a hierarchy, the
most efficient DAG to form a KPS using Key Establishment Scheme 6.8.
We presented a flaw in the key recovery system of the key distribution
scheme by Kurnio et al. We also exhibited some key refreshment schemes
based on hash structures including the chained pseudo-random number gen-
erator, which we believe to be very well suited to light-weight applications.
Chapter 7
Other applications and future
work
In this chapter we provide a brief overview of several other cryptographic
applications of hash structures. In each case we feel that it may be possible
to make improvements on the techniques described in the current literature,
but have not had time to explore these in detail in this thesis.
7.1 Micropayment schemes
One of the best known uses of hash chains is in micropayment schemes.
A company that frequently deals with small amounts of money, such as a
mobile phone operator, could potentially suffer large administrative costs
if it processed these transactions every time. Micropayment schemes are
specifically designed to efficiently process large volumes of small payments.
One of the most well known micropayment schemes is Payword, which
was simultaneously developed by a number of different authors [50, 103,
119]. Note the similarity between this scheme and Entity Authentication
Scheme 4.9.
203
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Micropayment Scheme 7.1: A simplified version of Payword, with cus-
tomer A, service provider B and trusted authority T .
Initialisation
• A pays T the sum of n pence, which will be spent paying B in penny
increments.
• T S−→ A : x for some random value x.
• T A−→ B : fn(x).
Payment number i
• When A wants to pay B the ith penny, A sends B the hash chain
value fn−i(x).
• B checks that the hash of this value matches the value received in
payment i− 1, and stores fn−i(x) in place of fn−(i−1)(x).
Collection of payments
• Whenever B wishes to collect the payments to date, they send T the
most recent value that they have received.
• T hashes this value repetitively to compare with fn(x), and thereby
verify that it is part of the hash chain.
• T then pays B appropriately from A’s funds.
The basic idea is adapted or extended by other papers, for example [102]
and [60]. A scheme by Lin et al. [74] is based on Payword, but instead
uses values from a hierarchical chain construction as opposed to a hash
chain. We observe that many other n-time entity authentication schemes
from Chapter 4 could be extended into micropayment schemes (for example
Schemes 4.16, 4.18 and 4.19), however we have not had an opportunity to
analyse these fully.
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7.2 Auctions
A similar application to micropayments is auctions. Here the bidders provide
the auctioneer with commitments to pay, as opposed to actual payments. An
example of an auction scheme that makes use of a hash chain for these com-
mitments is given in [135]. This scheme is for an English auction. However
other types of auction exist, including the first-price sealed-bid auction.
Definition 7.1. An English auction is an auction in which the auctioneer
accepts increasingly higher bids, until no competing bidder improves on the
current bid (within some reasonable time). The item is sold to the highest
bidder at a price equal to their bid.
Definition 7.2. A first-price sealed-bid auction is a two-phase auction
in which all bidders privately submit their bids during the bidding phase,
after which the auctioneer views the bids and determines the highest bidder
during the opening phase. The item is sold to the highest bidder at a price
equal to their bid.
Suzuki et al. use hash chains to facilitate an online first-price sealed-bid
auction in [136].1 Their hash-based scheme has a major advantage over any
traditional physical implementation. In a traditional physical scheme the
second phase must either be made public, in which case rival parties will find
out important information about one another’s valuations, or kept secret,
in which case the bidders are forced to trust that the auctioneer has not
colluded with any of the bidders. In the hash-based scheme all users can be
assured of the auction’s correctness, without losing bids being revealed. We
now give a simplified version of their scheme.
1In fact their scheme is better described as a Dutch auction, which in theory should
have the same outcome as a sealed-bid first-price auction [80]. A Dutch Auction is an
auction in which the auctioneer starts with a high asking price and gradually lowers it
until a bidder is willing to accept the auctioneer’s price.
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Auction Scheme 7.2: A simplified version of the first-price sealed-bid auc-
tion from [136]. The auctioneer advertises the lot being auctioned, together
with some system parameters: a maximum price ofm pence, which should be
chosen higher than anyone will bid, and two distinct bit strings zyes and zno.
Bidding phase
• Each bidder makes their valuation of the lot: p pence (p < m). Each
bidder chooses a seed at random xp−1. They create a chain with values:
xp = f(zyes||xp−1);
xi = f(zno||xi−1), for p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
• Each bidder securely sends xm to the auctioneer.
Opening phase
• The auctioneer announces each price decreasing from (m− 1) pence.
• At i pence, each bidder sends the value xi to the auctioneer.
• The auctioneer checks if xi+1 = f(zno||xi) for each user. If this holds
for all users then the auctioneer announces the next price (i−1 pence).
• If the values do not match then the auctioneer checks if xi+1 = f(zyes||xi).
If this is the case, they announce the end of the auction and the win-
ning bid. Otherwise the bidder has not submitted a valid chain and
the auctioneer should take appropriate action.
In [110], Prakobpol and Permpoontanalarp present a variation of the
previous scheme using a hierarchical chain construction. In [99], Omote and
Miyaji present an auction scheme using hash chains differently; each chain
value is used to mask a digit of a user’s bid.
In 1961, Vickrey proposed an alternative to the first-price sealed-bid auc-
tion, which has become known as the Vickrey auction [143].
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Definition 7.3. A Vickrey auction (or second-price sealed-bid auc-
tion) is a two-phase auction in which all bidders privately submit their bids
during the bidding phase, and then the auctioneer views the bids and deter-
mines the highest bidder during the opening phase. The item is sold to the
highest bidder at a price equal to the second highest bid.
Any computational implementation of a Vickrey auction must address is-
sues that do not affect first-price sealed-bid auctions [123]. One such example
is that a corrupt auctioneer must not be able to insert additional bids after
the opening phase has begun, otherwise they could insert a bid between the
highest and second highest bids in order to increase their revenue.
Many Vickrey auction schemes exist, including several that do not depend
on public key cryptography [17, 75, 90]. However all of these solutions require
multiple independent auctioning authorities, and some reveal private bid
values to some of these authorities (ideally in a Vickrey auction only the
second highest bid should be obtainable).
We created a draft Vickrey auction scheme using hash chains, based on
Auction Scheme 7.2, but it is prohibitively costly in terms of computation.
It remains an open problem to design a hash-based Vickrey auction with a
single auctioneer, such that all bidders can be satisfied that the auction has
been carried out correctly [139].
7.3 Pseudo-random number generation
As mentioned in Section 2.4, randomness is intrinsically linked with hash
functions, and many applications of hash functions require their outputs to
be pseudo-random. There are several well-known ways of generating pseudo-
random numbers using a hash function.
Perhaps the most common technique for generating a pseudo-random
sequence {x0, x1, . . .} is using a star-shaped inverted hash tree defined as
follows:
xi = f(s||i), where s is the seed.
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In Section 6.5.2 we saw how this method of generating pseudo-random
numbers could be used for key refreshment.
In Section 4.3.3 we saw that in some situations it may be appropriate to
use the chained pseudo-random number generator (Definition 3.10). However
this scheme will suffer if the underlying hash chain is comparable in length
to the size of the hash’s range (see Section 3.1.4.5 for more details).
Other methods of combining hash functions to create pseudo-random
numbers exist, including [46] and [133].
If a hash function can be used to generate pseudo-random numbers from a
seed then it can also be used to encrypt a message. Many stream ciphers use
the key as a seed to generate pseudo-random numbers, and then exclusive-or
it with the message. One recent example of a stream cipher that is based on
a hash function in this way is Salsa20 [8].
7.4 Information sealing
In this section we look at two methods of sealing information. The first
allows information to be kept secret for a certain amount of time, and the
second facilitates the efficient release of consecutive records from an ordered
set of data.
7.4.1 Time-release cryptography
In certain applications it may be useful to seal a piece of information such
that it can only be read after a certain amount of time has passed. For
example, in a sealed-bid auction, a bidder may want to keep their bid secret
until the opening phase.
In [120] Rivest et al. suggest that a trusted agent T using a hash chain
could provide a service where they respond to two types of request. If a user
asks for the current hash chain value, T will provide it. From this value
the user can compute all previous hash chain values. If the user asks T to
encrypt a message m so that it can be decrypted at time t, then the agent
will respond with the encryption Ekt(m), where kt is the hash chain value
that will be released at time t.
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7.4.2 Interval release cryptography
In Section 6.2.3.5 we saw a scheme from [58] which facilitated the possibility
of interval release cryptography. A server creates two hash chains x∗ and y∗,
each of length n. From these, the server defines an ordered list of keys of
the form (xi ⊕ yn−i). The server can then provide a user with two values xi
and yj, and using these values the user can find keys for the interval [i, j].
We note that this can easily be extended to more dimensions by using
two more hash chains for each additional dimension.
For example, pixel data in a video may have the three dimensions column,
row and time. The video’s owner can create six hash chains xcolumn,∗, xrow,∗,
xtime,∗, ycolumn,∗, yrow,∗, ytime,∗ and use these to create a key for each pixel of
the form: xcolumn,c ⊕ xrow,r ⊕ xtime,t ⊕ ycolumn,C−c ⊕ yrow,R−r ⊕ ytime,T−t.
The video’s owner can then provide the same copy of the video to many
users, but provide them with a different viewing configuration. One user may
pay for widescreen access, while another may pay to see extended footage.
The owner only needs to send six hash chain values for any configuration
that a user pays for.
7.5 Generating rainbow tables
Lastly we consider a very different application of hash structures. Many pass-
word based applications store the hash of the password (computed using a
preimage-resistant hash function f), as in Entity Authentication Scheme 4.3.
Assuming the user is allowed to choose their own password, there is a reason-
able chance that it will be found in a dictionary, or list of common passwords.
Typically, a search of these lists will be computationally easy, especially
compared to the computationally infeasible task of a search of all potential
passwords.
In some scenarios the adversary may be able to obtain the hash of the
password, and may wish to avoid submitting large numbers of incorrect pass-
words. An efficient way to find the password is using rainbow tables [97].
To form a rainbow table, we use the hash function f and a family of
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reduction functions g∗ with domain equal to the range of f , and range equal
to the list of common passwords L. The rainbow table x∗,∗ has r rows and
(l + 1) columns, and has entries from L defined by:
xi,j =
{
a random member of L if i = 0
gi(f(xi−1,j)) otherwise.
We note that by considering the combination of the hash function and the
reduction function as a new hash function, each row of the rainbow table x∗,j
is a rainbow chain of length l (Definition 3.8).
To reduce the memory required to store the rainbow table, only the first
and last columns are stored (that is {x0,∗} and {xl,∗}).
If a password is hashed somewhere in our rainbow table then we can find
the password p from the hash output f(p). We search each column of the
table in turn by applying the appropriate sequence of reductions and hashes
to f(p), and check to see if the result is a member of {xl,∗}. If it is, then
we find the first value of that row, and hash and reduce until we obtain the
preimage p.
The precursor to rainbow tables was based on hash chains [51]; however
rainbow chains are better suited to this application.
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we gave an overview of the application of hash structures to
micropayments, auctions, pseudo-random number generation, interval release
cryptography and hash preimage computation, and indicated several open
problems.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this thesis we have considered many applications of hash functions and
hash structures to cryptography.
We began in Chapter 2 by examining the definitions of types of hash
function, and found that there exists a certain amount of conflict in the
literature. We presented a set of three definitions suitable for this thesis.
We explored the relationship between hash functions and pseudo-random
functions. We suggested a parameterisation of hash functions by security
and output size. We summarised the progress made by NIST in defining
properties required from a new hash function SHA-3.
In Chapter 3 we presented a toolkit of hash structures, which we believe
to be the first comprehensive overview of its kind. We briefly studied the
relationship between the properties of a hash function and the hash chain
formed from it. We compared infinite-length hash chains with hash chains
and observed that infinite-length hash chains are less suitable for use in
restricted environments. We made a distinction between hash trees and
Merkle trees, and defined a useful type of tree, the almost perfect a-ary
tree. We gave a formal definition of a generalised hash directed acyclic graph
(DAG).
In Chapter 4 we studied entity authentication, and the schemes that can
be formed using the hash structures from Chapter 3. We also presented a new
notion of public verifiability, and several hash-based schemes which possessed
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it. We identified two adversaries that were useful in comparing existing
and new entity authentication schemes. We presented a novel hash-based
scheme with minimal storage requirements for authenticating and verifying
parties. We created two new entity authentication schemes which provide
entity authentication to many verifying parties. We showed a relationship
between the use of Merkle trees in a entity authentication scheme and a one-
time signature scheme. We suggested an extension of the hierarchical chain
construction to an entity authentication scheme suitable for sensor networks.
We also suggested entity authentication schemes based on sandwich chains,
comb skipchains and hash chains with breakpoints.
In Chapter 5 we studied the application of hash structures to signature
schemes. We compared one-way trapdoor based signature schemes with hash-
based one-time signature schemes. We proved that any set of Vaudenay’s rake
signature patterns with constant average chain position is a signature scheme.
We then proved some results about the size of these signature schemes. We
showed that for a given signature space size there is not a unique best choice
for the optimal Vaudenay’s rake signature scheme used. We proved that for
any signature scheme based on a hash tree there is another signature scheme
based on a Merkle sub-tree that has the same number of signature patterns.
We then presented a novel algorithm to find a large one-time signature
scheme based on a given hash structure. We also presented a scheme to
find the largest signature scheme, although this proved prohibitively slow for
large structures. We used our algorithms to explore the relationship between
the number of vertices in a graph, and the efficiency of one-time signature
scheme that it admitted. We generalised a scheme by Bleichenbacher and
Maurer and demonstrated that the original scheme is the most efficient in
the limit. We created two efficient one-time signature schemes, which also
have simple message to signature space maps. These signature schemes are
the most efficient such schemes that we know of. We also explored k-time
signature schemes, and presented the concepts of perforated and porous k-
time signature schemes. We studied the definition of efficiency for k-time
signature schemes, and presented two useful definitions. We suggested a new
method for the construction of a porous k-time signature scheme.
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In Chapter 6 we studied the application of hash structures to key estab-
lishment schemes and compared many key predistribution and key distrib-
ution schemes (KPSs and KDSs) from the literature. We combined ideas
from two key predistribution schemes to create the inverted hash tree KPS.
We presented a hash chain based KPS for lattice-shaped hierarchies. We
generalised this scheme, replacing hash chains with generalised hash DAGs,
making the scheme suitable for use with many other hierarchies. We ob-
served that a key escrow scheme by Joye and Yen can be applied to any set
of group keys formed by a KPS. We improved a scheme by Chang et al. to
facilitate the inclusion of new users and to reduce the storage space required
by trusted authority. We presented a flaw in a KDS due to Kurnio et al.
We noted the inconsistency in the literature over the definitions of forward
and backward secrecy. We proposed definitions of strong forward and back-
ward secrecy, and used these definitions to compare several hash-based key
refreshment schemes. We proposed a key refreshment scheme based on the
chained pseudo-random number generator, and a simple extension to improve
its efficiency.
In Chapter 7 we briefly studied the application of hash structures to
several other areas of cryptography, including micropayments, auctions and
pseudo-random number generators. We also mention hash structure based
schemes for interval release cryptography and preimage computation. We
generalise an interval release scheme due to Joye and Yen to many dimen-
sions.
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Appendix A
Algorithms
Algorithm 5:
Description: An algorithm to output all the paths in a DAG
G with source set S(G) and sink set P (G).
Find paths(G, S(G), P (G))
(1) foreach vertex in S(G)
(2) Create a new list starting with this vertex.
(3) while the previously considered vertex is not in P (G)
(4) Append the first child of that vertex to the list.
(5) print the list as a path of G
(6) Set Pointer to point to the last but one vertex of the
path.
(7) while Pointer points to a vertex
(8) if the vertex pointed to by Pointer has an older
child than the child used in the previous list
(9) Create a new list by copying all the vertices in
the previous list up to and including the one
pointed to by Pointer
(10) while the previously considered vertex is not in
P (G)
(11) Append the first child of that vertex to the
list
(12) print the list as a path of G
(13) Set Pointer to point to the last but one vertex
of the path
(14) else
(15) Set Pointer to point to the previous vertex in
the previous path.
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Algorithm 8:
Description: An algorithm to output all minimal verifiable
sets which is very often more efficient than Algorithms 6 and 7
Input: A list of all the paths in G, An empty set (PartialMVS)
Output: A list of all the minimal verifiable sets in G
Find minimal verifiable sets(Paths, PartialMVS)
(1) while we still have at least one path
and all paths still contain vertices
(2) if no vertex is in all paths and the shortest path has
length at most one
(3) foreach non-empty subset U of the shortest
path Pˆ
(4) Append the vertices in U to PartialMVS.
(5) Make a temporary set of paths TempPaths to
pass to the next recursion.
(6) Copy all paths from Paths to TempPaths which
do not contain vertices in U .
(7) foreach vertex v in Pˆ and not in U
(8) Remove all references to v in TempPaths.
(9) Find minimal verifiable sets(TempPaths,
PartialMVS)
(10) Remove the vertices in U from PartialMVS.
(11) return
(12) else if it is currently better to consider the vertex v∗
which appears in the most paths
(13) Append vertex v∗ to PartialMVS.
(14) Make a temporary set of paths TempPaths to pass
to the next recursion.
(15) foreach path P in Paths
(16) if P does not contain v∗
(17) Copy P to TempPaths.
(18) Find minimal verifiable sets(TempPaths,
PartialMVS)
(19) Remove vertex v∗ from PartialMVS.
(20) Remove all references to vertex v∗ from all the lists
in Paths.
(21) if Is set minimal and verifiable(PartialMVS)
(22) print PartialMVS
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Algorithm 9:
Description: An algorithm to construct the associated poset
on the set of minimal verifiable sets MVS(G) ordered by com-
putability.
Input: A list of the minimal verifiable sets of G, A list of the
paths in G.
Output: An array containing the poset relations between the
members of MVS(G).
Find associated poset(MVS(G), Paths(G))
(1) Create an array to contain the poset rela-
tions Poset[MVS(G),MVS(G)].
(2) Initialise all entries of the form Poset[i, i] to EQUAL,
and all others to UNKNOWN.
(3) foreach distinct pair of minimal verifiable sets i and j
(4) foreach path P in Paths(G)
(5) Set pi to the vertex in P and i nearest the source
of P .
(6) Set pj to the vertex in P and j nearest the source
of P .
(7) if pi is nearer the source of P than pj
(8) if Poset[i, j] = UNKNOWN
(9) Poset[i, j] = LOWER
(10) Poset[j, i] = HIGHER
(11) else if Poset[i, j] = HIGHER
(12) Poset[i, j] = INCOMPARABLE
(13) Poset[j, i] = INCOMPARABLE
(14) else if pj is nearer the source of P than pi
(15) if Poset[j, i] = UNKNOWN
(16) Poset[j, i] = LOWER
(17) Poset[i, j] = HIGHER
(18) else if Poset[i, j] = HIGHER
(19) Poset[j, i] = INCOMPARABLE
(20) Poset[i, j] = INCOMPARABLE
(21) print Poset
In Algorithm 9 we use the following constants UNKNOWN, EQUAL,
HIGHER, LOWER and INCOMPARABLE. If Poset[i, j] is set to HIGHER
then i is computable from j. If Poset[i, j] is set to LOWER then j is com-
putable from i. If Poset[i, j] is set to INCOMPARABLE then i and j are
not computable from each other.
